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I. The gist of the thesis: atomism versus holism 
Do you have self-knowledge of your intention to be at work on time tomorrow if you've 
had a rew drinks too many? Do you know that you want a divorce if you express your desire 
during a fit of anger? Do you know your own desires, hopes and beliefS if you're depressed, 
insecure or got out ofbed on the wrong side? Do you have self-knowledge of your desire 
to buy a healthy quinoa salad rather than fish and chips for lunch ifit's evident that you've 
been 'nudged' into doing so? Do you have self-knowledge of your belief that having a baby 
boy is better than having a baby girl if you've been manipulated by state propaganda? 
These are fundamental and difficult questions about self-knowledge and about 
what it means to know your own beliefs, desires, hopes, intentions and other attitudes. 
The answers to these questions are by no means obvious. The aim of this thesis is not 
to provide a concrete answer to such questions, but rather to ask what is required in 
order to answer them. More specifically, the aim is to explore whether contemporary 
philosophical theories of self-knowledge have the materials to handle such questions 
in a satisfactory manner, i.e. in a way that respects their subtleties and intricacies. 
The current philosophical debate on self-knowledge is mostly concerned 
with the question of whether self· knowledge is a matter of lookinB into our minds 
(introspectionism), interpretinB our minds (interpretivism), speakinB our minds 
(expressivism) or makinB up our minds (rationalism). Hence, when working on 
self· knowledge, one of the first questions one is confronted with is whether one 
is an 'introspectionist', 'interpretationist', 'expressivist', 'rationalist' or perhaps 
a 'pluralist' of some sort.' In other words, much of the current self-knowledge 
According to introspectionist or 'hybrid' introspectionist accounts, self-knowledge is a matter of inner looking 
or 'detecting' one's own mental states (e.g. Armstrong rg68; Lycan 1996; Goldman 1993; 2oo6; Nichols and Stich 
2003; Rosenthal 2005; Peels forthcoming). Self-ascriptions or second-order beliefS about one's first-order state 
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debate focuses on the methods or procedures of self-knowledge- their differences, 
similarities and (in)compatibilities.' 
The focus of this thesis will instead be on what appears to be a widely shared 
though implicit assumption, which I'll refer to as the assumption of atomism 
regarding self-knowledge. This is an assumption about what is required for 
someone to acquire knowledge of her attitudes. The atomist assumption comes 
down to this: following the theorist's preferred procedure or method (such as 
speaking or making up one's mind) is sufficient for a subject to acquire knowledge 
of her attitudes. The alternative 'holist' approach can be understood negatively as 
the reverse of atomism: the mere following of any of these standard methods or 
procedures by itself does not guarantee that they will yield self-knowledge. 
The plan is to articulate and problematize the atomist approach to the question 
of self-knowledge. More specifically, my aim is to address the preconditions of self-
knowledge, which I will address by asking under what circumstances following some 
particular method is actually knowledge-conducive. In so doing I will concentrate, 
specifically, on the expressivist and rationalist accounts. 
The atomist view as I have just described it is a caricature, which, I take it, hardly 
anyone will be happy to defend. In recognition of this fact, I distinguish between 
two types of atomism. According to what I'll call a radical atomist approach to self-
knowledge, the question of whether the ascription of a belief or other attitude to 
oneself counts as self-knowledge is independent of the circumstances under which 
one followed method X: there are no 'bad' circumstances of self-knowledge. So even 
someone who is depressed, in a fit of anger, manipulated by state propaganda, under 
the influence of mind-altering substances, hypnotized or tortured still has knowledge 
ofher attitudes, as long as she arrived at her self-ascription in the 'right' way. 
are understood as 'descriptions' or 'reports' of underlying states. Interpretationists and/or inferentialists think 
that one's second-order belief is the result of an (unconscious or sub-personal) process of self-interpretation, a 
process of'first-person mindreading' or a process ofinferences made on the basis of evidence (Bern 1972; Gopnik 
1993; Carruthers 2009; 2ou; Schwit2gebel2001; 2010; 2012; 2013; 2016; Lawlor 2003; 2009; Cassam 2010; 2on; 
2014; 2015). Expressivism, rationalism and interpretivism will be explained in detail in the chapters to come. I will 
not discuss pluralist accounts in this thesis, but see, for example, Andrews (2015), Samoilova (2015) and Coliva 
(2016). 
2 A brief note on terminology: the notion of a method or procedure can be understood either in a narrow way, as 
referring to a way of doing something step by step or on the basis of a pre-established manual or recipe or, more 
broadly, as 'a way of doing something' or an 'act or a manner of proceeding in any action or process'. I shall 
understand the notions of methods or procedures in the latter, broader, sense, i.e. as a way of doing something, 
more specifically as a way of making or arriving at a self-ascription or coming to judge or coming to believe that 
one cps that P. 
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This view is a caricature, I think, because most philosophers working on self-
knowledge will allow, implicitly or explicitly, that there are at least certain 
circumstances in which a self-ascription does not count as self-knowledge even if 
the appropriate method is followed. If, say, a 'mentalist' like Derren Brown were to 
hypnotize you into thinking you're a chicken, and you go on to think you need to 
brood your eggs, then, in some sense at least, you lacked knowledge of your beliefs, 
desires or intentions, such as not wanting to be made a fool of, the belief that you are 
not a chicken, the desire to be unhypnotized, and so on. The sort of self-knowledge 
you have while hypnotized is only knowledge of your occurrent thoughts.J 
Hence, I shall distinguish radical atomism from what I call moderate atomism, 
which can be understood as a 'hedged' version of atomism. It is moderate atomism 
that I shall be centrally concerned with. A moderate atomist claims that even though 
there are certain extreme circumstances in which a self-ascription does not count 
as self-knowledge, in 'normal', 'standard' or the 'right' conditions, the proposed 
method is indeed knowledge-conducive, i.e. will allow the subject to know what 
her attitudes are. The crux of the difference, then, between moderate atomism and 
holism is that even the moderate atomist agrees with the holist that radical atomism 
is mistaken; s/he thinks that the success of some or all of the above-mentioned 
methods can be said to hold ceteris paribus, that is, all else being equal, right or 
normal, or in the absence of countervailing forces or disturbing factors. Whereas 
a moderate atomist thinks that we can talk meaningfully about 'exceptions to the 
rule', I will try to make a case for the idea that in the end, the exceptions are the rule. 
The moderate atomist thus proceeds to concern herself with 'matters of method' 
and questions regarding procedures by appealing to certain ceteris paribus clauses. 
This, in tum, allows her to deal with, i.e. set aside, the sort of cases mentioned at the 
beginning of this introduction. We can ignore angry spouses, tipsy colleagues and 
depressed friends in our philosophical theories of self-knowledge because they're 
the exception to the rule, and they do not generalize in such a way that would require 
abandoning moderate atomism and moving towards a holist approach. The main 
challenge for the moderate atomist is to appeal to some non-arbitrary cut-off point 
between normal and abnormal circumstances and to define the right circumstances 
in a way that does not beg the question, i.e. does not define countervailing forces in 
terms of self-ignorance or self-deception. 
3 I say a bit more about the thought/attitude distinction below. 
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It's important to stress from the outset that I will not argue for the alternative holist 
account of self-knowledge directly, only indirectly by arguing against moderate 
atomism. I will argue that the moderate atomist's appeal to normal circumstances 
is hard to maintain, and that, in the end, the (implicit) ceteris paribus clauses end up 
doing all of the work to determine the question of whether or not someone has self-
knowledge. The argumentative strategy pursued in this thesis, then, is to show that 
moderate atomism is not a stable position and that it collapses into either radical 
atomism or holism. 
The notions of'atomism' and 'holism' will probably be familiar to most readers, 
given that these labels are often used in other areas of philosophy. The distinction 
between the two has, for instance, been applied to issues surrounding theories 
of meaning (Fodor and Lepore 1992; Hutto 2008), personal identity (Schechtman 
1990; Slors 2001), personhood and individual agency (Hobbes 1651; Pettit 1996; 
1996; Stoljar 2015), moral responsibility (Vargas 2013) and (moral) reasons for 
action (Dancy 2004; 2007). As I will understand these terms, atomism and holism 
are labels used to specifY the role that circumstances play.4,s 
Applied to self-knowledge, atomism can have either of two sources. One is to 
be a 'constructivist' and think that some procedure or method M (e.g. making up 
one's mind) constitutes one's attitudes and that by constituting one's attitudes in this 
way, one automatically comes to know about them. A radical atomist constructivist 
thinks that by following M one always constitutes one's attitudes one thereby knows 
4 Dancy gives the following description of the distinction, as applied to (moral) reasons for action, which is in line 
with the present project: "Atomism holds that any feature that is a reason in favour of action in one case will always 
be a reason in favour of action wherever it occurs. The same feature always makes the same reason; or, a reason is 
a general reason. This theory is false; something that is a reason in fuvour of action in one case may in another case 
be no reason at all, or even a reason against action. It all depends on the circumstances; reasons are sensitive to 
context" (Dancy 2007, 8o). Manuel Vargas draws the distinction, as applied to moral responsibility, along similar 
lines: "Let atomism refer to the view that free will is a non-relational property of agents, that is, it is characterizable 
in isolation from broader social and physical contexts •... [atomistic] accounts specifY some property-say, a real 
self, an uncaused event, the presence of reasoning capacities, or what have you-that, at least in principle, one 
could identify simply by looking inside the agent If the relevant feature is there, then the agent has free will, 
independent of context" (Vargas 2013, 204-5). He describes the alterative view as follows: "[The alternative] 
picture suggests is that we cannot answer the question of whether an agent has free will simply by looking at the 
agent. What we need to know are filets about both the agent and the circumstances. On this picture, free will turns 
out to be a relational property, partly constituted by both agent and circumstance, and not the kind of thing that is 
sertled entirely by the presence of, say, a mechanism of practical reasoning or a general cross-situationally stable 
capacity to recognize and respond to moral considerations." (Vargas 2013, 206). 
NB I certainly do not mean to suggest that if one accepts atomism or holism in one domain, one would be 
committed to accept atomism in some other domain. One can certainly have a holist perspective on self-knowledge 
without being a holist (or, in Dancy's vocabulary, a so-called 'particularist') about (moral) reasons for action. 
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about; a moderate atomist constructivist, on the other hand, thinks that following 
M 'under normal circumstances' constitutes one's attitudes one thereby knows 
about. But not all self-knowledge theorists are constructivists. Alternatively, 
one might be a 'reliabilist' about self-knowledge and think that the relevant 
procedure is a highly reliable way of finding out or detecting certain facts of the 
matter, and that one is entitled to assume that if one follows M, then one has 
'latched on to' the relevant (mental) facts. A radical atomist reliabilist thinks 
M is a reliable method in all circumstances; a moderate atomist reliabilist 
thinks following M only has the desired result in the 'right' circumstances. 
Despite these differences, what those with an atomist view of self-knowledge 
in general share is the (implicit) idea that what makes self-ascription count as self-
knowledge does not require that the subject considers what went on before her self-
ascription or how she will be inclined to act in the future (the subject's self-ascripti.ve 
'biography') nor what's going on, as it were, around or outside her self-ascription-
the self-ascriptive 'context', broadly conceived. Instead, what makes someone's self-
ascription count as self-knowledge is a question the answer to which can be given 
by focusing on what went on during, or immediately preceding, the moment of self-
ascription. This is so, in particular, for expressivist and rationalist views, since both 
'speaking one's mind' and 'making up one's mind' are activities one does in the 
present, here and now. The result of these activities likewise delivers (knowledge of) 
what one thinks here and now. The question, therefore, is whether and why these 
methods, which provide the subject with knowledge of her occurrent states, would 
ipso facto tell her what her attitudes are: what she really believes, wants, hopes for, 
expects, prefers, fears, and so on. 
To use a metaphor, we might say that whereas an atomist 'zooms in' and 
focuses on the methods and the moment of self-ascription, someone with a holist 
perspective on self-knowledge instead 'zooms out' and considers the place that 
a specific self-ascription occupies within the subject's larger biography and self-
conception, as well as the concrete context in which her self-ascription was made, 
including the overall psychological state or 'mood' of the self-ascriber. She also 
takes into account the moral-political circumstances in which the subject finds 
herself, such as whether or not she is subject to the will of another. 6 Someone with 
6 Another way of looking at it is to say that it's the atomist who zooms out and looks at ditrerent people's self· 
ascriptions from a distance and concludes that some epist:emic feature is stable across these cases, whereas a holist 
zooms in and considers what is going on and what the good-making epistemic features are in each case. 
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a holist view of self-knowledge thinks that the question of whether some subject S 
has knowledge ofher attitude A by following some procedure or method M can only 
be answered by addressing 'questions of circumstance'. Questions of circumstance 
include questions like these: Who isS? Where isS? What willS do? What has S done? 
How does S feel? What does S know? Who isS talking to? How isS related to A? How 
isS treated by others? How does S think about or treat herself? 
On a holist view, it is not only the brainwashed, drugged and hypnotized among 
us who might potentially lack knowledge of our attitudes, in spite of having spoken or 
made up our minds but also people who are simply tired, hungry or insecure, who lost 
their temper or got out ofbed on the wrong side, or people who are distracted, confused, 
heartbroken or in love. In other words, people like us. On a holistview, then, the question 
of what is required in order for someone's self-ascription to express self-knowledge can 
only be answered by tailoring this question to the specific individual who ascribes an 
attitude to herself, the life that she leads and the context in which she finds herself. 
2. Qualifications, assumptions and limitations 
Before proceeding, two important qualifications are in order. First, I do not mean to 
deny in what follows that tipsy colleagues, angry spouses or people under oppressive 
circumstances don't have any self-knowledge, even though the process of my clarifYing this 
qualification will require us to have some patienc. This will be needed because in Chapter 7 
I will suggest that we should not Gust) distinguish between different procedures or routes to 
self-knowledge, but that it will be helpful to talk about different types of self-knowledge and 
allow for a sort of pluralism that at present is absent in the self-knowledge debate. 
I also want to highlight an important assumption of this thesis, which is that 
I will be exploring theories of self-knowledge, more specifically expressivism 
and rationalism as theories of attitudinal self-knowledge, that is, as theories of how 
a subject acquires knowledge of intentional mental states such as beliefs, desires, 
hopes, intentions, and perhaps (some) preferences and emotions. The contrast is 
the knowledge we have of 'occurrent states', such as one's bodily sensations (the 
experience of pain or nausea), one's conscious thoughts or words "running willy-
nilly through her head", as Harry Frankfurt (rg88) would put it.7 Most theorists 
7 As we'll see, 'judgements' form a special case, at least on the rationalist view. 
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of self-knowledge are explicit about the fact that their ambitions are to explain 
attitudinal self-knowledge, not (merely) the epistemic relation we have with regard 
to our own conscious thoughts, even though many of these theorists often go on 
to equivocate between the two. 8 An underlying assumption of this thesis is that 
addressing the question ofhow someone knows her own attitudes is not necessarily 
the same as addressing the question of how someone comes to know her occurrent 
states, or indeed is not necessarily the same as addressing the question of how 
someone knows her beliefs. It may well be that equivocating between propositional 
attitudes and conscious thoughts is legitimate and that an account ofhow a subject 
comes to know the latter ipso facto gives us an account of how she knows her own 
desires, hopes and intentions, and (some of) her preferences and emotions. My 
plan, though, is not to assume that this is so from the outset. The hope is that the 
thesis as a whole will go some way towards explaining why these two 'domains' of 
the mental are importantly distinct and require different epistemic explanations. 
I should also make explicit the limitations of this thesis. As said, I will for the 
most part concentrate on expressivism and rationalism. This means I will not be 
discussing a number of other interesting theories of and philosophers interested in 
self-knowledge in the chapters to come. I will not, for instance, discuss any historic 
or contemporary introspectionist accounts (e.g. Armstrong rg68; Nichols and Stich 
2003), nor will I have much to say about constitutivist theories which have been fairly 
dominant in the self-knowledge debate. One reason for this is that there's only so 
much I can do in the chapters to come, and something has got to give. A better reason, 
perhaps, for leaving these theories aside is that they are relatively minimalist theories 
of self-knowledge; self-knowledge only requires that the subject is conceptually 
competent (constitutivism) and/or that she is equipped with the requisite faculty or 
mechanism (introspectionism). It is not unlikely therefore that these theories are, 
in current terminology, versions of radical atomism - the latter of which I will not, 
principally, be concerned with. Furthermore, traditional constitutivist views are 
centrally concerned with so-called 'cogito states', which concern thoughts of the form 
'I am thinking that! am thinking that P'. In other words, I will for the most part ignore 
8 Those who mention being interested in propositional attitudes generally, not beliefs specifically or indeed 
occurrent thoughts, and who go on to equivocate between what attitudes and thoughts include are, for example, 
Donald Davidson (1987, 2001), Tyler Burge (2013), Annalisa Coliva (2012), Brie Gertler (2onb) and, to some extent, 
Peter Carruthers (2ou). Exceptions include, for example, Quassim Cassam (2on, 2014), Eric Schwitzgebel (e.g. 
2010), Johannes Roessler (2013, 2015b) and Christina Borgoni (2015). 
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constitutivism because it is concerned mostly with occurrent thoughts rather than 
propositional attitudes (by which I mean attitudes other than so-called conscious 
or present beliefs). Whether or not atomist/holist approaches are (im)plausible 
when it comes to these occurrent states is not an issue I will be addressing. 
Another assumption I should mention is that I take it to be natural to think that 
being in a certain mental state is one thing, but knowledge thereof is another. I can 
want, feel or perhaps even believe something without knowing that I do; and I can 
think that I want, feel or believe something without having the relevant attitudes. 
I will be interested, therefore, in (versions of) theories of self-knowledge that do 
not claim that self-knowledge somehow 'comes for free' or is 'self-intimating', 
and which at least allow for the possibility that there could be circumstances that are 
epistemically undermining with respect to attitudinal self-knowledge. However, a 
constitutivist or, according to my definition, a 'radical' version of rationalism will be 
discussed in Chapter 6. 
Finally, I should be clear that my claim in the chapters to come is not that all 
existing theories of self-knowledge are obviously and/or necessarily committed 
to (moderate) atomism. Rather, my aim is to examine the extent to which certain 
contemporary views implicitly subscribe to a version of atomism. Or, in cases where 
it's not clear whether or not some view is 'atomist' or 'holist', the strategy will be to 
read them along atomist lines for the sake of the argument, and to examine what 
the implications and problems are and whether a holist rendering of the account is 
possible and is capable of avoiding these problems. 
Before moving to the summaries of the chapters to come, let me end this introduction 
with a passage written by Wilfrid Sellars, who famously began his essay 'Philosophy 
and the Scientific Image of Man' as follows: 
The aim of philosophy, abstractly formulated, is to understand how things in 
the broadest possible sense of the term hang together in the broadest possible 
sense of the term. Under 'things in the broadest possible sense' I include such 
radically different items as not only 'cabbages and kings', but numbers and 
duties, possibilities and finger snaps, aesthetic experience and death. (Sellars 
1963) 
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The fundamental conclusion of my thesis is perhaps best described as a meta-thesis 
about the self-knowledge debate as a whole, urging that before we dive into the 
details of this or that procedure, we first of all need to question the preconditions 
of self-knowledge: which questions are assumed to have been answered without 
receiving explicit treatment? We must recognize that metaphysical questions such 
as what we take beliefs, desires and intentions to be, and epistemological questions 
about what we take 'knowledge' in 'self-knowledge' to be, are questions that 
dovetail with the question ofhow someone acquires self-knowledge. 
Echoing Sellars, we might say that the more specific aim of the philosophy of 
self-knowledge, abstractly formulated, is, or at least should be, to understand how 
things in the broadest possible sense of the term hang together in the broadest 
possible sense of the term. Under 'things in the broadest possible sense' I include 
/ 
such radically different things as not only selves and thoughts but friendships and 
feelings, cultural practices and character traits, morality and propositional attitudes. 
I have not even begun to chart, let alone give an account of, all of these and other 
(inter)connections. My hope is that the present thesis will at least succeed in showing 
that there are such interconnections and that at least some of them are crucial to a 
proper understanding of the topic and question of self-knowledge. 
3. Plan for the thesis 
The thesis is divided into two parts. The first part deals with expressivism and the 
second deals with (different versions of) rationalism. I will spend significantly more 
time on rationalism than on expressivism, because rationalism can and has been 
understood in different ways, whereas the difference between various accounts of 
expressivism appears to be less fundamental. I think it is therefore worthwhile to 
consider these different versions of rationalism independently. 
In terms of the arguments provided against expressivism and rationalism 
generally, it will become clear, after a while, that a certain pattern begins to emerge. 
The structure of this thesis is not linear. What I will try to show is that despite the 
differences between expressivism and (different versions of) rationalism, these 
views are confronted with similar problems and face similar challenges. This 
pattern, in its turn, is an indication of the fact that moderate atomism in general is 
questionable. 
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In Chapter 2, I describe Dorit Bar-On's (2004) expressivist view. Expressivism is 
usually read as merely offering a non-epistemic theory of first-person authority. 
The main goal of this chapter is to describe expressivism taken as a theory of self-
knowledge; more specifically, it is to explain how we might understand that self-
ascriptions, or what expressivists refer to as 'avowals', can express self-knowledge. 
In so doing, I explain how we might think of avowals as expressing (second-order) 
beliefs about one's mental condition, what would make such beliefs justified and 
how an expressivist may approach the question regarding the truth conditions of 
self-ascriptions. 
In Chapter 3, after having explained how expressivism can be understood as a 
theory of self-knowledge, I tum to the question of how it must be evaluated in this 
regard. I aim to show that on what seems to be a natural reading of the account, 
expressivism betrays a form of moderate atomism. I argue that the atomist elements 
in expressivism, and what stands in the way of a holist approach, can be traced 
back to the expressivist's reluctance to see avowals as assertions. I suggest that a 
holist construal requires understanding self-ascriptions as assertions that serve 
a communicative point but that understanding self-ascriptions in this way is 
incompatible with one of expressivism's central claims. 
In the next block of chapters, 4-7, I tum to rationalism. In Chapter 4, I first of 
all outline the rationalist view as set out by Richard Moran (200I), and then discuss 
the central thesis that we can know our own attitudes by following the so-called 
'transparency procedure'. I discuss a number of common objections to rationalism 
and consider ways of dealing with them. I end by discussing the relation between 
judgements on the one hand and attitudes on the other, and point out, following 
a number of recent authors, that for the transparency procedure to deliver self-
knowledge, it must be construed along inferentialist lines. 
In Chapters, I distinguish between a 'radical' and a 'moderate' atomist version 
of rationalism. I take issue with the latter view, according to which the transparency 
procedure only has the right 'output' (self-knowledge) provided that the subject 
made up her mind and/or followed the transparency procedure in the right or normal 
circumstances of deliberation. I argue that the moderate rationalist is ultimately 
unable to provide a satisfYing account of what counts as the right circumstances, 
at least without ruling out self-deception from the outset. This, then, leaves the 
rationalist the choice of construing rationalism along holist lines or 'going radical' 
and ruling out the appeal to normal circumstances from the outset. 
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In Chapter 6, I consider an alternative, so-called 'Activist' take on rationalism, as 
developed by Matthew Boyle (2oogb, 2ona, 2onb). I suggest that Boyle's view 
appears to be committed to the radical claim that 'making up our mind' is a way of 
acquiring self-knowledge whatever the circumstances or reasons involved in one's 
deliberation and so would qualifY as a version of radical atomism. My main aim is 
to show that the question of whether Boyle's epistemic account of how one knows 
one's attitudes is plausible - and thus whether radical atomism is problematic -
depends on how one answers the metaphysical question of what attitudes are. To 
this end, I contrast Boyle's metaphysical view with an alternative 'Dispositionalist' 
view, taking my cue from Eric Schwitzgebel (e.g. 2001, 2010). My conclusion is that 
radical atomism is implausible or absurd only given one's (implicit) answer to the 
metaphysical question, which in its tum depends on more fundamental issues such 
as one's views regarding the role (and relevance) of'intuitions' about certain cases, 
and one's meta-philosophical views. 
In Chapter 7, I present yet another reading of rationalism by taking the 
rationalist account as a normative account of why the capacity to make up one's 
mind matters to autonomy. The connection between autonomy and self-knowledge 
has received little attention. I suggest that a thoroughly normative reading of the 
rationalist account may have a lot going for it, but that it has not been systematically 
compared with other theories of autonomy, such as 'proceduralist' theories on 
the one hand and 'relational' theories on the other. This, then, is what I set out to 
do. I then abstract away from the details of rationalism and conclude that we need 
to distinguish not just between different objects of self-knowledge or different 
routes to them (as Moran proposes, 'alienated' versus 'non-alienated') but also 
between different types of self-knowledge, such as introspective, non-alienated and 
autonomous self-knowledge. I finish the chapter by taking a step back to reflect on 
the deeper metaphysical and epistemic sources of atomism. 
In the concluding chapter, I take stock and summarize some of the key points 
in the thesis, reflect on the contribution of this thesis to our understanding of self-
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l(nowing Your Mind by Speaking Your Mind 
1. Introduction 
Expressivism is often understood as, indeed typically presented as, a theory of 'first-
person authority' rather than self-knowledge (Gertler 2ona, 2onb; Bar-On and Long 
2001; Bar-On 2004). A theory of self-knowledge tells us what makes people's self.. 
ascriptions epistemically privileged, whereas a theory offirst-person authority deals with 
the question of why we generally presume this. The distinction is subtle but important.' 
Being epistemically privileged means that our second-order beliefs about our first-order 
states are more likely to result in knowledge, compared, for instance, with the way in 
which we gain knowledge of others' mental states or the external world. First-person 
authority, on the other hand, means, in very general terms, that the speaker herself is 
the 'authority' on what state she thinks or says she is in. More specifically, first-person 
authority refers to the special authority subjects have with respect to expressing or 
reporting their own mental states. This is shown in the fact that when someone avows 
her mental states, we are usually not inclined to override, challenge or correct her self.. 
ascription, or to ask her whether she is sure that she is in the self.. ascribed state. 
A so-called 'epistemic' reading of expressivism, i.e. a reading that takes 
expressivism to be about self-knowledge, has not received much attention in the 
literature. The main goal of this chapter is to discuss expressivism taken as a theory 
of self-knowledge as an account ofknowing our minds by speaking our minds. This 
will pave the way for the subsequent chapter, where I take issue with the expressivist 
account of self-knowledge in so far as it is an atomist theory of self-knowledge. 
The structure of this chapter is as follows. First of all I describe the general 
expressivistview (Section 2), and Dorit Bar-On's expressivistview more specifically, 
See also Jongepier and Strijbos (2015). 
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given that her theory is the most comprehensive expressivist account to date (Section 
3). I then point out, in Section 4, that even though expressivism is typically taken to 
be a non-epistemic account of the role and peculiarities of avowals, it makes prima 
facie sense to understand expressivism as an epistemic account of how we acquire 
self-knowledge, or indeed as offering a theory of something (roughly) like justified 
true beliefs about our first-order states. I explain how expressivism can be understood 
epistemically in Sections 5-7. Assessing expressivism as a theory ofself-knowledgewill 
involve addressing the question ofhow (well) it handles failures of self-knowledge, or 
what Bar-On calls 'expressive failures'. I end by discussing some prima facie worries 
about the expressivist account, thereby paving the way for the next chapter, where I 
take up the question of the (ir)relevance of the circumstances of self-expression. 
2. Expressivism: the basics 
The 'expressivist' theory of self-knowledge includes many different views (Ryle 
1949; Fleming 1955; C. Taylor 1985; Finkelstein 2oo8; Bar-On 2004; Bar-On and 
Long 2oor; J. Roessler 2013, 2orsa, 2orsa; Jacobsen 1996). The central expressivist 
thesis, as I understand it, is not primarily metaphysical, nor epistemic, but rather 
has its main roots in the philosophy oflanguage and action. The central thesis is one 
that concerns the question of the function of self-ascriptions. The idea is that we 
should recognize that self-ascriptions, or what expressivists prefer to call 'avowals', 
are linguistic acts that have their proper place in a linguistic, social community- an 
idea which, in its turn, of course, will have metaphysical and epistemic implications. 
Expressivism can best be understood as a critique of and an alternative to 
detectivism. Detectivism can be described as a view which assumes that our self-
knowledge is "grounded on our being aware, or somehow presented with, mental 
items that we must identifY as being (or representing) states of this or that mental 
kind on the basis of their presented properties" (Shoemaker 1993, 78). 2 Dorit Bar-
On similarly describes what she refers to as the "recognitional" approach to self-
knowledge, according to which self-ascriptions "must be grounded in our ability 
to tell through our recognition of distinctive features of a present mental state what 
content it has" (Bar-On 2004, qo). The self-ascriptions "I want a cup of tea" and 
2 This is not Shoemaker's own view, but rather his description of Goldman's (1993) view. 
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"I want to pursue a career in philosophy" are thus based or grounded on a judgement 
of some sort Self-knowledge, then, is a matter of"recognitional success, which then 
invites an epistemic explanation". (Bar-On 2004, rg8). On such a detectivist view, 
something like 'brute error' is in principle possible. Just as one can be mistaken 
in one's perception of a tree outside (it is really just a picture of a tree projected 
onto a wall), one could likewise 'mis-take' one state for another through some 
kind of epistemic failure (misperception, misinterpretation, etc.). Brute errors are 
errors that do not involve any rational failure or a fuilure that is due to the subject's 
concepts or capacities; rather, a brute error "is one that is simply due to the world 
failing to cooperate" (Bar-On 2004, 9; see also Burge 1996, 153). David Finkelstein 
gives a very useful definition of a 'detectivist' epistemology as 
a subject's ability to say what she is thinking or feeling is the result of her 
somehow ftndinB out-whether by observation alone or in conjunction with 
memory and inference. A detectivist thinks that our ordinary consciousness of 
at least some significant range of mental states or events is explained by the fact 
that we are able to detect their presence. (Finkelstein 2001, 216, 2008) 
One of the basic claims of expressivism is that detectivism is false. This is, for 
instance, evident in Ryle's work: 
If a person says "I feel bored", or "I feel depressed", we do not ask him for his 
evidence, or request him to make sure. We may accuse him of shamming to us or 
to himself, but we do not accuse him ofhaving been careless in his observations 
or rash in his inferences, since we do not think that his avowal was a report of 
observations or conclusions. He has not been a good or a bad detective; he has 
not been a detective at all. (Ryle 1949, 87)3 
On a detectivist view, self-ascriptions have a reportive function. On an expressivist 
view, by contrast, self-ascriptions have an expressive function, that is to say, avowals 
are not reports of underlying states but directly 'speak from' or 'show' these states, 
provided that the subject is sincere. 
3 Though Ryle is often described as an inferentialist or interpretationalist (and not without reason), his view has 
importantly expressivist elements, as this passages shows. For an expressivist reading ofRyle, see also Johannes 
Roessler (2or 5 b). 
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Expressivists claim that our self-ascriptions or avowals are continuous with other 
ways in which we express ourselves that aren't reportive either. When someone 
smiles, it's implausible to think that her smiling somehow represents or is grounded 
in her belief or judgement that she is pleased, and that her smiling behaviour, as it 
were, results from that belief. Rather, we think that the smile expresses, i.e. directly 
shows, her pleasure. According to expressivists, we should think about avowals in 
a similar way. When someone offers the self-ascriptive avowal "I am so pleased to 
see you" instead of, for example, smiling, this self-ascriptive expression does not 
represent or 'rest' on the subject's belief that she is pleased to see X; she is simply 
speaking her mind. 
Contemporary expressivists typically start by describing and distancing 
themselves from the 'simple' or 'classic' expressivist account that is often associated 
with some ofWittgenstein's remarks. Consider, for instance, the following well-
known passages: 
To say, "I have a pain" is no more a statement about a particular person than 
moaning. (Wittgenstein 1953, 67) 
The verbal expression of pain replaces crying and does not describe it. 
(Wittgenstein 1953, §244). 
It can't be said of me at all (except perhaps as a joke) that I know I am in pain. 
What is it supposed to mean-except perhaps that I am in pain? Other people 
cannot be said to learn of my sensations only from my behaviour,-for I cannot 
be said to learn of them. I have them. The truth is: it makes sense to say about 
other people that they doubt whether I am in pain; but not to say it about myself. 
(Wittgenstein 1953, §246) 
I can know what someone else is thinking, not what I am thinking. It is correct 
to say "I know what you are thinking", and wrong to say "I know what I am 
thinking." (A whole cloud of philosophy condensed into a drop of grammar.) 
(Wittgenstein 1953, §315) 
On the Wittgensteinian expressivist account, my sincere self-ascriptions are not 
grounded in my second-order beliefs about my first-order state (are not the result 
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of scanning or detecting). In fact, the claim is much more radical yet, namely our 
avowals do not report anything at all. We are misled if we think that our avowals are 
instances of describing and reporting purely because of the grammar of avowals, in 
which I seem to be ascribing some state to myself(e.g. "lam sad", "I want a slice of 
cheesecake", etc.). 
The problem with the Wittgensteinian version of expressivism is that avowals 
are not truth-evaluable, and there is thus a deep discontinuity between my saying "I 
feel bored" and your saying "You feel bored". You are making a truth-evaluable claim 
about the state I am in, whereas I am not. This is strange, because on the face of it, my 
utterance seems to be one in which I do in fact ascribe a certain condition to myself. 
Also, it seems that one's self..ascriptive expressions, such as "I feel bored", can be 
used in a variety ofinferences, e.g. "I am bored, but you are not, so only one person is 
bored". But if we follow Wittgenstein and think that saying "I am bored" is rather like 
'moaning' and hence is not truth apt, then we cannot explain the fact that my utterance 
is similar to and semantically continuous with other ascriptions in this way. 
Hence, contemporary expressivists move from a simple or traditional 
expressivist view to versions that are able to accommodate the fact that sincere, 
self-ascriptive expressions are truth-evaluable. According to Finkelstein, avowals 
have an "assertoric function" (Finkelstein 2008, ror), and according to Bar-On, any 
account of avowals must respect "the claim that avowals are interchangeable salva 
veritate in context with certain unproblematic statements and can figure in certain 
logical inferences" (Bar-On 2004, ro). The latter is what Bar-On refers to as the 
desideratum of'Semantic Continuity'. 
Contemporary expressivism thus tries to pull off a delicate balancing act between, 
on the one hand, seeing linguistic self-ascriptions as very similar to other expressive 
acts (smiling, etc.) and, on the other hand, seeing avowals at the same time as very 
different from expressive acts like smiling, in order to secure semantic continuity 
between avowals and other linguistic acts, and the idea that avowals (though not 
smiles or moans) can be false.4 
I turn to the way in which expressivists accommodate the phenomenon of'false 
avowals' or 'expressive failures' in a moment. First, I describe the idea of self-
expression in more detail. I do so by focusing on Bar-On's neo-expressivist account 
4 I address the relevance of securing semantic continuity in the subsequent chapter, where! argue that the expressivist 
is forced to choose between seeing avowals as expressions (similar to smiling) or seeing them as speech acts that 
can be true or false. 
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(2004, 2015; Bar-On and Long 2001). I focus on her account specifically because 
her theory is the most comprehensive expressivist account to date and also because, 
apart from Bar-On, not much has been written on what constitutes 'expressive 
failures', which I will argue is an important aspect of any plausible expressivist 
theory of self-knowledge. 
3· Bar-On's neo-expressivism 
Bar-On describes the specific type of act that avowing is by drawing on the work 
of Wilfrid Sellars (1g6g). The point Bar-On takes from Sellars is distinguishing 
between two senses of the notion of'expression': expression in the action sense and 
expression in the semantic sense.s When someone gives expression to a state of mind 
in the action sense (when she 'a-expresses' her state), she expresses a state of hers 
by intentionally doing something. 6 Expression in the action sense is what avowals 
share with other natural expressions: 
You could clap your hands enthusiastically, emit a "Yea!", say "This is great!" or avow 
"I'm so excited". Pre-theoretically, there seems to be very little to distinguish the 
different acts in terms of the process they involve.( ... ) [fhey all] seem to issue directly 
from your excitement, without the intervention of an inward reflection on, or even 
recognition of, your condition. ( ... )These considerations may speak in favor of a prima 
facie similarity in the process involved in all these performances. (2004, 252-53) 
A-expression is a relation that holds between an agent, her mental state and an 
expressive vehicle (gestures, facial expressions or verbal behaviour). This should 
be distinguished from expression in the semantic sense (s-expression), which 
is a relation that holds between "contentful tokens, such as sentences, and their 
semantic contents" (Bar-On 2015, 140). So, saying "I'd like some tea" is both an 
a-expressive and an s-expressive act. But pointing at 'Earl Grey' on the drinks menu 
In her book, Bar-On also mentions that there's a causal sense of expression: "an utterance or piece of behavior 
expresses an underlying state by being the culmination of a causal process beginning with that state" (2004, 216). 
I leave this third category aside for now, as does Bar-On (2015). 
6 I return to the relevance of expression being an intentional action and its relation to how expressing oneself delivers 
self-knowledge below. 
KnowingYcur Mind by Speaking Your Mind 33 
does not s-express anything, though it still expresses my desire for Earl Grey tea in 
the action sense. The fuct that avowals are expressions in both senses is what makes 
them of special interest. 
Avowals are, according to Bar-On, similar to other natural expressions like 
smiling. What is distinctive about naturally expressive behaviour, she writes "is not 
only that it shows the conditions or states it expresses, but that it is behavior that is 
sufficient to show the relevant conditions or states" (Bar-On 2004, 275). The contrast 
here is between 'showing' something and 'communicating' something, the latter 
involving ttllin,g someone or conveying information about yourself (such as what 
mental state you're in). To express one's mental states, on her view, is to "show 
the conditions they express, rather than merely communicate information" (Bar-On 
2004, 273). According to Bar-On, 
avowals wear the conditions they are supposed to express on their linguistic sleeve, 
as it were. An avowal such as "I wish we'd get some rain today" explicitly names a 
kind of condition (a hope) and articulates its content (that it rain today), as well as 
ascribing it to a certain individual; it reveals the kind of state the avower expresses 
(as well as its intentional content, when it has one) through what the sentence 
expresses in the semantic sense. (2015, 142 emphases removed) 
In his article 'Language as Thought and as Communication,' Sellars makes the rather 
radical suggestion that the activity of thinking out loud or indeed speaking one's 
mind is "a form of meaningful speech which doesn't consist in talking to anyone 
at all, even oneself, and hence is not, in any ordinary sense, talking" (Sellars 1969, 
518). Echoing Sellars, Bar-On writes that spontaneous, self-ascriptive expressions 
are not made "with the aim ofinforming their audience of what is going on in them" 
and are not acts subjects undertake "to perform with a specific audience-directed 
goal in mind, such as convincing, informing, pleasing, etc. Like many non-verbal 
expressive acts, they may not even have any communicative point" (2004, 242). So 
when someone says "I think that P" or "I want X", she is not informing or telling 
anyone anything but simply expressing her view that P or her desire for X. As Bar-On 
emphasizes, "the point of avowing an intentional state is not to provide a descriptive 
report ofit, but rather to share it, or air it, or give it voice, or just to 'vent' it", and our 
self-ascriptive expressions "may not even have any communicative point" (2004, 
243). 
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Importantly, Bar-On claims this only holds for what she refers to as 'avowals proper', 
which Bar-On and Long (2001) define as "sincere, spontaneously volunteered, 
unreflective utterances (voiced or silent)" (Bar-On and Long 2001, 326). Avowals 
proper, they say, are "often evinced as an immediate reaction to something" and 
"are pressed from the subject and are not the culmination of the subject's reflective 
truth-targeting act" (2001, 326). In what seems to me to be an important footnote, 
Bar-On contrasts the notion of'avowals proper', which she characterizes as "purely 
expressive", with so-called 'mixed avowals', which "have descriptive or reportive 
elements" (2004, 304). Later in the book she seems to suggest that we should think 
of our self-ascriptions as being on a spectrum, from highly secure 'avowals proper' 
at one end to "alienated or theoretical "!"-ascriptions, which are arrived at on the 
basis of evidence, inference, etc.", at the other (Bar-On 2004, 338). 
Bar-On is explicit about the fact that self-ascriptions made "on the basis of 
therapy, consultation with others, self-interpretation, or cognitive test results" do 
not qualifY as avowals and do not belong to the "ordinary, everyday way" (2004, 194) 
in which we ascribe mental states to ourselves. Crucially, it is only when we offer 
avowals proper or when we "simply avow ... (as opposed to making a conjecture 
about my own state of mind, for example)" (2004, 193) that her expressivist account 
(fully) applies/ 
My ultimate goal is to assess expressivism as a theory of self-knowledge, and, 
more specifically, to see whether it is plausible taken as an atomist theory of self-
knowledge. In other words, whether speaking your mind is sufficient to acquire 
knowledge of your mind, all else being equal. But nothing I've said so far actually 
concerns self-knowledge. Should we understand expressivism as a theory of self-
knowledge at all? Obviously, radical/moderate atomist expressivism is going to fail 
as a theory that gives us the sufficient conditions for self-knowledge if expressivism 
is, at the very beginning, not a theory of self-knowledge at all. So the first step is to 
address the question of how we might understand expressivism as a theory of self-
knowledge. 
7 This will be of relevance later, when I discuss expressivism as an atomist theory of self-knowledge. 
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4· Expressivism as a theory of self.. knowledge? 
4.1 Self-knowledge andjirst-person authority 
Curiously, expressivists themselves have been hesitant to construe their theories 
as theories of self-knowledge. I say 'curiously' because an expressivist account 
understood epistemically seems to make a lot ofintuitive sense. Ifi sincerely say "I'm 
so pleased to see you!" how could I possibly fail to know about my being excited to see 
you? Or if the waiter comes over and asks me whatl want to drink, and I haven'treally 
given it much thought, but I find myself saying "I'd like a cappuccino, please", what 
more would be needed for me to know whether I have a desire for a cappuccino? As 
we'll see, things aren't so simple, but at least prima facie expressivism may have a 
lot going for it epistemically speaking. 
One reason why expressivism hasn't received much 'epistemic' interest might be 
due to the fact that self-knowledge is generally conceived as a type of second-order 
knowledge, and expressivists emphasize the spontaneous and unreflective nature of 
our self-ascriptions. Perhaps this combination is not taken to be very plausible. Also, 
even though contemporary expressivists allow that avowals are truth-evaluable, they 
still deny that avowals are reports of underlying states. Still, at the very least it seems 
plausible that self-knowledge would be a natural side-effect, if you will, of expressing 
ourselves self-ascriptively, even if when we avow some mental state we are not being 
'detectives' or intending to report on what's on our minds. 
But, as mentioned earlier, expressivists see their primary goal as explaining 
first-person authority rather than self-knowledge'. 8 Central to Bar-On's book is the 
following question: 
What accounts for the unparalleled security of avowals? Why is it that avowals, 
understood as true or false ascriptions of contingent states to an individual, are 
so rarely questioned or corrected, are generally so resistant to ordinary epistemic 
assessments, and are so strongly presumed to be true? (2004, n) 
Explaining first-person authority involves explaining the special role that avowals 
have; in particular, it involves explaining why certain epistemic challenges to them 
8 I should note that Bar-On does not like the term because she believes that notion implies that what's special about 
avowals is •a matter of epistemic advantage" (Bar-On 2004, 123). 
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are inappropriate. The basic idea is that when someone avows "I'm so tired" or 
"I hope the meeting will be cancelled", we do not usually respond by saying "Are 
you sure?". As Ryle writes, the avowal 'I want X' is "not used to convey information, 
but to make a request or demand. It is no more meant as a contribution to general 
knowledge than 'please'. To respond with 'do you?' or 'how do you know?' would 
be glaringly inappropriate" (Ryle 1949, 164). Certain epistemic challenges are 
inappropriate, expressivists claim, because such challenges assume that you were 
'being a detectivist' about your own mind, i.e. that your avowal was the result of trying 
to come to know your own mind. Thus understood, to say "How do you know?" as a 
response to my saying "I'd like a cappuccino" would be out of place because I wasn't 
'claiming any knowledge' in the first place. It's a bit like, say, if you are strolling 
through a museum and then stop to look at a painting, and someone comes up to 
you and asks "Well, what's the verdict?" when you weren't in the business of trying 
to come up with a well-formed judgement about it in the first place. 
Though the expressivist account of first-person authority has its strengths, I am 
not sure just how strong the link is between our actual intersubjective practices of 
(not) challenging avowals and what avowals actually are, i.e. the claim that they are 
non-reportive speech acts. There are all kinds of reasons fornot challenging people's 
avowals, and it's not obvious that our reasons are grounded in the fact that the self-
ascriber was not 'in the business' of offering a self-descriptive report. Also, there 
are cases in which the audience seems equally disinclined to challenge someone's 
speech act when this isn't an avowal (e.g. "I had a headache this morning" or "I was 
imagining myself on a beach in Spain a moment ago").9 Plus, there seem to be quite 
a number of cases in which we do challenge peoples avowals, and do so precisely 
for the reason that what we take them to be doing is making a claim about 'how 
it is with them', i.e. claiming to know how they feel or what they want. I address 
these issues in the next chapter. For now, the point is that even though expressivism 
can perhaps make sense of the absences of epistemic challenges, it's not obvious 
that expressivism can also make good sense of the presence of such challenges. 
But what explains our practices of (not) challenging each other's avowals 
is not my primary concern here. The expressivist epistemology seems to have 
become buried under its account of first-person authority. Some even think that 
9 These are not avowals because you cannot express, i.e. directly show or speak, from past mental states, only from 
your present mental states. 
Knowing Your Mind by Speaking Your Mind 37 
expressivism has not offered, or cannot offer, a theory of what allows subjects to 
know, by avowing, what mental state they are in. In his review of Bar-On's book, 
Alex Byrne complains thus: 
Now all this might seem a little disappointing. The subtitle ofSpeakinB My Mind 
is 'Expression and Self-Knowledge', but self..knowledBe is not the chief topic. We 
aren't getting an explanation of why self-knowledge is "privileged", but at best 
an explanation of why we presume this. (Byrne 2oub) 
Similarly, Brie Gertler writes: 
Because these [expressivist] views do not seek to explain our epistemic relation 
to our own states, they are not accounts of se!f-knowledBe, per se. Since this book is 
mainly concerned with the epistemic dimensions of self-knowledge, we will not 
discuss [Wright's] default authority or expressivistviews further. (Gertler 2oub, 
54-55 Gertler's emphases) 
I think this dismissal of expressivism is too quick, not only because I think there 
are good prima facie reasons for taking an expressivist theory of self-knowledge 
seriously but also because the expressivists that Byrne and Gertler discuss and dismiss 
have sought to explain our epistemic relation to our own states. It may be true that 
providing an account of self-knowledge is not the expressivist's first concern, but that 
doesn't mean such an account could not, or indeed has not, been provided. 
In her book, Bar-On distinguishes the earlier non-epistemic question regarding 
first-person authority from the following question: 
Do avowals serve to articulate privileged self-knowledge? If so, what qualifies 
avowals as articles of knowledge at all, and what is the source of the privileged 
status ofthis knowledge? (2004, u) 10 
10 Bar-on also adds a third question: "(3) Avowals aside, what allows us to possess privileged self-knowledge? How 
is it that subjects like us are able to have privileged, non-evidential knowledge of their present states of mind, 
regardless of whether they avow being in the relevant states or not?• This question, she writes, assumes that we 
can explain self-knowledge in abstraction from avowals altogether. Bar-On's goal in Speaking My Mind is to give a 
non-epistemic answer to (I); to show that there are non-defl.ationaryviews consistent with (:1.); and to explain that 
there is something wrong with (3). 
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Even though Bar-On's primary interest certainly isn't self-knowledge but rather 
first-person authority, she devotes two chapters in the book to the question of how 
avowals might serve to express self-knowledge. Johannes Roessler has also recently 
defended a 'modestly epistemic' expressivistaccount of self.. knowledge (J. Roessler 
2013, 2015a, 2015b). In what follows, I explain the shape of an expressivist account 
of self-knowledge. 
5· Avowals as expressing second-order beliefs 
In order to make the activity of speaking one's mind into an epistemic activity, 
we need that activity to provide (something like) justified true beliefs about one's 
first-order states. As Anthony Brueckner writes, "if an avowal 'represents' self-
knowledge, then there must be a justified, true belief associated with the avowal" 
(Brueckner 20u, r8r). The justified true-belief model (JTB model) of knowledge 
is certainly not uncontroversial. Here, though, I use the JTB model merely as a 
benchmark, as does Bar-On (2004, 363). Applying JTB analysis to self-knowledge, 
the basic idea is that speaking one's mind must first of all provide one with some 
sort of belief or judgement or some way of being cognitively related to one's first-
order state (belief, desire, feeling); second, the belief should be true; and third, the 
belief should be justified, i.e. should not have come about by chance or luck. I'll 
discuss these elements one at a time. 
The idea that avowals represent (second-order) beliefs might seem hard to square 
with the expressivist approach. After all, expressivists claim that an avowal is not a 
belief in the sense that it results from an activity of detecting or trying to recognize 
what state one is in. Bar-On, however, distinguishes between two different senses in 
which one may be said to believe that p, namely believing in the 'opining' sense and 
believing in the 'taking as true' sense (2004, 363). The first involves being able to 
give corroborating evidence or reasons for one's belief, and this is the sort of belief 
that is incompatible with expressivism. For ifl say "I really want some coffee", then 
I am not 'of the opinion' that I want some coffee- this is why it would be out of place 
for you to ask, for example, what makes me think I want some coffee. If avowals 
were to express beliefs in the opining sense, then avowals are reports of one's first-
order states. Ifthatwere the case, then the distinctively expressivistelementhas been 
given up. But, Bar-On continues, there is a more liberal, dispositional sense ofbelief, 
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in which a subject believes that p, provided (roughly) that she would accept p 
upon considering it. This holding-true sense, as we may refer to it, is the one we 
apply when we say that people have beliefs concerning matters they have not 
yet even considered. For example, I may not presently have any active opinion, 
formed on some specific basis, regarding matters such as the color of rain in 
Spain, or the sum of some numbers, or that a building within my field of vision 
is taller than a tree standing next to it. Yet, if suitably prompted, I would affirm 
the relevant claims. (Bar-On 2004, 363) 
'Holding true' requires only that I "would accept p ifi were to consider it" (2004, 
365). This requirement is arguably too liberal, though. It seems odd to say that 
when someone avows that she is hungry, she might believe that she's hungry only if 
suitably prompted or if she were to "consider it". 
However, Bar-On rightly observes that the expressivist can make room for a 
stronger notion of belief by appealing to the fact that speaking one's mind is an 
intentional action. Given that "we normally credit people with knowledge of what it 
is they are doing, in the course of doing it" (2004, 386), we can likewise say that 
we can credit the self-ascriber with knowledge of what she is doing. This feature 
of 'knowledge in action' is central to understanding the expressivist epistemic 
potential (as well as to some varieties of rationalism - but that's something I will 
discuss in later chapters). Roessler makes a similar claim: "As Hampshire puts it, 
statements about one's own future or current intentional actions have, in this sense, 
a 'double aspect' (Hampshire 1965, 72). It is not clear why a self-ascription ofbelief 
should not also serve to express two attitudes" (J. Roessler 2015a, rs8). 
It's this intentional feature of self-expression that should make plausible what Bar-
On refers to as the "Dual Expression Thesis", which is the idea that "when I avow, 
unlike when I engage in naturally expressive behavior, I express not only the avowed 
condition but also my judgment that I am in that condition" (2004, 307). Brueckner 
formulates it as follows: 
If(a) a speaker sincerely utters sentenceS, (b) the utterance is backed by competent 
linguistic understanding and (c) the utterance ofS semantically expresses P, then 
the utterance expresses the speaker's belief that P. (Brueckner 2ou, r8r) 
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As Brueckner points out, Bar-On is reluctant to accept this principle (Brueckner 
2on, r8r). But I'm assuming her acceptance of this principle here for the purposes 
of assessing expressivism as an epistemic account of self-knowledge. For despite 
Bar-On's reluctance, we have good reasons to accept the above principle as applying 
to avowals, because 
if the Dual Expression Thesis is denied and the [above principle] is restricted 
to non-avowals, then this would constitute something close to a violation of 
Semantic Continuity. Whereas my utterance of "I am standing" would express 
my belief that I am standing, my utterance of"I am in pain" would not express 
my belief that I am in pain. (Brueckner 2on, r8r) 
This seems right. If the neo-expressivist wants to avoid collapsing back into simple 
expressivism, which sees avowals and non-avowals as semantically discontinuous, 
and if it's plausible that ordinary assertions express beliefs, then expressivism 
ought to accept the idea that avowals also express one's belief that one is in the self.. 
ascribed condition. When I sincerely and spontaneously 'vent' my mental states by 
saying "I really want some coffee", I have shown not only my desire for coffee but 
also my belief or judgement that I have a desire for coffee, and I have shown this 
not just to you but also to myself, the latter explaining why people's avowals should 
represent attitudinal self-knowledge. Indeed, Bar-On in the end says, "All there is to 
having a self-beliefin the case at hand, it might be held, is the (intentional) issuing 
of a self-ascription" (Bar-On 2004, 366). The upshot of this is that expressivism can 
satisfY the first-belief requirement for self-knowledge. The next question is what 
would make these second-order beliefs true and justified. 
6. Avowals as expressing justified second-order beliefs 
There are different ways in which an expressivist might consider second-order 
beliefs to be justified. Bar-On suggests that her expressivist view is compatible with 
different approaches. One possibility is to adopt an 'Expressivist-Reliabilist' view 
(Bar-On 2004, 369-73) and to say that someone has self-knowledge ifher true self-
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ascription is reliably connected with the mental state she has expressed." This is not 
the view Bar-On herself prefers, though. Bar-On's own proposal is to understand the 
sort of self-knowledge that an agent acquires when speaking their mind by recourse 
to the fact that avowing is an intentional action. Johannes Roessler similarly appeals 
to the relevance of'practical knowledge' to explain why speaking your mind might 
provide you with self-knowledge. He suggests that we may understand the epistemic 
role of people's expressions as follows: 
given that we normally enjoy "knowledge in intention" of what we are 
intentionally doing (Anscombe 1957), someone spontaneously (and sincerely) 
asserting that p can have knowledge in intention of stating her view that p. 
Beliefs are not actions. Still, one may be aware of an action under descriptions 
that do not fall short of a self-ascription of belief, such as "I am stating my view 
that p". Your assertion "the name is Langshaw", then, can make it intelligible 
that you are aware of your belief that he was called Langshaw: you may know 
your beliefin "spontaneously" expressing it .... [W] e might say that in making a 
spontaneous assertion one knows or is aware of- and in that sense confronted 
with- one's belief. O. Roessler 2015a, 161) 
Bar-On likewise stresses that 'avowing' something is "not merely something that 
happens to a subject, liketheappearanceofarash, ora sneeze" but"is something she 
intentionally does: an act of speakinB her mind". The character of such (intentional) 
actions, she suggests, "may yield a special epistemic warrant for avowing subjects" 
(Bar-On 2004, 383). Bar-On suggests that what makes someone's belief that she is 
in a particular state justified is the very state she speaks from: 
what is epistemically unique about avowals is that the very same thing-
one's being in M-provides both a rational reason for the avowal understood 
as an (expressive) act and an epistemic reason for the avowal understood as 
representative of the subject's self-judgment. (Bar-On 2004, 391) 
II This is what Bar-On refers to as the 'Low Road' approach. She also discusses a 'High Road' approach, which I will 
leave aside here and focus instead on her preferred 'Middle Road' approach. 
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What gives the subject epistemic warrant ... is the very same thing that gives her 
reason for the act of issuing the self-ascription: namely, her being in M. (Bar-On 
2004, 393, see also 2012) 
When I say "I want some coffee", then the avowal is, as Brueckner explains, 
"grounded in, epistemically warranted by, the avowed state M itself, which is an 
epistemic reason", which means that "the truth-maker for [my second-order belief] 
turns out to be identical to the justifier" (Brueckner 2on, 183). Fleming puts the 
point rather well when he says that when a man says he feels bored, then he "would 
say, surely, that he has got a justification for saying that he feels bored, namely, his 
feeling bored" (Fleming 1955, 62o). 
A consequence of this way of understanding the way in which one's second-order 
beliefs that are expressed in one's avowals are justified is that when we are dealing 
with a false self-ascription, one's second-order belief has no justification. For only 
in the 'good' case is there a mental state and one's avowal speaks from that state. 
Indeed, it's possible to claim that the avowal can be seen to be 'caused by' the mental 
state. But clearly, we need a very different (causal) story about what's happening 
when one issues a false avowal. Bar-On's solution is to appeal to disjunctivism 
(Bar-On 2004, 391ff), and she claims there is a fundamental difference between the 
justification one has to believe something in the good case versus in the bad case 
(i.e. in the case where there is a mental state and there isn't one respectively).'> 
One of the most important questions, though, has not been considered so far, 
namely what actually makes someone's self-ascription true? 
7· Avowals as expressing true second-order beliefs 
What are the truth-makers of someone's avowal or self-ascription? On the face 
of it, the answer seems obvious: what makes someone's self-ascription true is 
just whether or not she is in the self-ascribed state. Just as we might say that what 
12 A number of critics have taken issue with this move. Brueckner writes that the idea that there is no longer any 
"common epistemic factor between a case of a true avowal and a case of a false avowal" is counter-intuitive, and 
Aidan McGlynn notes that Bar-On's account of self-knowledge "rests on a very radical and implausible version of 
disjunctivism, and that her account of the securiry of avowals seems to push the question back in an unsatisfactory 
way" (McGlynn 2on). 
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makes someone's self-ascription of having a headache true is her actually havin9 a 
headache, we might similarly say that the question of what would make someone's 
second-order belief about her desire/hope/belief true is just whether she actually 
does want/hope/believe thatp. But this does not tell us very much, yet, for everything 
depends on what it means to 'have' a desire/hope/desire, and so on. On the face 
ofit, the expressivist can just 'plug in' her preferred metaphysical account of what 
mental states are. In this section I therefore want to review some of the different 
metaphysical options that an expressivist (or any other theorist of self-knowledge) 
can appeal to. 
We can broadly distinguish between 'realist' and 'constructivist' metaphysical 
accounts. Julia Tanney (2oo2) gives a helpful characterization of realism: 
Much of modern and contemporary philosophy of mind in the "analytic" 
tradition has presupposed, since Descartes, what might be called a realist view 
about the mind and the mental. According to this view there are independently 
existing, determinate items (states, events, dispositions or relations) that are 
the truth-conferrers of our ascriptions of mental predicates. The view is also a 
cognitivist one insofar as it holds that when we correctly ascribe such a predicate 
to an individual the correctness consists in the discovery of a determinate fact 
of the matter about the state the individual is in-a state which is somehow 
cognized by the ascriber. (Tanney 2002, 37, see also rgg6) 
On a realist picture of the mental, the question of what your attitudes are (your first-
order state) is independent of what you think your attitudes are (your second-order 
belief). The second-order state does not change the nature or ontological status of 
your first-order state. In other words, there are inner 'facts of the matter' that we can 
(fail to) know. 
By contrast, on a constructivist view of the mental, the very nature of a person's 
mental states is taken to bedependentonherrelation to them, e.g. on her interpretation, 
acceptance or endorsement of them. Constructivists deny that a person's first-level 
mental states and her judgements about them are ontologically distinct states, 
whereas a realist does not (see E. Fricker 1998, 173). On a constructivist view, then, 
a person's first-order state and her second-order beliefs/judgements regarding that 
state are dependent on each other. Having a desire/belief or other attitude is partly 
constituted by a person thinking that she has a certain desire/belief or other attitude. 
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So-called 'introspectionist' views, according to which self-knowledge is modelled 
on perception, usually accept a realist view of the mental (e.g. Armstrong 1968; 
Lycan 1996; Goldman 2006). The core thesis of the inner sense view, as Gertler 
describes it, is that "introspection is a causal process and introspective beliefs qualifY 
as knowled,ge because they are appropriately linked to the mental states they concern" 
(Gertler 2onb, 131). The so-called 'rationalist' account of self-knowledge, which I 
will discuss in later chapters, is, by contrast, a constructivist view. The important 
point for present purposes, though, is that expressivism can be construed either 
along 'realist' or 'constructivist' lines. 
On a constructivist expressivist view, speaking your mind can be in part 
constitutive of what mental state you're in. For instance, according to Charles 
Taylor's (1985) 'hybrid' expressivist view (because he combines elements from 
expressivism, interpretivism and rationalism), our self-expressions are self-
interpretations that may, or may not, constitute our emotions and attitudes. He argues 
that as 'self-interpreting animals' we are bound up in a process of articulating 
ourselves and that such self-interpretations shape us by informing and changing 
our attitudes. 
This is not the sort of view Bar-On favours, however. The constructivist view, 
according to which "facts in the mental realm are determined in part by what self.. 
ascribers take them to be", Bar-On thinks, "seems to require settling for a certain 
irrealism about mental states, which many would find problematic" (Bar-On 2004, 
412). In explaining what would make a self-ascriptive expression false (or true), 
Bar-On appeals to what she calls "robust commonsense realism" in relation to the 
mental (Bar-On 2004, 41off). Bar-On does not tell us what she means by realism; 
indeed, she sees it as a strength of her view that she has "not committed myself 
to any particular view of what bein,g in a mental state of these kinds consists in" 
(Bar-On 2004, 410). But, in any case, Bar-On criticizes the broader constructivist 
view by claiming that it is committed to what she takes to be a sort of irrealism 
about the mental, and claims it is "no part" of her expressivist view to maintain such 
dependence between first- and second-order states (2004, 254). 
Why be anti-constructivist? The reason has to do with the fact that expressivism 
is often associated with some sort of crude behaviourism. There is a temptation, 
Bar-On says, to ''associate all expressivist views of mental self-ascriptions with an 
implication that there simply are no independently existing mental states of subjects 
to ground the cognitive success or failure of mental self-ascriptions", but this, she 
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writes, is a mistake. There is no reason "to saddle the [expressivist) view with the 
ontological denial, or with the intention of uprooting all cognitivist understanding 
of mentalistic discourse" (2004, 353-54). 
If one adopts a so-called 'Realist-Expressivist' view, as Bar-On does, then this 
has consequences for how one thinks about failures of self-knowledge and, more 
specifically, of expressive failures, that is, cases in which one speaks one's mind 
without acquiring self-knowledge. This will be central to the next chapter, so it is 
important to understand Bar-On's way of dealing with expressive failures. 
Bar-On claims that one might be in mental state M without showing the relevant 
expressive behaviour, and one might engage in certain expressive behaviour 
without actually being in M. She thus denies that her account does not commit 
her expressivism to the "crude behaviourist claim" that "naturally expressive 
behaviour is constitutive of mentality" (2004, 278). Bar-On goes on to discuss two 
types of 'expressive failures'. In the first case, one expresses one's own state, but 
one's expressive behaviour is simply misperceived by others. An example might be a 
person who intends to show her mental state ofjoy, but whose expressive behaviour 
instead shows a strained grimace, e.g. because of a scar (2004, 281). In this case, the 
subject is in the relevant state and tries to show that state by expressing herself, but 
nonetheless fails to do so. So this is a case of expressive failure: someone engages in 
expressive behaviour, but her expressive behaviour does not show the mental state 
she's in. In this case, the 'mistake' is not due to the subject, but rather the hearer. 
Bar-On also discusses another, more interesting, type of expressive failure. 
In a second sort of case, the expressive behaviour is not misperceived by others, 
but expresses a state that the speaker is not actually in. Examples include saying 
"Ouch!" when one is not, in fact, in pain, e.g. when sitting in the dentist's chair, 
anticipating the sting of the needle. In such cases, one cannot be expressing one's 
own state, because one isn't in the mental state, and hence it's impossible that one 
speaks from that state. 
Bar-On proposes that expressive failures of the second sort are instances in which 
one has still successfully expressed a mental state, but no tone's own mental state (2004, 
32off, see also 2012,207,2015, 145-46). This happens in cases of self-deception. Bar-
On gives the example of someone who says "I find this painting very interesting", but 
she does not really think this. The self-ascription was not insincere, but was brought 
about by "some kind of social or personal pressure to think well of the painting" 
(Bar-on 2004, 330). (This example does not strike me as particularly plausible, but 
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I'll ignore this for now.) In cases of self-deception, one expresses a mental state (of 
thinking the painting interesting), without genuinely expressing one's own state. Bar-
On construes other examples in a similar way. For instance, she considers children 
who "display certain forms of expressive behaviour just for dramatic effect'' or a 
talented actor who "produces a rolling laughter" (2004, 279). Bar-On writes: 
In general, it seems possible to make expressive use of a tool that is semantically 
associated with a mental condition without being in the relevant condition, and 
thus without expressing one's condition, even when one does not intend to deceive 
or engage in dissimulation or act playing. For this reason, I reject expressivist 
views that maintain that a subject's avowing a mental condition conceptually 
,guarantees her being in the condition (so the avowal must be true), as long as the 
subject is linguistically or conceptually competent and sincere. Such views fail to 
take account of the distinction between expressing M and expressing one's M. 
(2004, 325, see also 2012) 
Bar-On's suggestion is thus that in order to figure out whether someone's speaking 
her mind is a way for her to achieve self-knowledge or whether it instead counts 
as an expressive failure, we must invoke a distinction between expressing M and 
expressing one's M. 
8. Some prima facie worries 
Bar-On's realist version of expressivism invites a number of worries and questions 
that I want to briefly turn to in this final section. 
First, the distinction between expressing M and expressing one's M appears to 
me to be rather an ad hoc move designed for the (sole) purpose of dealing with 
expressive failures. Also, it isn't clear what it means, exactly, to express a mental 
state without expressing one's own mental state. It now turns out that to express is 
still a 'success verb', but it does not necessarily successfully express the right thing. 
This seems a counter-intuitive conception of 'expression', whereas arguably 
one of the strengths of the expressivist view is meant to be that it offers an intuitive 
account of what self-ascriptions are. What's more important for present purposes, 
though, is that the entire weightofBar-On's account ofwhen one has self-knowledge 
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via speaking one's mind and when one does not now falls on (her appeal to) mental 
realism. Whether one has expressed one's mental state or has merely expressed 'a' 
mental state- which makes all the difference for whether one does or does not have 
self-knowledge- in the end simply depends on whether or not one's self-ascription 
'fits the facts'. In other words, the question of what is required for an (expressed) 
self-ascription to count as self-knowledge is simply outsourced to mental realism. 
A first worry here is themetaphysical worry of whether we can even talk sensibly 
about mental 'facts' at all. Bar-On's theory is dependent on a metaphysics of the 
mind that isn't uncontroversial, as Tanney and others have shown. Another worry 
is a general epistemic worry, which various types of realism in general seem to face 
(including for example moral realism, see e.g. Sayre-McCord 2017) namely how do 
you know that your expressive (self-)reports 'fit the facts'? What makes expressing 
oneself particularly reliable with regard to the facts? 
Notice that on Bar-On's realist construal of expressivism, it's no longer the case 
that the act of speaking your mind enables you to know your own mind, because for 
all you know, you were merely expressing a mental state - not your own. So when 
you speak your mind, there's always the further question of whether you have really 
spoken your own mind. This seems to invite global scepticism about our avowals: 
how do we ever know whether or not our ascriptive self-expressions are true if 
their truth is something that's independent of our speaking our mind? Perhaps 
we could avoid such scepticism if we allowed that our relation to our own self-
expressions co-determined what our attitudes are, i.e. by construing expressivism 
along constructivist lines as for example in Charles Taylor's work, but this is not 
something Bar-On is willing to do.'3 But if no room is made for such a constructivist 
element, then what would make it reasonable to think that by speaking our mind 
we acquire self-knowledge? This remains a mystery. Self-knowledge appears 
to be a (common) coincidence. Of course there's the possibility of saying that 
expressivism isn't and perhaps cannot be a theory of self-knowledge after all, but 
for reasons provided earlier, this does not seem a particularly desirable route to take. 
Second, Bar-On's rejection of constructivism appears to be based on an 
implausible conception of constructivism. Bar-On thinks that endorsing 
13 Her reasoning seems to be that, apart from expressing a thought (so-called cogito-states), most self-ascriptions of 
attitudes are not self-verifYing (Bar-On 2004, 220-21). This seems to be a particularly strong requirement, however. 
Attitudinal self-expressions, one might argue, can ftil to be self-verifYing and yet have an important constitutive 
role vis-a-vis the attitude expressed. 
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constructivism requires settling "for a certain irrealism about mental states" (Bar-
On 2004, 412). This might be true of some constructivist views, but certainly not all. 
As Annalisa Coliva writes, 
[Some] theorists have argued against constructivism on the grounds that it would 
entail the irreality offirst-order mental states. The idea is that if such mental states 
do not pre-exist their self-ascription, they don'thave real, independent existence. 
Since this is implausible-the train of thought continues-constructivism is 
doomed from the start. (Coliva 2009) 
But, as Coliva too notes, constructivists aren't (necessarily) irrealists, anti-realists or 
relativists. This would only follow if one thought that for a mental state to be 'real' it 
must exist in the way that things like tables or cats exist or that having a belief would 
mean possessing "an internal representational token (perhaps a sentence in the 
language of thought) with the content P" (Schwitzgebel 2010, 536).4 In any case, 
if one thinks that constructivism is forced to accept some sort ofirrealism, then the 
choice between constructivism and realism is not really a fair choice. 
Bar-On's main reason for resisting constructivism is that when it comes to "basic 
mental states", such as "those we share with non-human animals and pre-cognitive 
children" (Bar-On 2004, 412), like being in pain or wanting an ice-cream, etc., it 
just does not seem plausible that such states are of the subject's 'own making'. That 
might be true, but then it seems we might need some other account of all of those 
mental states that we don't share with animals and young infants, unless we restrict 
expressivism to these basic states, which makes the scope of the expressivist project 
rather limited. Also, it's not uncontroversial to think of the basic mental states of 
linguistically competent adults as the same as the basic mental states of animals and 
young infants, which then invites a similar explanation. As McDowell claims, our 
14 Daniel Dennett, among others, rejects the crude (Fodorian) realist view and defends a "milder sort of realism" 
according to which there is sometimes "no fact of the matter of exactly which beliefS and desires a person has" 
(Dennett 1987, 28), but denies that tlris should lead us to think tlrat beliefS and desires, and so on, do not really 
exist. In Real Patterns, Dennett writes: "Philosophers generally regard ... ontological questions as admitting just 
two possible answers: either beliefs exist or they do not. There is no such state as quasi existence; there are no 
stable doctrines of semirealism. BeliefS must either be vindicated alongwitlr tire viruses or banished alongwitlr tire 
banshees. A bracing conviction prevails, then, to tire effect that when it comes to beliefS (and other mental items) 
one must be either a realist or an eliminative materialist" (Dennett rggr, 27). 
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subjectivity is not the same as those of cats and young infants "plus the conceptual 
garb" (McDowell 1998, 295). '5 
A third problem is that it's not clear how we should combine the realist claim that 
(r) what makes our avowals true is dependent on the existence of realist mental facts 
and that these mental facts are what causes an utterance or piece of behaviour (such 
as an avowal),'6 with the expressivist claim that (2) mental states can be 'shown' 
and directly perceived. The worry is that the appeal to realism seems to pull us in 
the direction of thinking of expressive behaviour as signs or symptoms that reliably 
indicate a person's mental states, whereas thinking that mental states can be shown 
and directly perceived seems to push us away from that idea. The realist claim thus 
raises the question of how speaking one's mind would still be 'sufficient to show' 
one's mental states.'7 
A final worry is that the question of what it means to express 'one's own' mental 
state versus expressing 'a' mental state has just shifted to the question ofwhatitmeans 
to (really) be in a mental state. In other words, unless we are provided with some more 
substantive account of realism, which Bar-On says she wants to remain neutral on, 
then we don't know what expressive failures are, and so we have no account of what it 
means in the end to know or fail to know one's mind by speaking one's mind. 
Importantly, all of the above worries may or may not point to the possible limits 
of an expressivist account of self-knowledge, but this does not change the fact that 
expressivism can plausibly be taken as a theory of self-knowledge. Indeed, I will 
revisit some of these worries in the next chapter and will suggest that some of the 
above worries may lead us to consider a different (constructivist-interpretationalist) 
version of expressivism, such as Taylor's account briefly mentioned above. 
However, of more immediate concern is the question of whether expressivism 
is plausible if construed along atomist lines. If expressivism is, as I have suggested, 
15 Cf. "What is essential is to avoid the temptation to suppose that when, say, a cat, or a human infant, is in pain, what 
constituteS the relevant kind of episode in our inner lives is all there in the eat's or infant's consciousness, barring 
only the ability to talk; or-to put the idea in connection with us-that our ability came to encompass our pains by 
way of our having our attention drawn to something that was already (sometimes) there in our consciousness--in 
the way that the eat's or an infant's pain is there in its consciousness--and being taught what to call it" (McDowell 
1998, 294). 
16 Bar-On invokes Sellars' notion of expression in the 'causal sense', defined as an utterance or piece of behaviour 
which "expresses an underlying state by being the culmination of a causal process beginning with that state• (Bar-
On 2004, 216). For instance, someone's reaching behaviour may be caused by one's desire for a particular object; 
or one's shaking hands may be caused by one's pain or nervousness (ibid.). 
17 In more recent work, Bar-On sets aside the causal sense of expression (Bar-On 2015, 149). 
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plausibly taken as a theory of self-knowledge, then there are at least two ways of 
understanding the view. One is that speaking one's mind is sufficient for acquiring self.. 
knowledge. This means that whenever one expressively avows believing that P or wanting 
Q, then one does believe that P/want Q, and by having expressed oneselfin this way, one 
has come to know that one believes that P/want Q. Alternatively, on a moderate atomist 
version, speaking one's mind normally provides self-knowledge, namely if one speaks 
one's mind in the right or 'normal' circumstances of self-expression. 
The relevant question then becomes what these circumstances would be and 
whether the expressivist can unproblematically appeal to certain (implicit) ceteris 
paribus clauses, such that the idea that one knows one's mind by speaking one's mind 
would still be informative. If, however, it turns out to be impossible to give an account 
of the circumstances in which speaking one's mind actually is knowledge-conducive, 
because of what these circumstances can change from person to person, then this 
would mean an atomist conception of expressivism may have to be abandoned. 
9· Conclusion 
In this chapter I have introduced expressivism and have described more specifically 
how expressivism can be said to meet the relevant epistemic conditions to qualifY 
as a theory of self-knowledge. The more or less standard contemporary expressivist 
view appeals to practical knowledge to explain both the sense in which one's avowals 
represent second-order beliefs (as well as the first-order mental state it expresses) 
and what would make one's belief justified. Whether or not this view is in the end 
plausible, it seems in any case unfair to dismiss expressivism outright by saying that 
it does not offer (or is not able to offer) a theory of self-knowledge. 
Having shown how expressivism can meet the relevant epistemic conditions 
to qualifY as a theory of self-knowledge, it's now time to assess it as a theory of 
self-knowledge and, more specifically, as an atomist account of self-knowledge, 
according to which speaking your mind is always, or normally, sufficient for self-
knowledge. But in what sort of circumstances might speaking your mind not 
provide self-knowledge? And are these circumstances minimal and straightforward 
enough to warrant putting them in an 'all else being equal' clause? This is the topic 
of the next chapter. 
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The Limits ofExpressivism: 
Failures ofSelf-Expression 
r. Introduction 
On the expressivist view, the idea is that one directly shows or manifests one's 
mental state when one expresses or speaks one's mind. As discussed in the previous 
chapter, on Bar-On's account, it's possible to speak from 'a' mental state, but not 
from 'one's own' mental state. On the assumption that an expressivist theory of 
self-knowledge would not make any sense if it was a contingent matter whether, 
when speaking one's mind, one was expressing one's own mental states or rather 
'a' mental state, it seems reasonable to suppose that when speaking one's mind, 
one expresses one's own mental state (hence I will simply, from here on, talk 
about mental states rather than 'one's own' mental states). If so, then a plausible 
understanding of expressivism is to see it as an atomist account of self-knowledge: 
if you speak your mind then you always (radical atomism) or normally (moderate 
atomism) come to know your own mind. 
The key question is what is required to express or speak one's mind. There appear 
to be two conditions. First, one's self-ascription must qualify as what is referred 
to as an avowal. Call this the 'avowal condition'. If meeting the avowal condition 
is all that is required for one to acquire self-knowledge, then this amounts to a 
radical atomist version of self-knowledge, on my terminology. On this conception 
of self-knowledge, to answer the question of what makes someone's self-ascription 
deliver self-knowledge, all we need to do is zoom in on what the subject was doing 
when she ascribed a mental state to herself and answer the question of whether 
she was avowing her state or not. A moderate atomist, on the other hand, thinks 
that there are some circumstances (e.g. intoxication) in which one might speak 
one's mind without knowing one's mind. If that's the case, then we need to rule out 
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such circumstances. Call this the 'normal circumstances' condition. The moderate 
atomist version of expressivism relating to self-knowledge holds that only in normal 
circumstances does one come to know one's own mind by speaking one's mind. 
The main goal of this chapter is to point out the limits of the moderate atomist 
version of expressivism, which I plan to do by exploring the plausibility ofboth above-
mentioned conditions. First, I argue that there's no unproblematic conception of 
the notion of'avowal' that we can appeal to. I then argue that the strategy of ruling 
out exceptional circumstances in ceteris paribus clauses is not a legitimate move by 
pointing out that most 'abnormal' circumstances are actually quite 'normal' for 
human beings. 
The structure of this chapter is as follows. First, I evaluate the plausibility of the 
avowal condition (Section 2), and then go on to address the 'normal circumstances' 
condition (Section 3). If both conditions are problematic, the result is that the 
question of what makes someone's self-ascription count as self-knowledge 
cannot simply be answered by zooming in on the self-ascriptive act and figuring 
out whether, all else being equal, it was an 'expressive' self-ascriptive act. The 
interim conclusion is that perhaps we should consider whether expressivism can be 
construed along holist lines, and I make a proposal in this direction by suggesting 
that we should think of people's self-expressions as self-interpretations, which 
amounts to understanding expressivism along interpretationist or inferentialist 
lines (Section 4). In the final two sections, I take a step back and offer a diagnosis by 
showing that the atomist version of expressivism can be traced back to the reluctance 
to see attitudinal self-ascriptions as genuine assertions (Section 5). I suggest that 
developing a holist account requires seeing self-ascriptions of our attitudes as 
genuinely semantically continuous with other ascriptions - a view that would be 
congenial to the interpretationalist approach suggested earlier. Given that reports 
regarding one's height or hair colour are communicative speech acts, I suggest that 
if we want to respect semantic continuity and avoid the simple expressivist view, 
we should see our attitudinal self-ascriptions as communicative acts as well. I 
argue in the final section (Section 6) that this approach has significant theoretical 
advantages, in particular the fact that it paves the way for a holist account, but that it 
does not seem to be compatible with some of the expressivist's core claims. 
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2. Ceteris Paribus 1: assuming I am avowing 
Central to expressivism is the notion of an 'avowal' ,1 So far, I've simply assumed that 
we have an intuitive grasp of what avowals are, and indeed this is what expressivists 
themselves typically do, too (Finkelstein 2014; Bar-On 2004). Bar-On, for instance, 
writes that she begins by describing "avowals in a very rough-and-ready way" and 
that her "starting point is a familiar phenomenon, which can be characterized 
ostensively as it were" (Bar-On 2004, 26). The question I want to address in this 
section is whether a definition of avowals can be provided that isn't circular. In 
other words, whether it's possible to give a characterization of what it means to 
avow something that does not build self-knowledge into the notion ofwhatavowals 
are, for that would render the expressivist view non-informative ('you come to know 
your mental states by avowing your mental states of mind if and only if avowing your 
mental states provides you with knowledge of your mental states'). 
We can begin with the idea that avowals are ascriptions of states of mind, which 
means that not all self-ascriptions qualifY as avowals. After all, I can sincerely self.. 
ascribe this or that character trait ("I am timid" or "I am impulsive"), but such self-
ascriptions are not epistemically privileged, because self-ascriptions of character 
traits such as being timid or impulsive are made on the basis of evidence (observation, 
theorizing, etc.). I cannot, by self-ascribing some character trait, show you this character 
trait of mine. To find out whether the self-ascription is true, both you and I need to 
look at the evidence over time. Self-ascribed character traits, habits, and so on are thus 
not epistemically special, and are ruled out as avowals. Avowals are pronouncements 
regarding one's current mental states such as "hoping or wishing that p, whether I 
preferx toy, whether lam angry at or afraid ofz, and so on" (Bar-On 2004, 106). 
However, this restriction won'tdo, because self-ascriptions of mental states can also 
fail to qualifY as avowals. Finkelstein, for instance, writes, echoing Wittgenstein, that the 
utterance "I hope he'll come" can be understood as an 'expression' (avowal) but also as 
a report and that this can "vary from occasion to occasion" (Finkelstein 2014, 189). Bar-
On makes a similar observation: "avowals contrast in their security with ascriptions that 
are grammatically and even semantically indistinguishable from them. 'I am very happy' 
can sometimes be an avowal and sometimes not" (Bar-On 2004, 26). 
This also goes for other non-detectivist theories of self-knowledge, most notably, the rationalistaccount. So many 
of the worries voiced here can be read as being applicable to other theories that likewise appeal to the notion of 
avowal. 
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At this point, expressivists typically point out that whether a self-ascription is an 
avowal or not depends on the basis for and/or reasons that the subject had for 
issuing the self-ascription. More specifically, for a self-ascription to count as an 
avowal, there must be no such bases or reasons. An example of a self-ascription that 
isn't an avowal but is an ascription of a mental state, would be the self-ascription 
that I have certain implicit biases which I make, e.g. on the basis of having gone 
through a number of online implicit-association tests. Self-ascribed implicit biases 
have no special claim to truth because they're made on the basis of evidence, and 
hence I could have made interpretative or inferential mistakes. Self-ascriptions like 
"I am bored", "I am thirsty" and "I hope the meeting will be over soon" are different 
because they're not based on evidence, or so expressivists claim. So avowals are (I) 
ascriptions of one's mental states rather than, for example, character traits, where 
(2) these ascriptions are not based on evidence. 
A further characteristic of avowals is that they are sincere self-ascriptions. 
Consider, for instance, Ryle's remark: 
Avowing "I feel depressed" is doing one of the things, namely one of the 
conversational things, that depression is the mood to do. It is not a piece of 
scientific premises-providing, but a piece of conversational moping. That is why, 
if we are suspicious, we do not ask "Fact or fiction," "True or false," "Reliable or 
unreliable?," but "Sincere or shammed?". (Ryle 1949, 102) 
But what is sincerity, exactly? As John Eriksson remarks, "the most common answer 
amongst philosophers is that a speech act is sincere if and only if the speaker is in 
the state of mind that the speech act functions to express" (Eriksson 2009, 213). 
But this is not a definition of sincerity that expressivists about self-knowledge can 
appeal to, on pain of circularity. If we want to explain expressing or speaking one's 
mind in terms of avowals, and avowals in terms of sincerity (at least in part), then it 
seems we cannot explain sincerity in terms of expressing or speaking one's mind. 
But how else might we define sincerity? 
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In Truth and TrutfUUlness, Bernard Williams spends quite some time on these notions, 
especially in his chapter 'From Sincerity to Authenticity'. 2 He writes: 
Sincerity at the most basic level is simply openness, a lack of inhibition. 
Insincerity requires me to adjust the content of what I say. (Williams 2002, 75) 
Regarding self-knowledge, Williams notes that "in the simplest case I am confronted 
with my belief as what I would spontaneously assert" (ibid.).3 Sincerity, he goes on, 
is to "speak frankly and spontaneously with others" (2002, 179) and is a form of 
"uninhibited expression or enactment, rather than reporting the findings of self-
examination" (2002, r8g). 
In a somewhat similar vein, Gilbert Ryle, describes 'avowing' as a kind of 
"voluntary non-concealment" (Ryle 1949, 87). Ryle distinguishes between what he 
refers to as 'guarded' and 'unguarded' talk, and suggests that avowals belong to the 
latter category: 
It is notorious ... that people are frequently insincere and talk in manners 
calculated to give false impressions. But the very fact that utterances can be 
guarded and studied implies that unguarded, unstudied utterance is possible. 
To be reticent is deliberately to refrain from being open, and to be hypocritical is 
deliberately to refrain from saying what comes to one's lips, while pretending to 
say frankly things one does not mean. In a certain sense of"natural", the natural 
thing to do is to speak one's mind, and the sophisticated thing to do is to refrain 
from doing this, or even to pretend to do this, when one is not really doing so. 
Furthermore, not only is unstudied talk natural or unsophisticated, it is also the 
normal way of talking. We have to take special pains to keep things back, only 
because letting them out is our normal response; and we discover the techniques 
2 In this chapter, Williams gives an exposition of Rousseau's conception of authenticity that is implicit in his 
autobiographical Confessions - which Williams considers naively romantic - and contrasts it with the life and 
writings ofDiderot. Williams, for instance, cites a passage from a letter Rousseau wrote to Malesherbes: "I shall 
show myself to you as I see myself, and as I am, for since I pass my life with myself! am bound to know myself, and 
I see from the manner in which others who think they know me inrerpret my actions and my conduct that they know 
nothing about them." Rousseau explains his decision to wrilf: the Gonftssions as follows: "I decided to make ofit a 
work that would be unique because ofits unparalleled truthfulness, so that once at least people would be able to see 
a man as he is within himselP' (Williatns 2002, 175). Williams' chapter from which this and subsequent passages 
originate is much richer than I can do justice to here. 
3 For discussion, see also Roessler (2or5a, rsg-6o) and Feldmann and Hazlett (2013). 
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of insincerity only from familiarity with the modes of unforced conversation that 
are to be simulated. (Ryle 1949, 162) 
When talk is guarded, Ryle writes, we need to exercise "sleuth-like qualities", that 
is, we have to "infer from what is said and done to what would have been said, if 
wariness had not been exercised, as well as to the motives of the wariness" (1949, 
165). He compares a person's guarded self-ascriptions to the pages of a sealed book, 
and contrasts this with spontaneous, unguarded talk, which he compares to the pages 
of an open book; he adds that "the fact that concealments have to be penetrated does 
not imply that non-concealments have to be penetrated" (1949, 165). 
So if expressing your mental states means avowing your mental states and 
avowing one's mental states means offering sincere mental self-ascriptions, then, 
following Williams and Ryle, we might understand this to involve speaking one's 
mind in a spontaneous, uninhibited or unguarded way. If only avowals are the 
right sort of self..ascriptive speech acts to be included in the epistemic expressivist 
account, then only our spontaneous self-ascriptions can be known expressively. 
The idea that avowals must be spontaneous or unguarded also plays a role in Bar-
On's account. She for instance, writes that "what I have been calling 'avowals' ... are 
to be contrasted with 'alienated' or 'theoretical' self-ascriptions" (2004, 172). She 
characterizes the latter by suggesting that these are ascriptions made, for example, 
"on the basis of therapy, consultation with others, self-interpretation, or cognitive 
test results" (2004, 194). 4 The sort of self-ascriptions that are ruled out as avowals 
are, for instance, those that are offered in response to certain sorts of promptings. 
The reason for this, I take it, is because the subject might be in the business of 
answering a question rather than in the business of spontaneously speaking from 
her mental state. For expressivists, what makes avowals special (epistemically and 
otherwise) is that they are 'groundless' or 'immediate', i.e. that the avower has no 
"reasons or grounds for her avowal" other than the first-order mental state itself. If 
this were not the case, offering an avowal would not be similar to smiling- smiling 
directly 'speaks from' the underlying mental state and is not mediated by having a 
'reason' to smile, or on the judgement that I am pleased to see you. Bar-On is explicit 
about this: 
4 Moran (2oor) similarly suggests that self-ascriptions made in the context of psychotherapy aren't avowals (see e.g. 
Moran 2001, 86). 
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When avowing, as opposed to issuing a mental self-ascription on the basis of 
evidence, inference, analysis, or self-interpretation, a subject has no reason, or 
epistemic grounds, for affirming the various components of the self-ascription 
other than whatever reason or grounds she has for issuing the self-ascription as 
a whole. (Bar-On 2004, 226) 
The question, though, is this: when we are actually dealing with unguarded, 
uninhibited, spontaneous self-ascriptions, and thus, avowals, is it even possible to 
distinguish real avowals- spontaneous, unguarded self-ascriptions- from seeming 
avowals, i.e. guarded self-ascriptions? How many of our self-ascriptions are really 
spontaneous and unprompted? 
Interestingly, Ryle notes that "often we do not know whether [talk is guarded] 
or not, even in the avowals we make to ourselves" (1949, 164-65). Ryle thus realizes 
that there is an epistemic problem when it comes to being able to tell apart avowals 
and self-ascriptions that aren't avowals. However, Ryle does not seem to recognize 
the implications that this has for theories of self-knowledge that appeal to the 
notion of avowals. It seems right to me that we often don't know whether someone's 
self-ascription is guarded or unguarded, including our own. But if that's true, then 
this means that we often don't know whether or not we are dealing with a sincere 
self-ascription, and so by implication we don't know whether or not we are dealing 
with an avowal, which means we don't really know which of our self-ascriptions 
are epistemically privileged and which of them aren't. If that's the case, then the 
(moderate atomist) slogan that you know your own mind by speaking your mind 
does not really tell us very much. 
The emphasis on spontaneity or unpromptedness seems problematic because it 
rules out what appear to be perfectly normal instances of expressing one's mental 
states. Suppose, for instance, you're at a workshop, and the coffee break has just 
begun. You're standing next to someone and maybe you're slightly uncomfortable, 
perhaps because you cannot get the conversation going, or because you're tired of 
always talking about philosophy during coffee breaks, or because you're dreading 
your own talk after the break. Then, at the end of the room, you see they've brought 
in the sandwiches. In order to avoid the uncomfortable situation, you say to the 
person standing next to you, "I'm hungry" (which is true) or "I'm going to grab a 
sandwich" (also true), and with a nod to the person next to you, you walk off to the 
buffet. 
6c Chapter 3 
This seems to me a very ordinary scenario involving speaking your mind. However, 
though your self-ascription was sincere, it was clearly prompted, or in any case not 
particularly 'spontaneous'. You offered your avowal partly in order to avoid talking to 
this person. It is not as if, in this example, you had "no reason, or epistemic grounds, 
for affirming the various components of the self-ascription other than whatever 
reason or grounds ... [you had] for issuing the self-ascription as a whole" (Bar-On 
2004, 226). So it seems, to the extent that your self-ascription was, as R.yle would 
say, to some extent 'guarded', that your self-ascription does not belong to the class 
of speech acts that count as avowals. Or in other words, if your self-ascription was 
not a genuine avowal, then the expressive account of self-knowledge cannot apply 
to it. You don't come to acquire self-knowledge by having avowed your mental state, 
because expressivists would not consider it to be a case of having avowed anything 
at all. You have either expressed or spoken your mind when you said "I'm going to 
grab a sandwich", but you have not 'avowed' anything, which would be rather strange 
because it would require decoupling 'speaking/expressing one's mind' and 'avowing' 
something, which I take it is something an expressivist would not be willing to do. 
Alternatively, you did not express or speak your mind and so did not avow anything. 
But if one cannot be said to speak one's mind or express a desire when one says "I'm 
going to grab a sandwich", then when does one speak one's mind? 
With the self-ascriptions that Bar-On rules out as avowals, she includes those 
made on the basis of"consultation with others" (2004, 194). The reason for this, 
I take it, is that Bar-On assumes that in conversational contexts, people's self-
ascriptions are never spontaneous but are always prompted, because, for example, 
they're given in response to a question. For self-ascriptions to qualify as avowals they 
cannot be prompted. But suppose that during a conversation with a close friend, 
Harry self-ascribes the feeling of grief over the loss of his father. 5 Harry clearly does 
not just 'vent' or 'air' his feelings; his self-ascription requires effort, and is only 
offered because his friend knows him well and feels confident to push him a little. 
It is only after a series of inquisitive questions that Harry finally has the courage to 
speak his mind. 
What would an expressivist say about a case like Harry's? First of all, Harry's self-
ascription is offered in the context of consultation with others, which appears to 
5 This is intended to be a case of a self-ascribed feeling rather than, for example, a trait or a description of a pattern 
ofbehaviour. 
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be incompatible with avowing anything. Second, Harry has reasons or grounds for 
issuing his self-ascription other than speaking directly from his feelings: he offers 
the self-ascription because he wants to feel better and because he wants to stop his 
friend giving him a hard time, etc. Third, it's also not unlikely that Harry's self-
ascription is made on the basis of evidence. Maybe, during the conversation, he has, 
if only very briefly, considered his feelings over the last couple of months. Maybe he 
imagined his father and noticed a distinct pang of sadness, on the basis of which 
Harry inferred that it is grief that he had been feeling (cf. Lawlor 2009). Or maybe 
it's only when Harry hears himself say the words that he is still grieving following 
the death of his father that everything locks into place and that Harry finally realizes 
that this has been what was on his mind, or what was bothering him, and only now 
does be discover his feelings. 
Despite the fact that Harry seems to have spoken his mind, nearly everything 
seems to be going wrong, from an expressivist's point of view. Again, we have 
two options. Either Harry spoke his mind but has not 'avowed' anything, which is 
implausible for the reasons given above, or he did not speak his mind and so did not 
offer an avowal, which again seems implausible. 
The more general problem regarding the notion of avowals is that whereas the 
notion of an avowal is meant to be more or less intuitive, it turns out to be a technical 
one. 6 Worse, it seems that only expressivists can tell us what it means to (truly) avow 
your mental state. This is illustrated, for instance, by Bar-On's discussion of so-
called 'negative avowals'. Negative avowals involve the ascription of the absence of 
a mental state, such as "I am not feeling hungry", "I do not believe that p", "I am 
not angry with you". Such ascriptions can, it seems, be true, and they are in many 
ways relevantly similar to positive avowals of the sort I've been discussing (e.g. "I am 
feeling hungry"). 
The problem is that when it comes to negative avowals, there is no corresponding 
first-order state, and therefore they seem to pose a problem, for there is nothing 
for the subject to express or speak 'from'. To deal with this problem, Bar-On first 
of all claims that negative self-ascriptions are "not self-ascriptions of absence but 
rather ascriptions of 'complementary' mental states" (Bar-On 2004, 334). So "I 
do not think P or "I do not want X" is, she suggests, a positive avowal in disguise, 
namely "I think not-P" or "I want not-X". This strategy is not entirely satisfactory, 
6 Snowdon (2or2, 246) makes the same point against Crispin Wright 
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though, because the meaning of the complementary positive self-ascription is not 
necessarily the same as the negative avowal. As Brueckner writes, when I avow "I 
do not believe there are exactly ninety-nine wombats in the Ukraine" then I am not 
thereby expressing a belief that there are not ninety-nine wombats in the Ukraine. 
What I do, rather, is suspend judgement on the Ukrainian wombat population" 
(Brueckner 2on, r86). It seems plausible that there will be negative avowals for 
which we cannot find a semantically equivalent positive complement ("I am not 
angry with you" or "I do not feel jealous" seem to be good candidates). This is 
where Bar-On turns to a second strategy and responds by saying that if there are 
examples of where we cannot find a semantically equivalent complement of a 
negative avowal, then these aren't avowals; rather, they are alienated or theoretical 
self-reports in disguise. She writes, "I suspect that actual cases fitting this bill will 
not be easy to find. But if we find them, I see no compelling intuitive reasons to 
regard them as avowals" (Bar-On 2004, 334). These 'seeming' avowals are actually 
self-interpretations camouflaged as expressive self-ascriptions. This is strange. 
After all, these self-reports in disguise are phenomenologically identical to avowals. 
My main worry here is chiefly methodological: what justifies our seeing a 
particular ascription as a self-interpretation rather than an avowal, if what it seems 
like from the subject's point of view does not provide us with the answer? Aidan 
McGlynn (2on) claims that the fact that Bar-On cannot handle expressions in the 
absence of some mental state is the "biggest problem" that expressivism faces. 
Although I think McGlynn is absolutely right that it's important for expressivism 
to be able to deal with negative avowals, what seems more problematic to me is 
that expressivism turns out to rely on a rather technical notion of avowals - one 
that, coincidentally, is congenial to the expressivist thesis - and that only the 
expressivist seems to be able to distinguish between seeming and genuine avowals. 
In other words, the expressivist can 'handle' expressions of the absence of some 
mental state, but can only do so at the cost of making the concept of avowals, and so 
expressive self-ascriptions, rather elusive. 
The overall point is that it's unclear what avowals are supposed to be. To avow 
a mental state is, apparently, not just to speak your mind sincerely but to do so in a 
very specific way, i.e. doing so in a way that is non-interpretative, not prompted, not 
in conversational circumstances, and so on. Bar-On does mention, in a footnote, the 
contrast between 'avowals proper' and what she calls 'mixed avowals', i.e. avowals 
that have "descriptive or reportive elements" (2004, 304). The question is how we 
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know whether we're dealing with a mixed avowal or with a self-report. Only the 
first, after all, delivers privileged self-knowledge. If we don't know when our self-
ascriptions are expressive, or qualifY as avowals, and when they are not, then we 
don't, on closer inspection, know which of our self-ascriptions represent privileged 
self-knowledge and which of them do not. The more fundamental problem is not 
just an epistemic one- of how to tell the two apart- but a metaphysical one. Are 
there really such things as avowals (proper), to be distinguished from other types of 
self-ascriptions? We may have reason to be sceptical. 
One option, of course, is to ignore all of the 'mixed' cases and restrict the 
expressivistaccountofself-knowledge to avowals proper, that is, avowals that are truly 
unprompted, spontaneous, unguarded, and so on. It seems we do sometimes offer 
these sorts of self-ascriptions, e.g. when I run into you and immediately I say "I'm so 
happy to see you!", or ifl see a piece of carrot cake and I cannot help myselffrom saying 
"I want that!". The problem with restricting expressivism to avowals proper, though, 
is that the scope of expressivism is very narrow, because many of our self-expressions 
aren't 'proper' in the intended sense. Arguably, the sort of self-ascriptions that do fit 
the 'avowal proper' bill involve rather primitive ways of expressing ourselves. We can, 
and often do, control when we speak our minds, how we speak our minds or to whom 
we speak our minds. Pace Ryle, this is not the "sophisticated" but rather the natural 
thing to do - the less natural thing to do would just be to vent or air our thoughts 
and feelings whenever and wherever they came to us. My understanding is that one 
of the things that distinguishes adults from infants is precisely the fact that their self-
ascriptions can be guarded to greater and lesser degrees, respectively. 
One of the strengths of contemporary expressivist accounts is insisting that 
speaking our minds is an intentional act. But, ironically, this strength is arguably 
also its weakness. For, given that speaking our minds is intentional, this also means 
that we can, to some extent, control whether we speak our minds at all, or choose 
not to do so. In other words, if we see avowals as intentional actions, which seems 
plausible enough, then this has as its consequence that usually our self-ascriptions 
aren't as spontaneous, unprompted and unmediated in the way that non-mixed 
avowals are supposed to be. If we exclude all of our quasi-mediated or quasi-
prompted self-expressions, then nothing much is left for the expressivist to give an 
epistemic account of. 
Where does this leave us? Understanding expressivism along moderate atomist 
lines means that, in normal circumstances, you come to know your mind by 
speaking your mind. What follows from the above is that it isn't clear what this 
comes down to, because speaking one's mind turns out to require that one 'avows' 
one's mental states, and the notion of avowal turns out to be a technical notion. 
The expressivist seems to be required to say that many cases of what appear to be 
perfectly good and sincere instances of speaking one's mind either are not, despite 
appearances, instances of speaking one's mind after all, or they are instances of 
speaking one's mind but are not instances of 'avowing' something. Both options, 
though, seem to conflict with the idea that the expressivist's "starting point is a 
fumiliar phenomenon, which can be characterized ostensively as it were" (Bar-On 
2004, 26). 
This has consequences for the atomist approach to expressivism, because if we 
don't know whether or not someone's self-ascription counts as an avowal, then we 
don't know which of our self-ascriptions provide privileged self-knowledge and 
which do not. To the extent that it is clear ('avowals proper'), there's the worry that 
the scope of the expressivist theory only covers rather primitive self-ascriptions, 
which would make expressivism a lot less plausible in terms of proposing to offer a 
'theory of self-knowledge'. 
In the next section I assume, for the sake of the argument, that we can help 
ourselves to the notion of an avowal and that one offers an avowal when expressing 
or speaking one's mind. The question I address is whether speaking one's mind 
always delivers self-knowledge, as the radical atomist view claims, or whether 
it only does so in normal circumstances. This raises the question of what those 
circumstances might be and whether the exceptions don't end up becoming the 
rule. 
3· Ceteris Paribus II: assuming I am sane, sober and not asleep 
The idea that there are abnormal situations in which one's avowals do not provide 
self-knowledge seems widely assumed but it is rarely made explicit, let alone 
explained. But, for instance, in his article 'Expressing', William Alston writes 
that if a self-ascription is made "in a fit of abstraction, its indicative value will be 
impaired if not altogether lost" (Alston rg6s). Roessler agrees with Alston's main 
idea, to which he adds that the epistemic value of self-ascriptions is undermined not 
just in a fit of abstraction but also if made "during sleep, or in a state of advanced 
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intoxication" a. Roessler 2015a).7 And Victoria McGeer writes (though not in the 
context of expressivism), "Ifl claim to be upset or happy about something or to have 
a yearning for plum pudding, then, all things being equal (i.e. assuming I am sane, 
and sincere, and not deeply distracted), the appropriate default presumption is that 
such claims are true" (2007a, 8r). 8 So, in general, we might say that in the presence 
of a 'normal consciousness', expressing one's mental state amounts to knowing 
one's mental state. 
What this shows, first of all, is that even if you take an atomist approach to self-
knowledge and think that the question of what makes a person's self-ascription 
true can more or less be answered in terms of the procedures that the self-ascriber 
did or did not follow, you are not committed to the implausible view that the self-
knowledge procedure delivers self-knowledge in all (psychological) circumstances. 
Atomists, including expressivist atomists, can after all allow that psychological 
circumstances, like those mentioned above, matter to whether or nota self-ascription 
qualifies as self-knowledge by claiming that the relevant procedure only provides 
self-knowledge 'all else being equal' or under the 'normal' circumstances of self-
ascription. According to the expressivistview understood along atomist lines, then, 
all you need to do in order to have self-knowledge is to follow the relevant procedure 
-to speak your mind- and to be sincere, sane and sober. 
The ceteris paribus clauses mentioned by Alston, Roessler and McGeer can be 
taken to be uncontroversial because the circumstances that could undermine 
self-knowledge are highly exceptional or abnormal and so typically irrelevant for 
thinking about self-knowledge. Only in a handful of abnormal or extreme cases, 
such as 'advanced intoxication' or when one is 'deeply distracted,' do expressive 
7 As discussed in the previous chapter, Roessler (like Alston) explains the epistemic privileges of expressive self-
ascriptions by appealing to the idea that expression is an intentional action. On Roessler's account, the value of 
a self-ascription of an attitude as a source of knowledge of the speaker's attitude depends on the utterance being 
intentional, with the speaker realizing what she is doing. The idea here is that in such circumstances, one arguably 
does not "know what one is doing", and hence the self-ascription tails to express self-knowledge. The question 
thus becomes in what circumstances one fails to know what one is doing. 
8 In all fairness, McGeer here is making a claim about first-person authority, not self-knowledge. But given that many 
philosophers including McGeer do not properly distinguish between the two (or they start out by doing so, but end 
up confiating them again), I will not discuss the distinction here and will assume here that if we cannot assume 
someone is sane, then "the presumption that [a person's self-ascriptions) are true" (20o7a, 81) no longer holds. 
Characterizing McGeer's remarks as having this implication is somewhat unfair, but doing so is instrumentally 
convenient so that the issue can be brought to a head in this chapter. For what it's worth, I don't think it's plausible 
that 'sanity' should be a condition fur having first-person authority, either. 
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self-ascriptions fail to deliver self-knowledge. I'll call these circumstances -
intoxication, or being asleep or deeply distracted- 'exceptional circumstances'. The 
question I want to address is whether such an appeal to the 'normal' psychological 
circumstances is clear enough and so legitimate or not. If not, then this raises a 
challenge for the moderate atomist view of self-knowledge. 
To start, I want to observe that the sort of psychological circumstances mentioned 
so fur do not necessarily threaten the epistemic value of a self-ascription. Apart from 
the folk wisdom of the saying in uino veritas (which suggests that being intoxicated 
might, in some cases, give you an insight into what you care about most or whom you 
love, or indeed might give you the confidence required in order to come to know it), 
there seem to be quite a number of things that one can unproblematically know while 
being in a state of'advanced intoxication', for instance the desire to lie down or have 
a glass of water or that one is experiencing a headache and wants an aspirin. When a 
heavily intoxicated stranger (sincerely) tells you he wants to marry you, you might rightly 
take the epistemic value of his self-expression to be 'impaired if not altogether lost'. 
But if he tells you he is feeling sick and needs to throw up, you'd better believe him. In 
other words, he seems to know his own mind in spite ofbeing severely intoxicated. Also, 
'being asleep' need not threaten (all types of) self-knowledge. A sleepwalker might still 
know that she is hungry while (sleep )walking towards the fridge. · 
Nor does it seem plausible that being 'severely distracted' is a condition that we 
should necessarily include in ceteris paribus clauses. If someone is in a fit of anger, 
say, and is inclined to sincerely, but falsely, express herself in ways she will regret 
afterwards ("I wish you were dead", "I want a divorce", and so on), but then is 
suddenly deeply distracted by something (she witnesses a car accident, say), her 
being distracted might actually allow her to regain self-knowledge by allowing her 
to cool off and put her resentful thoughts and feelings into perspective. Distraction 
can be a good thing if your current thoughts or feelings do not represent your actual 
attitudes. Consider the following passage from Iris Murdoch: 
I am looking out of my window in an anxious and resentful state of mind, 
oblivious of my surroundings, brooding perhaps on some damage done to my 
prestige. Then suddenly I observe a hovering kestrel. In a moment everything is 
altered. The brooding self with its hurt vanity has disappeared. There is nothing 
now but kestrel. And when I return to thinking of the other matter it seems less 
important. (Murdoch 1970, 67-68) 
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Sheila Mullett (1987) suggests that Murdoch is going through what she refers to as 
an 'allocentric' shift- a shift away from her own inner states towards the world -
and thereby comes to see her own attitudes anew and learns something about herself 
and her attitudes in the process (1987, 317). Maybe this is not what was going on at 
all in Murdoch's case, but the idea that distraction is necessarily a circumstance in 
which one cannot acquire self-knowledge is certainly too strong. 
My main concern with the appeal to ruling out exceptional circumstances is not 
that these exceptional circumstances aren't necessarily undermining, as suggested 
above, but rather that the circumstances that threaten the epistemic status of our 
sincere self-ascriptions are not particularly exceptional, i.e. that the list is (fur) from 
sufficient. The idea would seem to be that if you speak your mind, provided that 
you are sober, sane and sincere, then you know your own mind. But being sober, 
sane and sincere is no guarantee of expressive self-knowledge, for there are many 
circumstances that are not particularly exceptional or extreme in any way but which 
still raise important challenges regarding the epistemic status of people's self-
ascriptions. 
As we've seen, Alston mentions 'severe intoxication' as a potentially undermining 
circumstance. But what about just being tipsy? You might be out for drinks with 
a colleague, and you end up having one drink too many, which leads you to self-
ascribe, rather impulsively and naively, the intention to be at work on time tomorrow. 
You're not drunk, let alone severely intoxicated, and yet your psychological condition 
makes it such that your self-ascription of your intention is implausible. Having had 
too much coffee can also lead people to speak their minds where doing so fails to 
deliver them with self-knowledge. Suppose I sincerely express feeling nervous for 
a meeting or a telephone call later in the afternoon, but come to realize that I have 
probably drunk way too much coffee. In such a case, I have misinterpreted some of 
the bodily cues that are similar to both anxiety and having had too much caffeine. 
Having had too much coffee can hardly be considered an exceptional psychological 
condition, but still, in at least some cases, being 'high on caffeine' might lead to 
expressive fuilures. 
Being sleep-deprived is another possible 'self-knowledge defeater'. Suppose 
Sally suffers from insomnia and hasn't had a proper sleep in days. When she wakes 
up, she feels reluctant to get out of bed and to go outside, and she shrinks from 
the thought of having to go to her friend's dinner party. Sally knows her occurrent 
thoughts, but does she have knowledge of what she wants? Does her sincere self-
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ascription "I don't want to go to the dinner party" accurately represent her attitude? 
It does not seem implausible to think that not having had enough sleep might 
make Sally think that not getting out of bed is what she really wants, even though 
it's not. 9 Perhaps one doesn't need to be sleep-deprived for one's self-expressions 
to fail to provide self-knowledge- perhaps one simply has to get out ofbed on the 
wrong side. 
Being hungry is another potentially epistemically relevant psychological 
condition. For some people, being hungry makes it hard to know what they believe, 
feel or want. Consider Hungry Tess. When we ask Hungry Tess whether she wants 
to go, say, to the cinema later this evening, she expresses her desire to stay at home. 
If we ask her again, she will probably get irritable. After having had some lunch, 
however, Tess feels and thinks differently about the subject matter. Not only does 
she regret her being irritable but she now thinks that she didn't see things clearly 
before: she didn't knowwhat she was saying when she self-ascribed the desire to stay 
at home rather than go to the cinema. When Hungry Tess self-ascribed the desire to 
stay at home, it was, as we might say, not Tess but rather 'the hunger talking'. Again, 
hunger is hardly an 'exceptional' circumstance or a condition that we can just rule 
out from the outset. The following statement is, after all, somewhat odd: 'speaking 
your mind allows you to know your mind, unless you're hungry'. 
It's also plausible that whether or not someone acquires self-knowledge by 
speaking her mind might depend on the stakes or the costs of being wrong. This 
seems plausible, in particular for many of our more complex attitudes: you're more 
inclined to make expressive failures if a lot is at stake when you are speaking your 
mind. But even in relation to much more simple self-ascriptions, such as self-
ascribed sensations, we can imagine that the question of whether someone has self-
knowledge is context-sensitive. An excellent example of such a case is provided by 
Paul Snowdon (2012): 
Imagine you are having troubling pains in your stomach. The doctor after an 
examination says: "It is one of two complaints. There is a test to determine 
which. I shall apply pressure to a region and it will cause pain in two areas-one 
9 Again, just as in Murdoch's case, this isn't necessarily the case. You can be sleep-deprived and genuinely have a 
desire to stay in bed, and know that you do. The point is only that it is possible in at least some cases that your 
original self-ascription was in fact false and that your occurrent thoughts and feelings misrepresented your actual 
attitudes. 
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left and one right-and which ever hurts most tells us what the problem is." He 
then applies the pressure and you judge that the left area hurts most. The doctor 
then says: "Oh dear, that means that you have a very serious condition, requiring 
drastic treatment. If it had been the right side then it would have been minor." 
Confronted with this, do you say: "Since my judgment is incorrigible go ahead 
with the drastic treatment?" Or might you say: "Do you mind if we repeat the 
test? Maybe I was a little bit hasty-I would like to make sure and check things"? 
(Snowdon 2012, 359) 
Snowdon rightly points out that in such a 'high-stake' case, we would opt for the 
second sort of response, not the first. Snowdon's example is meant to challenge 
the idea that beliefs about our sensations are supposed to be incorrigible, but for 
present purposes, we can also take his example to illustrate the fact that many of 
our self-ascriptions- not just the more complex self-ascriptions of our attitudes but 
also more simple self-ascriptions of our sensations - can be importantly context-
sensitive or 'stake-dependent'. It seems plausible to think that in the sort of example 
given by Snowdon, the initial avowal (e.g. "My left side hurts the most") did not 
provide the subject with knowledge of her sensations. And yet it seems implausible 
to include these sorts of cases in the original ceteris paribus clauses. It's implausible 
to say, for instance, that speaking your mind provides you with self-knowledge, 
assuming the implications of your self-ascription do not determine whether or not 
you're seriously ill. 
The overall message should be clear: human beings tend to get tipsy, distracted, 
confused, sick, nervous, angry, depressed, uptight, drunk and sleepy, become 
euphoric, jealous, foolhardy and insecure, and fall in love. In a great many cases, 
these circumstances - hardly exceptional - cause us to think, act and express 
ourselves in ways such that our self-ascriptions do not amount to self-knowledge. 
Certain circumstances make us speak our minds too easily (e.g. being in love, high 
on adrenaline, enthusiastic, the subject in an experimental study), the result of which 
is that our self-expressions do not provide self-knowledge. Also, making up our 
minds in certain circumstances might even lead us to (greater) self-deception (e.g. 
depression or insecurity, being under stress or dealing with hormonal fluctuations). 
Interestingly, the idea that non-exceptional circumstances can impede self-
knowledge is widely accepted when we consider the sincere self-ascriptions that 
young infants make. Children are more often liable to make expressive failures. 
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When considering young infants, the epistemic impact of being tired, thirsty, angry, 
and so on is especially salient. Parents are typically aware that their children are not 
fully competent self..ascribers yet, and they sometimes know what state their child is 
in better than the infant, particularly by taking the circumstances into consideration. 
For instance, imagine a toddler fretting and crying for a while, and finally saying "I'm 
thirsty!". The toddler's self-expression is sincere, even spontaneous, and yet his or her 
parents might not want to take the toddler's self-report at face value because it doesn't 
express the toddler's real or genuine desire- which is, simply, to get some sleep. 
In the case of young infants, we find it intuitive to give circumstances their due 
when it comes to whether or not our expressive self-ascriptions amount to self-
knowledge. Outside philosophy, we seem to take the epistemic relevance of certain 
circumstances seriously as well. But these considerations have had surprisingly 
little impact on the philosophical debate on self-knowledge, including the literature 
on expressivism. My suggestion would be to realize that there isn't a clear division 
between the epistemic value of infants' self-expressions and the epistemic value 
of self-ascriptions of sincere, sober, sane and mature adults. Epistemically 
undermining psychological circumstances were relevant when we were young, and 
they remain relevant when we grow older. 
I don't want to suggest that, on closer inspection, we hardly ever know what we 
want, think or hope for, because of this fact of human nature. The point, rather, 
is that we should not be mistaken in thinking that there is some kind of neutral 
psycholo.9ica! state that would provide the 'normal' circumstance of self-knowledge. 
There is no determinate list to be given of what the relevant ceteris paribus clauses 
are. The reason is that what counts as epistemically undermining circumstances is 
something that needs to be assessed in relation to the person who issues a self-
ascription and the life that she leads. Whereas for Hungry Tess being hungry might 
be epistemically undermining, it might not be epistemically undermining for 
Hungry Tim. Indeed, being hungry might be epistemically undermining for Hungry 
Tess on Tuesday, but not on Thursday. Likewise, being tipsy might lead Peter to 
issue self-expressions that lead to self-deception, whereas being tipsy might lead 
Petra to make self-expressions that instead lead to self-revelation. 
All this points in the direction of a holist rather than an atomist expressivist 
view. A holist version of expressivism would hold that the question of what makes 
someone's self-ascription true cannot simply be answered, assuming everything 
else is equal, by zooming in on the self-ascriptive act (is it an expression, i.e. was it 
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sincere and 'unguarded'?). On a holistview of self-knowledge, the question of what 
makes someone's expressive self-ascription true (or false) is something that depends 
at least in part on the attitude type, the content of the attitude, the self-ascriber's 
character traits and her earlier actions (history), as well as on her dispositions 
(future) and the context in which the self-ascription was made. A holist view would 
say that self-ascriptions have their proper place within the life of a person and that 
the question of what makes someone's self-ascribed attitude knowledgeable must 
be answered relative to that life and not just relative to her expressive act. 
An expressivist might object that the criterion for expressive self-knowledge 
isn't that one simply acquires self-knowledge when expressing oneself, but, more 
specifically, when one speaks one's own mind. My response to this objection is 
twofold. First, the distinction between expressing 'a' mental state versus expressing 
one's 'own' mental state is not unproblematic (see previous chapter). Second, even 
if we can talk meaningfully about expressing one's own mental state rather than 'a' 
mental state, then this still leaves the question of what counts as 'my' mental state.'0 
One might propose to answer this question of ownership by appealing to some sort 
of mental realism, as Bar-On proposes. But this, as discussed in the previous chapter, 
seems to be a somewhat evasive strategy, because the question of what is required for 
an (expressed) self-ascription to count as self-knowledge is simply outsourced to an 
appeal to mental realism, the latter of which is usually not elaborated upon much. n 
The question of ownership becomes particularly pressing when we consider that, 
first, many of our attitudes are not restricted to the here-and-now, but instead have 
"a reasonable life expectancy" (M. Fricker 2oog, 52) and second, that one can have 
a belief that P, hope for Q or desire for R without consciously considering P, Q or 
Rat a specific time. This challenges the idea that one only acquired self-knowledge 
when one expresses one's 'own' mental state, because what the subject's own mental 
state is, is not something she needs to be actively considering or consciously thinking 
about. To say what makes a belief or desire 'mine', we need to say something about the 
me whose attitude it is. This is just another way of saying that one cannot explain the 
idea of what it means for a mental state to belong to a subject, or what it means for a 
mental state to be the subject's own, without mentioning the subject's (mental) life. 
ro For a different but related discussion regarding the so-called experience of'mineness' of one's mental states, and 
a suggestion of how to explain such mineness in coherentist-narrative terms, see Slors and Jongepier (20I4). 
rr I return to the claim regarding the relevance of metaphysics for questions concerning self. knowledge in the final 
chapter. 
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The point is that self-expressions as such don't necessarily give us self-knowledge. 
One might after all express oneself rather badly. In order for self-expressions to allow 
for self-knowledge, one needs to make an extra step. More specifically, one needs to 
make an interpretative step from one's self-expression (which functions as material 
for self-interpretation) to the conclusion that one is (likely to be) in a mental state. 
For example, I might infer on the basis of the fact that I spontaneously expressed the 
desire to jump in the fountain that I have the desire to actually jump in the fountain. 
But I might come to a rather different conclusion on the basis of the same 'expressive 
evidence'- an equally possible conclusion is that the thought merely occurred to me 
to jump in the fountain. I don't have a genuine desire to jump in the fountain. In other 
words, our self-expressions are best understood as forms of self-interpretation, and 
so expressivism is best understood along 'interpretationist' or 'inferentialist' lines 
(Ryle 1949; Bern 1972; Gopnik 1993; Cas sam 2014, 2015a, Lawlor 2003, 2008, 2009). 
In the next section, I elaborate on what an interpretationist version of expressivism, 
which would be compatible with a holist approach, might look like. 
4· Self-expression as self-interpretation 
Of particular interest in this context is Charles Taylor's (1985) expressivistview. He argues 
that as 'self-interpreting animals' we are bound up in a process of articulating ourselves 
and that such self-interpretations shape us by informing and changing our attitudes. 
On Taylor's account, expressing ourselves involves 'articulating' what we feel and think. 
Our linguistic articulations of our thoughts and feelings enable us to see whether or not 
our attitudes or emotions become more focused, intelligible or coherent to us as a result 
(or the opposite). The point of self-expression is "to get clear about how I feel by letting 
my emotions take shape and find a voice in whatlsayanddo" (Carman 2003). 
The central interpretationist claim is that self-knowledge is a matter of 
interpreting what attitudes we have on the basis of the available evidence. As 
Quassim Cas sam points out, there are many different kinds of evidence: "One kind 
of evidence is behavioural but there are other possibilities; you can discover your own 
standing attitudes on the basis of your judgements, inner speech, dreams, passing 
thoughts and feelings" (Cassaro 2014, 138). Krista Lawlor (2009), for instance, 
makes a convincing case for the idea that knowledge of one's desire is derived from 
inferences of what she calls 'internal promptings'. Internal promptings can include 
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simple sensations but might also include one's emotions, imaginings and goings-
on in inner speech.U Inference from internal promptings, she says, is "a routine 
means by which we know what we want" (2009, 48). 
The suggestion would be to simply add 'self-expressions' to thelistof'promptings'. 
For instance, articulating one's feelings- e.g. expressing one's anger or desire-
might give one "a sense of ease or settledness" (Lawlor 2009, 57). This feeling might 
be a (good) indication of whether you really are angry or whether you really do have 
the self..expressed desire. Or you might order a glass of champagne (by avowing "I 
want some champagne") and immediately realize that "what you actually want is a 
vodka martini" (Cassaro 2014, 143). The same, Cassaro points out, may well apply to 
one's beliefs: "you say you believe the present government will be re-elected but the 
minute you say the words you realize they don't ring true" (ibid.). Even though beliefs 
and desires aren't feelings, "what you feel can sometimes tell you what you believe or 
desire" (Cassaro 2014, 144). Lawlor's and Cassaro's suggestions seem congenial to the 
sort of view Taylor defends, according to whom we come to experience the accuracy of 
our new self-expressions on the basis of what these words stir up in us. 
If avowals are self--interpretations, then it seems we would have to give up on the 
idea that expression is a 'success notion' and would instead have to see expression 
as an "evidential" notion (Davis 2003, 47; Eriksson 2009, 217-19). This means that 
self-expressions are (good) 'indications' on the basis of which one can infer what 
one's attitudes are. According to Alston, ifx has "indicative value" relative toy then 
"from x one can (fairly safely) infer the existence ofy" (1965, 20). Footprints in the 
snow, for instance, give us a good reason to think that someone was there before us. 
Applied to expressive self-ascriptions, the idea is that a self-ascription, such as "I 
feel bored", gives me a good reason to think that I am genuinely in the mental state 
of feeling bored. As Eriksson remarks, 'expression as indication' is a weaker notion 
than 'expression as showing': 
12. Lawlor gives the following example: "Katherine, a young woman, stands by her son's crib, watching him sleep. 
'Have another'-she hears the words in her head. She is startled. Was she thinking about that? She supposes she 
was, but she wonders: was that a directive from some part of her? Or was it a question? Or was it something else?" 
(Lawlor 2009, 47). Lawlor Imagines her to acquire self-knowledge in the following way: "[H]ow will Katherine 
find out what she wants? Now that the question has been called, Katherine starts noticing her experiences and 
thoughts. She catches herself imagining, remembering, and feeling a range of things. Putting away herson's now-
too-small clothes, she finds herselflingering over the memory of how a newborn feels in one's arms. She notes 
an emotion that could be envy when an acquaintance reveals her pregnancy. Such experiences may be enough to 
prompt Katherine to make a self-attribution that sticks. Saying 'I want another child', she may feel a sense of ease 
or settledness" (Lawlor 2009, 57). 
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it is possible to indicate, in the sense outlined, that one has a particular state 
of mind without actually having it, i.e., one can express, e.g., the belief that p 
without having the belief that p .... Asserting that p gives us reason, albeit not 
conclusive reason, to think that the speaker believes that P. (Eriksson 2009, 218) 
The above also holds for the speaker himself. When Larry speaks his mind and 
expresses his desire to stop studying for his PhD, then this gives him a good reason, 
though not a conclusive reason, to think that he wants to stop studying for his PhD. 
Differently formulated, Larry's spontaneous and sincere self-ascriptions expressed 
in private or in public form a good basis on which Larry can come to know what his 
desires are. So when we speak our minds, we do not necessarily show our states; 
rather, we give (very good) evidence of what state we're in. 
There are different ways of understanding expressivism as a version of 
interpretationism. For instance, one might think of one's mental states, of 
which one's self-expressions form (good) evidence, either along realist or along 
constructivist lines. On a realist view, one might think that there are certain facts 
of the matter as to what one's attitudes are, and that speaking your mind isn't 
constitutive of them. '3 Alternatively, one might think that one's self-expressions 
and other 'promptings' can only be evidence of one's attitudes, depending on how 
one sees, conceives, feels about or interprets these promptings. In other words, 
a person's self-expressions would be very peculiar 'indications'; they're not like 
footprints in the snow, because the subject's relation to her own self-expressions is, 
at least in part, what would make them reliable indications in the first place. This, I 
take it, is Taylor's view, according to whom "our interpretation of ourselves and our 
experience is constitutive of what we are" (C. Taylor rg8s, 47). He suggests that we 
must understand the notion of'self-interpretation' as a form of self-understanding, 
where such self-understanding is reflexive in the sense that we relate our attitudes 
to our other attitudes and projects and what we care about or find important. Taylor 
proposes that "our attempted definitions of what is really important can be called 
I3 Lawlor seems to lean towards a realist approach, as her understanding of the notion of self-interpretation 
seems to suggest. Self-interpretation, for Lawlor, is a causal notion. She writes, "In interpreting the import of 
these rehearsals, one does a special sort of interpretive work: ... one interprets one's imaginings for their likely 
cause, for the trace of desire they carry. One engages in causal self-interpretation" (Lawlor 2009, 72-73, see also 
2008). Lawlor continues, "Assigning a cause is part and parcel ofidentifYing the mental attitude that underlies the 
imaging", because doing so is "a way of identifYing one's imaging as the product of an intending, a remembering, 
or a desiring, to a specific effect. Assigning a cause is knowing one's mind" (Lawlor 2009, 73). 
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interpretations" (rg8s, 75). On Taylor's account, the question of what our attitudes 
are is not independent of our expressive efforts to interpret them and thereby try to 
make sense of them. Taylor suggests that expressing our minds allows us to relate 
to our mental states in a new and different way, simply because we have made our 
thoughts or feelings explicit. 
However, whatever interpretationistview one favours, it's clear that construing 
expressivism along interpretationist and, as I have suggested, holist lines requires 
giving up on what appears to be one of the most fundamental if not the most 
fundamental expressivist claim, namely that when we speak our minds, we make our 
mental states directly visible to others and that speaking our mind involves "showing 
us the conditions they express" (Bar-On 2004, 2 71). '4 The question, then, is whether 
there's anything still distinctively expressivist about an interpretationist expressivist 
view, or indeed a holist expressivistview according to which the question of whether 
someone's sincere self-ascriptions provide knowledge can only be answered by 
seeing how the self-ascription relates to the specific (psychological) circumstances 
the person is in, the relation her self-expression has to her other attitudes, values , 
self-conception, character traits, and more generally, how the subject relates to 
herself.'s 
So far, I've only considered a moderate atomist version of expressivism, and 
have suggested that this view isn't plausible; if that is true, it would be a reason 
for considering what a non-atomist expressivist view would look like. However, the 
alternative is to go radical: to deny that there are undermining circumstances at all 
and to say that whenever one avows being in mental state M, one is necessarily in 
the relevant mental state. This involves a retreat to what I referred to as the radical 
14 This also seems to be a problem for Taylor. In addressing the question of what is meant by 'expression', Taylor 
writes, "I think it means roughly this: something is expressed, when it is embodied in such a way as to be made 
manifest And 'manifest' must be taken here in a strong sense. Something is manifest when it is directly available 
forall to see. It Is not manifest when there are just signs ofits presence, from which we can infer that it is there., 
such as when I 'see' that you are in your office because of your car being parked outside" (C. Tllylor 1985, 219). 
rs By the latter I mean that! expect that any holist construal of expressivism, or any holist account of self-knowledge 
more generally, must include a 'reflexive' component regarding the subject's self-understanding, for example how 
she relatts to her own beliefS, intentions, personality, and so on. David Velleman characterizes reflexivity as follows: 
"Some activities and mental states have an intentional object: they are mentally directed at something. Of these, 
some can take their own subject as intentional object: they can be mentally directed at that which occupies the state 
or performs the activity. Of these, some can be mentally directed at their own subject conceived as such -conceived, 
that is, as occupying this very state or performing this very activity. A reflexive mode of presentation is a way of 
thinking that directs an activity or mental state at its own subject conceived as such" (Velleman 2oo6, 2; see also 
DOring and Dtiwell2orsl-
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atomist version of expressivism. But in that case, we would have to say that all the 
non-exceptional circumstances thati have mentioned, e.g. anger, intoxication, sleep, 
hormones, and so on, have no impact on the epistemic value of a self-ascription. 
Faced with this alternative, it seems better to accept the holist-interpretationist 
alternative just sketched. 
In the next two sections, I want to argue that the atomist version of expressivism 
can be traced back to the reluctance to see avowals or sincere self-ascriptions (I shall 
use these notions interchangeably) as genuine assertions, and I suggest that self-
ascriptions are communicative acts- a view congenial to the holist-interpretationist 
approach suggested above. 
5· Diagnosis: self-expression and communication 
Contemporary expressivists like Bar-On want to retain a delicate balancing act 
between seeing so-called avowals as instances of 'airing' or 'venting' on the one 
hand and seeing them as truth-evaluable and so semantically continuous with other 
ascriptions on the other. The first element of the balancing act is what makes the 
account expressivist, whereas the second element is what prevents one's account 
from collapsing into simple expressivism. In this section, I want to explain why this 
balancing act cannot, in the end, be pulled off. 
Recall that Bar-On is reluctant to see avowals as assertions. To express one's 
mental state, on her view, is to "show the conditions they express, rather than merely 
communicate information" (Bar-On 2004, 273). The contrast is thus between 
showing something on the one hand and communicating something on the other, 
and Bar-On's suggestion is that avowals are thus not instances of communicating 
information. 
When you make use of a truth-evaluable sentence, such as "I'm so pleased to 
see you!", "I'd like a cappuccino" or "I really need a holiday", Bar-On claims you 
are not aiming to report or describe your mental state and are not in the business 
of informing your audience what mental state you're in. In his article 'Language 
as Thought and as Communication,' Sellars makes the radical suggestion that the 
activity of thinking out loud is "a form of meaningful speech which doesn't consist 
in talking to anyone at all, even oneself, and hence is not, in any ordinary sense, 
talking" (Sellars rg6g, sr8). Echoing Sellars, Bar-On writes that self-ascriptive 
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expressions are not made "with the aim of informing their audience of what is 
going on in them" and are not acts subjects undertake "to perform with a specific 
audience-directed goal in mind, such as convincing, informing, pleasing, etc. 
Like many non-verbal expressive acts, they may not even have any communicative 
point" (2004, 242). So when someone says "I think that P" or "I want X", she is not 
(intentionally) informing or telling anyone anything but simply expressing her view 
that P or her desire for X. 
Avowals, then (whatever they are), are pseudo-assertions at best. Avowals are 
continuous with our ordinary means of communication only to the extent that we 
use the same semantic vehicles. The basic idea is that expressive self-ascriptions 
are not (proper) assertions because in issuing them, one has no 'communicative 
intention' to report what state one is in.'6 
However, I don'tthink the appeal to (the absence of) communicative intentions is 
a good reason to deny that avowals are assertions. Even though the basic insight that 
often our spontaneous and sincere self-ascriptions are not made with the intention 
of communicating something or informing anyone about 'how it is with one' seems 
plausible enough, I don't see how this should imply that what expressivists call 
avowals could not still be assertions or, more specifically, communicative acts. To 
say that most of our self-ascriptions are not made with any communicative intention 
is not the same as saying that they have no communicative point, unless one thinks 
that one can only be in the business of communicating something when one has the 
16 But, one might ask, might it not be possible that the emphasis on the passage(s) just quoted is on the notion of 
aiming or intmdins to report or describe? After all , to the extent that Bar-On says that avowals are truth-evaluable 
(in order to avoid collapsing into simple expressivism), avowals must be reports or descriptions of some sort, or so 
it seems. And so all that she denies is that avowals are speech acts that one intends to be reports or descriptions-
this does not mean she denies that they are assertions. However, looking at the text, what's more plausible is that 
Bar-On defines reports, descriptions and assertions as things for which one necessarily has to have an intention 
(Bar-On 2004, 294; 3Il). And so, given that when we speak our minds we often have no intention of stating to 
ounelf or others how things are with us, the self-ascription is not, therefore, an assertion or report So avowals 
are not assertions in the end (rather than avowals being assertions, we merely have no prior intentions to assert). 
There's an important reason that counts in &vour of this interpretation ofBar·On's account, i.e. seeing people's 
'avowals' as instances of venting rather than assertions, which is that apart from the fact noted above that this 
is what seems to make Bar-On's account genuinely expressivist, it is also only on this understanding of avowals 
that Bar-On's account of first-person authority can be maintained. For if avowals are assertions, then epistemic 
challenges ("How do you know?") seem to be appropriate (I discuss this in more detail below). One ofBar-On's key 
claims is her explanation of why certain epistemic challenges are inappropriate, which she establishes by pointing 
out that avowals are not assertions. If the speaker wasn't making a claim or assertion about 'how it is' with him in 
the first place then it isn't the hearer's business to correct the speaker, because the speaker wasn't in the business of 
communicating or asserting anything. If he was asserting, then the challenges are appropriate. This is what I'll try 
to argue for. 
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intention or aim of communicating something, which seems false. I might stand 
in front of a painting and spontaneously say "This is the best thing I've ever seen!", 
thereby not only expressing my mental state but also communicating to you that 
you should come and see it, even though I did not have any intention of doing so. 
This raises the following question: what are assertions? Generally speaking, 
assertions are speech acts in which something is claimed to hold. The more specific 
question is what asserting anything essentially consists in and what a speaker 
is doing when she asserts something. One option that was already implicitly 
considered in the foregoing is to say that when one asserts something, one must 
have a communicative intention ofinforming the hearer about something (c£ Grice 
I9S7). On a Gricean model of assertion, a subjectS asserts that P by the utterance u 
if and only if there is a hearer H such that 
i. S intends u to produce in H the belief that p 
ii. S intends H to recognize that i) 
iii. S intends H to believe that pat least partly for the reason that i). 
(Pagin 20IS) 
When I'm at the museum, and I point to a painting and say "That's a Francis 
Bacon", my utterance can be understood in Grice's sense. I am saying (i) "That's 
a Francis Bacon" in order to make you believe- or let you know- that this painting 
is a Francis Bacon, which (ii) I intend you to recognize, and (iii) I intend you to 
come to know that this is a Francis Bacon via my telling you so. As applied to 
self-ascriptions, this view of assertions seems prima facie implausible (as Bar-On 
claims). Indeed, even applied to non-ascriptive speech acts, the Gricean model 
is not uncontroversial because it's (meta-)representationally demanding (see e.g. 
Bar-On lOI3). 
The question, though, is at what level we should understand the Gricean model 
generally and, as applied to avowals, specifically. As Bart Geurts and Paula Rubio-
Fernandez (lOIS) point out, drawing on Marr (Ig82), we can distinguish between 
the level of what agents do and why (theW-level) and the level of explanation that's 
concerned with how agents do whatever it is they do (the H-level). As Geurts and 
Rubio-Fernandez write, "Whereas a W-level theory describes a system from the 
outside, so to speak, an H-level theory deals in internal processes" (lOIS, 4S3). The 
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suggestion here would be to take Grice's account (also) as an account that's located 
on the W-level. '7 
When it comes to our expressive self-ascriptions, one might think this distinction 
isn't of much help. When I say "I'm so happy to see you!" and we want to explain why I 
said this, it seems wrong to think that I am saying this in order to make you believe, or let 
you know, 'how it is with me', let alone that I intend you to recognize that I am saying 
this in order to make you believe how it is with me. And yet, I think, there is a sense in 
which we cannot properly explain why we 'speak our minds' at all, ifitweren'tfor letting 
others (and ourselves) know what we're thinking and feeling. The reason why the idea 
that it seems wrong to think that I am saying this in order to make you believe, or let you 
know, how it is with me, I suspect, owes a lot to the H-level reading of the proposal. 
To see why avowals can plausibly be taken as assertions, as I want to suggest, 
what would help is to further distinguish different levels within theW-level. When 
I say "I'm so happy to see you!" and you ask me why I said that, it would be odd ifi 
were to respond by saying "I intended you to believe that I am pleased to see you". 
According to Geurts and Rubio-Fernandez, a W-level theory describes a system 
from the outside. The why-question in this case was directed at my specific speech 
act, and at that level, the Gricean answer is odd. But I think we can, and must, zoom 
out further if we want to explain 'why' I was speaking my mind at all. Zooming out 
involves recognizing that the why-question concerns not the specific interaction 
between myself and my hearer, but rather concerns the place that expressing our 
minds has in our broader communicative practice, if, indeed, it has a place at all. 
One answer would be that on the zoomed-out W-level, what we should say is that 
I have no reason whatsoever. I've just blurted it out by accident, perhaps similar to 
the way a reflex works. This answer is clearly false, as contemporary expressivists 
also claim, given that they think that avowals are intentional actions. An avowal is a 
natural expression, and a natural expression is something "a creature does, or allows 
to happen, which is potentially susceptible to voluntary control, or at least subject 
to modulation in response to input that is directed at the behavior itself, even if it 
cannot be produced at will" (Bar-On 2004, 268). Saying "I'm so happy to see you!" 
or "I want some of that carrot cake" is something that is subject to voluntary control: 
I could not speak my mind, or I could speak my mind differently. 
17 NB: "The two perspectives will have to mesh, but how they wilt mesh is very much an open question" (Geurm and 
Rubio-Fernandez 2015 , 467). 
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I think this fact about how we express ourselves makes the following question 
salient: why do we speak our minds at all? A plausible answer, it seems to me, is 
this: we speak our minds at least in part to get something across, or to let others 
(and ourselves) know what we're thinking and feeling. Seeing my self~ascription 
as a form of social interaction, more specifically as a form of communication, can 
explain precisely the intentional nature of our sincere self~ascriptions, however 
spontaneous or impulsive they might be. '8 So I find much to agree with when 
Brueckner writes: 
Though Bar~On does not say so, I take it that I may have communicative reasons 
[for avowing] as well ... I (I) intend to get my audience to believe that P, and (2) 
intend that he gets that belief as a result of recognizing my intention (I). Or so 
the Gricean story goes. (Brueckner 2ou, I83) 
Denying this would seem to constitute something close to a violation of seeing 
avowals as semantically continuous with other ascriptions. As discussed in the 
previous chapter, we should see both my utterance "I am standing" and my utterance 
"I am in pain" as expressing a (second~order) belief. But the desideratum of semantic 
continuity goes further than this. Ifit's true that my saying "I am standing" is meant 
to induce in you the belief that I am standing, and that I intend you to have this belief, 
then if we deny that avowals are communicative acts, what we get is that my saying "I 
am in pain" is not meant to induce in you the belief that I am in pain, which would 
mean that avowals and non~avowals are importantly semantically discontinuous.'9 
r8 There are arguably also indirect assertions, or, more generally, assertions that do not count as 'assertions proper' 
(e.g. "This is a Francis Bacon"). An example of an indirect assertion would be "Could you pass me the salt" or an 
assertion that is implicit in requests, commands, rhetorical questions or ironic remarks. When I ask "Can you 
pass me the salt?", my question, taken literally and directly, concerns your abilities (hence the response "Yes, I 
could" is unsatisfjring), but indirectly, I'm claiming that there is salt on the table and am asking you to give it to me. 
And when I say, cynically, "Another lovely day!" when it's raining cats and dogs, then I can be said to be indirectly 
conveying information about the awful weather. If we do not find the W/H distinction compelling, we could at 
least model avowals on indirect or 'weak' assertions of this kind. This doesn't mean that any speech utterance is 
an assertion, of course. When I'm testing whether Skype works, and I say "It's raining" just to test it, and I have no 
idea what the weather is, then I'm not making an assertion, neither in its strong nor its weak sense. 
19 Rather than making the avowal follow the same norms as the non-avowal, the other option would be to say that 
in neither case does the Gricean story apply. Taken at the H-level, this seems right to me, but again, from a W-!evel 
perspective, I don't see what reason I have for intentionally expressing myselfin the way that I do if it weren't for 
the reason of trying to communicate something. 
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The W-level approach seems to be one way of making sense of the way in which 
self-ascriptions are semantically continuous with non-avowals. Offering self-
ascriptions is, it seems, not derivatively but intimately connected to one's trying 
to get something across, making oneself be understood, inviting the audience to 
think with the speaker or to correct her, and so on. All this can be taken on board 
without having to say that instances of speaking your mind are "acts that subjects 
deliberately undertake to perform with a specific audience-directed goal in mind, 
such as convincing, informing, pleasing, etc." (Bar-On 2004, 242). If we adopt a 
W-level approach to the practice of communication and the notion of communicative 
intentions, we do not seem to have any good reason to think that self-ascriptions 
don't serve the purpose of communication and so to deny that they are assertions. zo 
An 'assertive speech act' account of self-ascriptions is suggested by Noel Fleming 
(1955), who takes issue with Ryle's expressivist claims. As we've seen, according to 
Ryle, we are tempted to mistakenly take avowals to be self-descriptions: 
[l]n its primary employment "I want ... "is not used to convey information, but 
to make a request or demand. It is no more meant as a contribution to general 
knowledge than "please". To respond with "do you?" or "how do you know?" 
would be glaringly inappropriate. Nor, in their primary employment, are "I hate 
... " and "I intend ... " used for the purpose of telling the hearer facts about the 
speaker. (Ryle 1949, 164) 
20 One question is what the nonn of assertion is. A plausible view, it seems to me, is Timothy Williamson's view, 
which is to say that assertions are not claims to believe (truly and justifiably), but are simply claims to know, and 
that when one makes an assertion, one ought to follow the 'knowledge rule', that is , "one must> assert p only if one 
knows p" (Williamson 2002., 2.43). Applied to self-ascriptions, this means that when I self-ascribe some mental 
state, I claim to know I am in that state. This is compatible with the fact that the rule can be broken, because I 
might claim to know that I am in some mental state or other when I'm not. And so, even though my attitudinal 
self-ascriptions are claims to know- i.e. assertions - they can still fail to amount to knowledge. As Williamson 
notes, "When one breaks a rule of a game, one does not thereby cease to be playing that game. When one breaks a 
rule of a language, one does not thereby cease to be speaking that language; speaking English ungrammatically is 
speaking English. Likewise, presumably, for a speech act: when one breaks a rule of assertion, one does not thereby 
fail to make an assertion. One is subject to criticism precisely because one bas performed an act for which the 
rule is constitutive. Breaches of the rules of a game, language, or speech act may even be common. Nevertheless, 
some sensitivity to the difference-in both oneself and others-between conforming to the rule and breaking it 
presumably is a necessary condition of playing the game, speaking the language, or performing the speech act" 
(Williamson 2002, 243). 
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But according to Fleming, when someone says "I feel bored" then he is "giving 
information about himself, telling us how he feels, or what he wants to do, or whom 
he dislikes, much in the way that, in saying 'I have brown hair,' he is telling us the 
colour ofhis hair" (1955, 614). Fleming goes on to say that "we can learn something 
from the avowal in the way that we can learn something from 'I have brown hair,' 
and not just in the way that we can learn something from a yawn or a sigh, or from 
'hurrah' or 'goodness me"' (1955, 6r8). 
The assertive take on expressions has, I think, a number of advantages. One 
crucial advantage is that if we think of expressive self-ascriptions as assertions, then 
it makes a lot of sense to regard self-ascriptions, including one's own, as possible 
interpretations or articulations of the state one is in. This, in turn, would appear to 
make room for a holist approach. 
There are other advantages, too. I've already mentioned one such advantage, 
which is that it makes better sense of the fact that self-ascriptions, however 
spontaneous they might sometimes be, are still intentional (speech) acts. This 
leaves the place that avowals have in our broader communicative practices less of 
a mystery. But there are a couple of other noteworthy advantages, which I turn to 
below. 
6. Avowals as assertions: theoretical advantages 
The first advantage of the assertive approach is obvious: there is a natural way of 
accommodating the ways in which people's self-ascriptions, e.g. "I am hungry", 
are semantically continuous with other ascriptions, such as "She is hungry", and 
thus provides a straightforward way of avoiding what I referred to in the previous 
chapter as a 'simple' variety of expressivism that is committed to treating them as 
semantically different. Semantic continuity is not, pace Bar-On, a desideratum of an 
expressivistapproach, because on the assertive view, it's builtin from the beginning. 
Second, the assertive take on self-ascriptions makes room for the idea that the 
subject and her hearer acquire knowledge of S's mental state by virtue of S's self.. 
ascriptive act. More specifically, it does so without construing the subject as having 
privileged access to something that is in principle unavailable to her audience, 
or, differently put, without construing the audience's knowledge as a type of 
testimonial knowledge, in the sense that the subject is, when ascribing some state 
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to herself, telling the hearer something that only the subject knows and has access 
to and that her audience lacks. Roessler (2015a) makes a convincing case for the 
idea that it is possible to claim (r) that the knowledge an audience acquires of a 
speaker's belief depends on the speaker's self-knowledge, without (2) committing 
to the traditional model according to which the audience 'inherits' such knowledge 
by 'being told' about something to which only the speaker has access. If we consider 
self-ascriptions to be assertions, then there is no longer a good reason to think 
that the audience gains knowledge ofS's mental state by thinking ofS as offering 
something like an eyewitness report. Roessler suggests that the audience's and the 
speaker's knowledge may share a common explanation, which lies in the speaker's 
sincere self-ascription. Roessler points out that both ways of knowing may be seen 
as "complementary roles, or as interdependent aspects of a single shared capacity 
for communication" (J. Roessler 2015a, r63). 
Third, thinking that our sincere self-ascriptions setve a communicative purpose 
would explain the fuct that one might speak one's mind more often, or more openly, 
to someone one knows well and/or trusts, compared to strangers. The fact that 
speaking one's mind is audience-relative in this way can be taken as evidence for the 
idea that sincere self-ascriptions are not just intentional actions but are intentional 
communicative actions. Harry's voicing his frustration about work is not just an act 
ofventing his feelings but is probably also an act of informing Sally how he feels; 
perhaps it's a request for support, even if this is not at the forefront of Harry's mind. 
This, at least, would explain why Harry would not express himself in this way if Sally 
were not around (not even silently to himself). So when Ryle claims that the "natural" 
thing to do is "to is to speak one's mind, and the sophisticated thing to do is to refrain 
from doing this" (Ryle 1949, r62), perhaps he got things the wrong way round. 21 In 
many cases, when you don't want to communicate your feelings (to a stranger on the 
street, say), the natural thing is keep things back, instead ofjustventingyour thoughts 
and feelings ("I want coffee!", "I feel miserable!", "I need to go to the bathroom!"). 
The fuct that, as Ryle puts it, being "spontaneous, frank and unprepared" in one's 
self-ascriptions would be 'natural' is only plausible assuming the speaker feels that 
she can speak freely in the communicative situation in which she finds hersel£ 
Fourth, the assertive approach makes better sense of the way in which we actually 
treat our own and other peoples self-ascriptions in everyday life. It's certainly 
21 Admittedly, Ry!e himselfbegins by saying "(i]n a certain sense of'natural'" (Ry!e 1949, 162). 
true that my saying "I am hungry" is different, epistemically, from my saying "I have 
blonde hair", and philosophers have been right to try to figure out how this difference 
should be explained. But the preoccupation with such puzzles may have caused 
philosophers to overstate the differences in practice between self-ascriptions and 
third-personal self-ascriptions. For in everyday life we often do challenge and correct 
people's sincere self-ascriptions, including our own, especially when they concern 
our emotions, desires, hopes and fears, and even, I think, (some of) our beliefs. On 
the view that does not see self-ascriptions as assertions, when someone says she is in 
some mental state, then it's "inappropriate to subject her to such criticism" (Bar-On 
2004, 200). Indeed, Bar-On thinks that if avowals are like natural expressions which 
likewise merely serve to express the subject's mental states, then avowals 
belong in the wrong "grammatical" category for any epistemic assessment. It 
is as inappropriate, conceptually speaking, to assess their epistemic credentials 
as it would be to assess a moan or a cry or a laugh in terms of its evidence, 
correctness, or reasons. (Bar-On 2004, 231) 
Such a view, it seems, has a hard time explaining why avowals sometimes appear to 
be of precisely the right (grammatical) category for epistemic assessment. The non-
assertive view leaves it somewhat of a mystery why, in at least some if not many cases, 
it does seem appropriate to assess the epistemic credentials of someone's avowal. 
By contrast, an assertive approach can make much better sense of what is going 
on when we are dealing with so-called 'expressive failures'. Ifi make an assertion, 
or indeed a knowledge claim, then this means that all sorts of challenges are in 
principle legitimate. For when someone makes an assertion, certain questions seem 
prima facie appropriate, or so at least Austin claims in Other Minds (1946): 
When we make an assertion such as "There is a goldfinch in the garden" or 
"He is angry", there is a sense in which we imply that we are sure of it or know 
it ... though what we imply ... is merely that we believe it. On making such an 
assertion, therefore, we are directly exposed to questions (I) "Do you know there 
is?" "Do you know he is?" and (2) "How do you know?" If in answer to the first 
question we reply "Yes", we may be asked the second question, and even the first 
question alone is commonly taken as an invitation to state not merely whether but 
also how we know. (Austin 1961, 77) 
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If people's sincere self~ascriptions are assertions, that is, if they involve 'informing' 
or 'telling' others 'how it is with them', then it seems that we are in principle entitled 
to ask, in response to someone's self-ascription, whether she is sure that, or how 
she knows that, she wants X. Fleming gives a good example: 
Suppose someone says "I dislike deep~sea fishing," and you have good reason 
to believe that he has never been on the ocean, let alone fished in it; here your 
natural retort will be "How do you know you dislike deep~sea fishing? You've 
never done any"; and he may have to withdraw his avowal, or say that he meant 
he disapproves of deep-sea fishing. Nor is this challenge limited to such 
outrageous cases. If someone has just begun playing squash, and in the middle 
of a game says to you "I don't like this game very much," you may reply "How 
do you know? You haven't played enough to find out"; or if he has just arrived in 
Oxford for his first visit, and avows "I want to spend the rest of my life here," you 
may ask him how he knows this, for as yet he has barely seen the town. (Fleming 
1955,624) 22 
There are many more examples in which raising epistemic challenges is not 
inappropriate or out of place at all, pace the view that likens self~ascriptions to 
natural expressions. 
Notice that saying that because we are entitled to ask questions like "How do 
you know?" when we are confronted with an assertion does not mean that the self~ 
ascriber is able to answer the question, or indeed to give the right answer. 23 It also 
does not have the implication that just because self-ascriptions are best conceived 
as assertions, the question "How do you know?" is always an appropriate one to ask 
and could not in practice be impolite, rude or even disrespectful. When I say I have 
a bad headache, then given that my self-ascription is (also) a statement about the 
state I am in, you are entitled to ask me how I know that I am in pain or whether I am 
sure that I am. I might well be surprised or even offended by your question, and the 
assertive view does not need to deny this. In this regard, self~ascriptions of mental 
states considered as assertions might not be all that different from perceptual 
reports, such as my saying "The cat is under the plum tree". In the latter case, I 
22 I understand Fleming's example of deep-sea fishing to be an example of a self-ascribed attitude, not a self-ascribed 
character trait. 
23 Snowdon (20I2, 26o) makes a similar observation. 
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am also directly exposed, as Austin puts it, to questions like "Do you know that the 
cat is under the plum tree?" and/or "How do you know?". In the perceptual case, 
such questions might likewise take the subject by surprise, but this does not mean 
that the initial report was not a knowledge claim. Of course, perceptual reports and 
ascriptions of mental states differ in many ways. For instance, a possible answer in 
the perceptual case would be "Because I see that there is", whereas such an answer 
seems not to be available when I am reporting on an attitude of mine. But the fact 
that the self-ascriber cannot give an answer to the question does not mean that there 
is no tan answer; at most, it tells us that the answer is difficult, and is perhaps one for 
which we need to turn to science rather than the subject issuing the self-ascription 
(c£ Snowdon 2012, 26o-6r). 
All in all, I think the expressivist faces a dilemma and has to make a choice. 
If self-ascriptions are instances of venting and serve no communicative purpose, 
then they're not genuinely semantically continuous with other speech acts after 
all. Alternatively, if avowals are semantically continuous in this way, then our self-
ascriptions aren't just instances of venting but are communicative acts for which 
one normally has reasons and intentions and for which epistemic challenges are 
(in principle) appropriate. This would be the 'holist' route. The second route forms 
a horn of the dilemma, however, because expressivists want to claim one does not 
have reasons or intentions to avow. 
Nonetheless, I hope to have been able to suggest that the latter option is to 
be preferred. In fact, the second option makes room for a more plausible view of 
what sincere self-ascriptions are. Sincere self-ascriptions of mental states involve 
'informing' or 'telling' others and oneself 'how it is with one', and, as such, these 
self-ascriptions are to be understood as self-interpretations that can be the object of 
challenge and questioning, including one's own challenges and questioning, and 
things that may serve as, and stand in need of, reasons. 
Bar-On and other expressivists seem reluctant to construe avowals as bona 
fide assertions and so are reluctant to move towards holism, because they want, 
by any means, to avoid the detectivist view according to which our self-ascriptions 
are the result of recognizing or 'reporting on' some first-order mental state. But 
rejecting the recognitional or detectivist conception of what underlies people's self.. 
ascriptive expressions is compatible with the claim that our sincere self-ascriptions 
are assertions. The problem is that the latter, interpretationalist-holist, approach, it 
seems, is not compatible with expressivism. 
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7. Conclusion 
If we understand expressivism along atomist lines, then, assuming expressivism 
meets the epistemic condition, discussed in the previous chapter, the idea is that in 
normal circumstances one can come to know one's mental states by speaking one's 
mind. In this chapter I have aimed to point out the limits of this moderate atomist 
version of expressivism. I hope to have shown that both the 'avowal condition' and 
the 'normal circumstances condition' do not stand up to scrutiny. The overall upshot 
of this chapter is that a moderate atomist take on expressivism is not very promising, 
because we cannot appeal to 'normal' or epistemically 'good' circumstance of self-
ascription. This is because what counts as a 'good' circumstance of self-knowledge 
is something that can only be determined by relating a specific self-ascription to the 
subject whose self-ascription it is, and the life that she leads. 
I have suggested that a holist version of expressivism, according to which the 
question of what makes someone's self-ascribed attitude knowledgeable must be 
answered relative to that life and not just relative to her expressive act, has been 
overlooked because expressivists have been reluctant to see sincere self-ascriptions 
as genuine assertions. Expressivists have tried to maintain a balancing act between 
seeing avowals as instances of venting that serve no communicative point, on the 
one hand, and seeing them as truth-evaluable and so semantically continuous with 
other ascriptions, on the other. This position, I've argued, is ultimately unstable. 
The reason the expressivist thinks that when one avows being in some mental 
state, one is not communicating something is because this would (I) secure the 
neo-expressivist account of why we are usually not prepared to challenge or correct 
people's avowals, and (2) allow the account to remain genuinely expressivist. 
However, if avowals really serve no communicative purpose in the end, then we must 
abandon the claim that avowals are semantically continuous with non-avowals; it 
also remains a mystery why we speak our minds at all. 
Taking the other horn of the dilemma is to be preferred, or so I have tried to 
suggest. What we should say is that avowals are truth-evaluable and semantically 
continuous with other ascriptions, which commits us to seeing self-ascriptions of 
our mental states as similar to self-ascriptions of our hair colour or height and to 
seeing both as communicative acts through which we are informing someone about 
as aspect of ourselves. I have suggested that the communicative/assertive take on 
avowals has a number ofbenefits. 
8-, 
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However, for the expressivist it will be hard to accept, because it requires giving up 
on the expressivist account of first-person authority (because epistemic challenges 
are no longer inappropriate if avowals are assertions), and it also seems that the 
assertoric view is no longer distinctively 'expressivist'. If avowals are assertions, 
then it seems we will have to give up on the idea that expression is a success notion 
whereby subjects show the conditions they express, and must instead consider 
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4 
Knowing Your Mind 
by Making Up Your Mind 
On Richard Moran's (2oor) influential account of self-knowledge, the 'capacity to 
make up your mind', or the capacity to judge, is taken to be fundamental to acquiring 
self-knowledge. I will refer to this approach as the 'rationalist' account of self.. 
knowledge, because on the sort of view Moran defends, knowing one's attitudes 
regarding X involves answering the question of whether X is true (or desirable, etc.) 
in a "deliberative spirit'' (Moran 2oor, 6r), that is, by considering what counts as a 
reason for or against the truth (desirability, etc.) of X.' In this chapter, my primary 
goal is to explain the rationalist approach to self-knowledge, and, in particular, the so-
called 'transparency procedure' that is fundamental to it. Given that this view can be 
interpreted in different ways, and because it introduces a number of new concepts that 
need careful consideration, it will be important to be clear about the larger rationalist 
project before evaluating them more critically in the chapters to come. 
I proceed as follows. I begin by describing the more general 'agential' view that 
I take rationalism to be a sub-species of (Section 2). Next, I turn to rationalism 
and discuss the so-called 'transparency procedure' (Section 3.1) and the claim that 
following the transparency procedure delivers immediate or non-inferential self-
knowledge (Section 3.2). Next, I briefly discuss the claim that if one does not arrive 
at one's self-ascription 'transparently', then this leads to alienation (Section 3· 3). In 
Section 4, I discuss existing criticism of the rationalist approach, which I suggest 
has mostly been concerned with the question of whether following the transparency 
procedure is necessary for self-knowledge and has been less concerned with the 
I borrow the label 'rationalism' from Cassam (2014) and Gertler (2onb). 
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more radical question of whether, even if you do follow the transparency procedure, 
it provides the subject with attitudinal self-knowledge. In Section s, I consider a 
possible way of responding to the existing criticism that has sometimes been 
hinted at but which has not been systematically considered so far. The strategy is 
to say that 'transparency' is not an actual method or procedure in the first place, 
but rather a 'normative demand', which would render the rationalist account 
immune from most of the existing criticisms. I argue why such a non-epistemic or a 
'transcendental' reading of transparency, despite its potential, is not plausible if we 
take rationalism to be an epistemic theory of alienated and non-alienated types of 
self-knowledge. In the final section, I turn to the question of whether rationalism is 
'a version of' inferentialism or not, and why this question matters to the relevance 
of the circumstances of deliberation, which in tum is relevant to atomist/holist 
conceptions of rationalism. 
2. The agential account of self-knowledge 
In order to understand the rationalist view, it may be helpful to consider rationalism 
as a version of a broader 'agentialist' approach to self-knowledge (e.g. Tugendhat 
rg86; McGeer rgg6, 2007a; Moran 2oor; Hieronymi 2oog; Boyle 2oogb, 2ona; 
Bertolotti 2009; O'Brien 2007). On the agential account of self-knowledge, acquiring 
self-knowledge requires taking up an 'active stance as an agent'. The notion of the 
'self as agent' is one that goes back to the writings of Ernst Tugendhat, an early 
defender of the agential account of self-knowledge: 
What does it mean to ask oneself what one wants? Since this is a practical 
question, the issue is not to ascertain what I in fact want, what my inclinations 
are, but to determine what position to take toward my inclinations. (Tugendhat 
rg86, rg6) 
Tugendhat criticizes the tradition of thinking that characterizes self-knowledge as 
analogous to an observer looking at an object (most notably, introspectionism). 
For Tugendhat, our attitudes or the states we are in are always conceptually tied to 
the practical question of who we are and who we want to be, and so knowing our 
attitudes likewise requires considering who we are and who we want to be. 
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On the agential view, self-knowledge involves a kind of' maker's knowledge'. Maker's 
knowledge can be defined as "the special knowledge someone has of something, in 
virtue of making that thing" (Langton 2009, 289). With respect to self-knowledge, 
the idea is that the subject does not discover but instead constitutes her attitudes. The 
relation in which the subject stands to her attitudes is not an evidential but rather 
a constitutive relation. Just as car designers can have maker's knowledge of next 
year's models (Langton 2009, 303), subjects can have maker's knowledge of their 
own attitudes: when they self-ascribe an attitude, they 'make it the case' that their 
self-ascription is true. As Victoria McGeer writes, the agential account traces the 
special self-knowledge that subjects have, 
not to an agent's capacity for epistemic accuracy in self-ascription, but to a 
capacity to shape or determine her own states of mind. The agent has a privileged 
authority in self-ascribing intentional states because it is she who makes it the 
case that she deserves to be ascribed these states; she has 'maker's knowledge'. 
(McGeer 2007a, 82) 
McGeer writes that our self-ascriptions have an "actively constructive ingredient" 
and that our self-expressions are used "actively to tell a constantly updated story 
about ourselves that we also act upon to make true" and concludes that "'knowledge' 
of our own minds is peculiarly dependent on our role as agents" (McGeer rgg6, 
SI4-IS). Matthew Boyle, whose view I will describe in detail in Chapter 6, claims, in 
a similar vein, that subjects have "an ability to know our minds by actively shaping 
their contents" (Boyle 2oogb, 134; for discussion, see Cassam 2014, n3ff) 
In this sense, then, agential theories of self-knowledge are similar to so-called 
'constitutuvist' theories of self-knowledge. According to constitutivists, thinking 
that you are in mental state M somehow makes it the case, i.e. (partly) constitutes 
your being in M, and/or vice versa. More specifically, constitutivists think that self-
knowledge is "guaranteed to hold a priori, as a matter of conceptual necessity" 
(Co !iva 2009, 369; Burge rg88, 2013; Wright rg8gb). However, whereas 'traditional' 
constitutivists think that this holds as a matter of conceptual necessity, agentialists 
deny this is so and instead think that self-knowledge requires (at least some) 
cognitive work. Differently put, constitutivism is what Paul Boghossian (rg8g) 
would refer to as a "cognitively insubstantial" theory of self-knowledge, because 
constitutivists claim that we can have attitudinal self-knowledge without having 
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to base our second-order beliefs on observation (inner perception) or inference 
from (inner or outer) evidence. Take the judgement "I am here now". I can have 
knowledge of this judgement without having to infer it or direct my inner eye at 
anything. Constitutivists claim that knowledge of our thoughts and beliefs is 
cognitively insubstantial in this way. 
Agentialists claim that you don't get self-knowledge just by being conceptually 
competent. In other words, they think that it is wrong to think that observation on 
the one hand and making inferences on the other exhaust the options regarding 
what would make a theory of self-knowledge 'cognitively substantial'. Thinking that 
these two options are exhaustive is something that appears to follow only if one 
accepts a specific metaphysical conception- a realist, fact-of-the-matter conception 
-of what mental states are and what it means for something to count as 'cognitive' 
or a 'cognitive achievement'. 
So what does the subject need to do? According to McGeer, for instance, the 
capacity for self-regulation is crucial. She claims, "We know our own minds 
because we have been trained to take on the responsibility, as only cognitively and 
linguistically sophisticated agents can, for suiting our words to our deeds and our 
deeds to our words" (McGeer 1996, 515, see also 2007a; de Bruin, Jongepier, and 
Strijbos 2015). 
Moran (1994, 1997, 1999, 2001, 2012) has a different view, though. What Moran 
puts in place of'observation' and 'inference' is practical reason. More specifically, 
he claims subjects have the ability to determine or constitute their attitudes by 
considering the reasons in favour (or contra) the object of the attitude. Briefly, 
you don't get self-knowledge via third-personal observation or interpretation of 
various forms of evidence, nor do you get it for free by merely being conceptually 
competent. Instead, you get self-knowledge by deliberating about worldly affairs. 
I explain Moran's account, and in particular the appeal to practical deliberation, in 
detail in the subsequent section. 
Knowing Your Mind by Making Up Your Mind 95 
---------
3. The rationalist account of self-knowledge~ 
3.1 The transparency proudure 
Central to Moran's (2oor) philosophical account of self-knowledge is the idea that 
knowing our own mental states, e.g. finding out what we believe or want, is a matter 
of actively makin9 up our minds by deliberating on their particular subject matter. The 
special sort of authority that we have when making a self-ascription (believe that P, 
want Q, fear R.) is due to the fact that we have the capacity for practical deliberation, 
and that exercising this capacity can make a metaphysical difference with regard to 
one's attitude, that is, a difference to what one's attitude is. 
Moran sets out to explain the special nature of first-person authority in the 
wider context of (moral) human agency. He criticizes accounts of self-knowledge 
that seek to explain first-person authority exclusively in epistemic terms (2001, r). 
Such 'epistemic' accounts typically model first-person knowledge on perception or 
theory-based observation (Armstrong 1968; Gopnik 1993; Nichols and Stich 2003; 
Carruthers 2on). In cases of perception or theory-based observation, the perceiver 
or observer typically has a passive role in relation to the object perceived or observed, 
in the sense that the object leads an existence independently of the epistemic subject. 
Moran, by contrast, argues that such passivity is alien to our conception of ourselves 
as self-knowing agents. To use one of Moran's examples (2oor, 26), imagine asking 
someone whether she intends to pay back the money she borrowed. Suppose she 
answers, "As far as I can tell, yes". What makes this response particularly disturbing 
is that it appears to be issued from an onlooker's perspective, as if she were talking 
about someone else. We generally do not accept such answers, precisely because 
they signal a lack of first-person involvement. We demand that others play an active 
part in coming to know their own mental states; we demand that they make up their 
mind, i.e. decide whether they will pay back the money, perhaps after deliberating 
about the matter and endorsing the intention to (not) do so. 
Moran thus criticizes purely 'epistemic' accounts of self-knowledge for 
modelling the self-relation as an exclusively third-person or 'theoretical' stance 
towards one's own mental states. Thus, he states, 
2 Some of the material in this section and the next is adapted from Strijbos and Jongepier (forthcoming). 
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What is left out of the Spectator's view is the fact that I not only have a special 
access to someone's mental life, but that it is mine, expressive of my relation to the 
world, subject to my evaluation, correction, doubts and tensions. This will mean 
that it is to be expected that a person's own awareness of his mental life will 
make for differences in the constitution of that mental life, differences that do 
not obtain with respect to one's awareness of other things or other people. For 
this reason, introspection is not to be thought of as a kind oflight cast on a realm 
of inner objects, leaving them unaltered. (Moran 2oor, 37 emphasis in original) 
Moran often uses the phrase that someone's attitudes are in an important sense 
"up to him". By this, Moran does not mean that I have direct control over my 
attitudes - I cannot believe that pink elephants exist, for instance, by an act of will. 
What he means is that my attitude regarding P arranges itself to the conclusion of 
my exercises of practical reasoning. In other words, what my attitudes are is not 
independent of my reasons. They are up to me in so far as my reasons are up to me.3 
According to what Moran, following Gareth Evans, calls the 'transparency 
condition' of first-person statements of, for example, one's beliefs, one should treat 
the question of one's belief about Pas equivalent to the question about the truth of 
P. This means that one defers answering the self-directed question "Do I believe that 
P?" by answering the world-directed question "Is it the case that P?". This is Evans' 
formulation: 
If someone asks me "Do you think there is going to be a third world war?", I 
must attend, in answering him, to precisely the same outward phenomena as 
I would attend to ifi were answering the question "Will there be a third world 
war?" (Evans rg82, 225) 
It's not that it would be wise or good for me to attend to certain outward phenomena, 
but rather, as Johannes Roessler points out, that "the 'must' here is naturally 
interpreted as a 'must' of practical necessity" (J. Roessler 2013, 8). This ties in with 
Moran's interpretation of transparency, according to whom the world-directed 
question is a deliberative question: 
3 As we'll see, this formulation reveals a potential problem for the rationalist account, for to what extent are my 
reasons really up to me7 I will discuss these issues in Chapter 7· 
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I address myself to the question of my state of mind in a deliberative spirit, 
deciding and declaring myself on the matter, and not confront the question as a 
purely psychological one about the beliefs of someone who happens also to be 
me. (Moran 2001, 63)4 
That one question is 'transparent' to another is meant to bring out the fact that 
we can answer one question in terms of another. Moran stresses that transparency 
should be understood as a "stance taken toward oneself" and is not just "a logical 
feature" of self-ascriptions (Moran 2001, 66-67). 
The answer to a deliberative question should thus be understood as "the formation 
of a desire or a belief" (2007, 56 emphasis in original), that is, the outcome of taking 
up a deliberative perspective regarding P is "a form of conviction and hence brings 
me to a new state of mind" (Moran 2007, 73). Moran explicidy mentions that his 
account is meant to give us knowledge not just of our beliefs but of"various standing 
attitudes of the person, such as beliefs, emotional attitudes, and intentions" (e.g. 
Moran 2001, 9; see also 43ff; 52; 63; 78ff, 2002). For instance, he gives the example 
of someone wanting to "change jobs, or learn French, or avoid being seen", all 
of which can be understood to be 'judgement-sensitive' in that they "depend on 
certain beliefs aboutwhatmakes these various things desirable" (Moran 2001, us). 
Regarding these other judgement-sensitive attitudes, we must simply reformulate 
the relevant word-directed question. For instance, the idea would be that in order 
to know whether I have a desire to change jobs, I could ask whether 'changing 
jobs is desirable'. When I want to know whether I want to learn French, I answer 
the question ofwhether 'studying French is a good idea', etc. (I turn to (worries 
regarding) the scope that the transparency procedure is meant to apply to below.) 
4 There are other interpretations of transparency, such as Robert Gordon's (1995, 2007) so-called 'ascent-routine' 
account On Gordon's view, the passage from Evans quoted earlier takes central stage as well: "In answering a 
question concerning our belief about some matter, what we generally do is to step down a semantic level and 
answer the corresponding question about the matter the belief is about. To answer the question concerning my 
belief about the weather, I don' t in general search for a telltale feeling or other experiential mark of belief. Nor do I 
examine my recent behavior in the light of a theory. I simply recast the question as, 'Is it raining outside?'" (Gordon 
2007, 153). One of the differences between Gordon's and Moran's accounts is that for Gordon, the "question-
answer form is not essential to the notion of an ascent routine" (Gordon 2007, 154). Gordon's main point is not 
that in answering a question about one's belief about something, one can step down a semantic level. Rather, his 
main point is that "whether in answer to a question or not, people optionally step up a semantic level from an assertion 
that p to a self-ascription of a belief that p" (Gordon 2007, 154 emphases added). Second, the answer for Gordon 
doesn't have to be rational, as in Moran's case. The answers we give to world-directed questions are not made on 
the basis of rational deliberation but simply on the basis of training (Gordon 2007, rs8ff; cf. Michael2oro). 
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I take 'transparency' not Gust) to be a transcendental claim about, for example, the 
nature of human (rational) agency or what it is to be a believer but as an actual way of 
acquiring attitudinal self-knowledge (though I consider the 'transcendental reading' 
in more detail below). It is, I believe, no accident that Moran talks about transparency 
as a "route to knowledge" of one's attitudes (e.g. 2oor, 68). Hence, I will refer to the 
activity of making up one's mind as 'following the transparency procedure'. I should 
stress, though, given that the notion of a 'procedure' may not be the most suitable in 
this context, that I understand the notion of procedure (or method) in a broad sense, 
as referring simply to a 'way' of arriving at a self-ascription, or coming to believe 
that one has a certain belief, hope, intention or desire.5 
As I read Moran, making up your mind is equivalent to coming to a judgement, 
and this judgement constitutes, determines or settles your attitude. Therefore, in what 
follows, I take 'following the transparency procedure' to be equivalent to (r) 'making up 
one's mind', (2) 'answering the world-directed question' and (3) 'coming to a judgement 
by reflecting on the reasons in favour of the subject matter'. 6 The central idea, then, is not 
justthatwe have the capacity to answer world-directed questions but also a metaphysical-
cum-epistemic one: reflecting on the reasons in favour ofP issues in a judgement, and 
that judgement is constitutive of one's belief, one thereby knows about. Following the 
transparency procedure involves, first, asking oneself whether one has a certain attitude 
("Do I believe thatP?" or "Do I wantQ?"). Second, one tries to answer the corresponding 
world-directed question ("Is P true?" or "Is Q desirable?"). The second step involves 
deliberating over the subject matter, i.e. considering the reasons for and against Third, 
one comes to a conclusion regarding P, in other words, the deliberative process ends in 
a judgement (e.g. whether there will be a third world war). This judgement (a mental act 
or event) constitutes one's attitude (a mental state). 
At this point, though, nothing much has been said about self-knowledge. As Alex 
Byrne wonders, "Suppose that I examine the evidence and conclude that there will be 
a third world war. Now what?" (Byrne 2ona, 203). For the transparency procedure 
to have anything to do with self-knowledge, we need to add an epistemic condition 
such that the subject also knows about the attitudes that are so constituted. 
5 I return to the question of what the status is of'transparency' (a procedure, a condition, a constraint?) in the final 
chapter. 
6 Surprisingly, the notion of'judgernent' does not play much of a role in Moran's work. But I see no other way of 
understanding the 'outcome' of answering world-directed questions, i.e. one's conclusion (for a judgement-based 
take on transparency, see e.g. Boyle 2orra). 
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How exactly can one be said to know one's attitudes when they are constituted in 
a transparent way? The thought is that if one judges that P, one knows that one 
judges that P, i.e. one judges 'knowingly'. If one judges that P, then that judgement 
provides an epistemic basis, or grounds, for one's self-ascription (second-order 
belief), which explains the belief's status as knowledge. This interpretation of why 
making up one's mind provides one with self-knowledge invites an inferentialist 
explanation, though, namely that what is going on is that one infers that one believes 
that P from the fact that one has judged that P (Byrne 2oua; Cas sam 2ou, 2014). 
Such an 'inferentialist' construal of the transparency procedure, however, 
would be problematic, because one of Moran's key claims is that transparent self-
knowledge is 'immediate'. Moran claims that one's self-ascriptions are "not based 
on the observation of the person's sayings and doings" (2001, xii) and that "the basic 
concept of first-person awareness that we are trying to capture is that of awareness 
that is not based on evidence, behavioral or otherwise" (2oor, u emphases added). The 
idea is that one's knowledge or second-order belief regarding one's first-order state 
(one's belief that P, say) has no 'grounds', or is not 'based' on anything. Indeed, 
according to Moran, if someone had to rely on (behavioural) evidence to report on 
his mental states, then this "would suggest something wrong with him, some state 
of dissociation, and would raise doubt, about the rationality of those attitudes of his 
which are not accessible to him in the normal 'immediate' way", i.e. in "a way that 
does not rely on inferences from anything inner or anything outer" (Moran 2001, 
68). 
3. 2 Alienation 
Moran recognizes that sometimes what my attitudes regarding some object are 
and what my reasons regarding that object are can come apart. In other words, 
sometimes one cannot come to know one's own attitudes via 'making up one's 
mind' or following the transparency procedure. Central to Moran's account is that 
if one cannot answer the question of what one believes by directly reflecting on the 
content of that belief, then one is alienated from that attitude. 
In this context, Moran discusses an example of someone who learns, by going 
through psychotherapy, that she feels betrayed but who is unable to endorse this 
description of herself and is only able to attribute this state to herself from a third-
person perspective rather than avow it first-personally. Moran writes, 
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The person might be told of her feeling ofbetrayal, and she may not doubt this. 
But without her capacity to endorse or withhold endorsement from that attitude, 
and without the exercise of that capacity making a difference to what she feels, 
this information may as well be about some other person, or about the voices 
in her head. From within a purely attributional awareness of herself, she is no 
more in a position to speak for her feelings than she was before, for she admits no 
authority over them. (Moran 2oor, 93) 
Her feeling betrayed is, Moran says, "detached from her sense of the reasons". 
If one is unable to learn of one's attitude by reflection on the content or object of 
that attitude, and can only take a 'theoretical' or 'empirical' stance on oneself, then 
this leads to alienation. The fact that Moran explicitly remarks that the theoretical 
or alienated route to self-knowledge is also a route to self-knowledge means that 
transparent avowal and opaque attribution should be, as he says, "seen as different 
routes to knowledge of the same thing" (Moran 2oor, xviii; 8g). Not all self-
knowledge is transparently acquired, and even knowledge of one's attitudes can be 
acquired in a non-transparent way. 
What the language of alienation is meant to brings out is that despite the fact that 
alienated self-knowledge is also self-knowledge, it's not the 'right' or 'proper' way of 
gaining self-knowledge. This means that we cannot have a proper understanding of 
Moran's project if we ignore the fact that his project is irreducibly normative. This 
is evident from Moran's claims that there is something "wrong" (Moran 2oor, 68) 
with the person who can only rely on behavioural evidence to report on his or her 
mental states. It is only by putting to use our capacity for practical reason, if we avow 
our own attitudes, that they amount to 'genuine' self-knowledge where the latter 
means a type of self-knowledge that is non-alienated/ 
7 I will return to the relevance of the notions of alienation and ownership in Moran's account and their connection to 
the notions of authenticity and autonomy in Chapter 7. 
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4· Is the transparency procedure necessary and sufficient for self.. 
knowledge? 
4.1 Common objections to rationalism 
Moran himself is mostly concerned with showing that making up your mind is 
necessary for (genuine) self-knowledge, which is illustrated in the fact that he is 
arguing specifically against introspectionist views or other 'spectatorial' approaches 
which construe self-knowledge in third-personal terms and which overlook the first-
person perspective. The introspectionist view, he says, "underdescribes the differences 
between self-knowledge and the knowledge of others" (Moran 2001, 37). Moran's 
main claim regarding transparency thus seems to be that transparency is necessary 
for (non-alienated) self-knowledge, even if it isn't necessary for every instance of 
acquiring self-knowledge, and that any account that fails to mention the perspective 
of the judging first person only tells half of the story at best. In this section, I want 
to review, briefly, some of the common objections and worries about the rationalist 
account of self-knowledge. 
Much of the criticism of the rationalist approach takes issue with the claim that 
following the transparency procedure is indeed necessary for self-knowledge (the 
'non-alienated' clause is mostly forgotten about somewhere along the way). Most 
critics have been concerned with pointing out that having to deliberate over the 
reasons in favour of P as a way of finding out what one's attitudes regarding P are 
is a highly demanding and overly intellectualistic requirement for self-knowledge, 
and that we can often do without it (McGeer 2007a; Shah and Velleman 2005; 
Shoemaker 2003; Heal 2004; Cassaro 2014). This is clear, for instance, when it 
comes to beliefs we already have, i.e. regarding things we don't have to make up 
our minds about. Sydney Shoemaker notes that, often, "one would be at a loss to say 
what one's reasons are for believing what one does" (Shoemaker 2003, 395). This is 
true, he says, for instance, of 
one's perception-based knowledge of one's current surroundings, and one's 
memory knowledge of one's recent past. And it is true of one's knowledge of, 
and belief in, the vast number of historical and scientific facts that one has 
learned and retained in memory. (Shoemaker 2003, 395) 
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In these cases, following the transparency procedure becomes a rather laborious, 
indeed superfluous, task. As Shoemaker rightly points out, even though I know that 
I am wearing trousers, and thus believe that I am, 
it is hard to think of circumstances, other than those of a dream, in which it 
could be a question for me whether I believe this. I would also have a hard time 
saying what reasons I have for believing it. And I cannot think of any good sense 
in which it is "up to me" whether I believe it. (Shoemaker 2003, 396). 
Or consider David Finkelstein's argument: 
I dislike goat cheese intensely. But I don't believe goat cheese to be bad or 
undesirable or something that one ought not to like. I understand that fine 
people of excellent taste love the stuff. ... When I tell you that I dislike goat 
cheese ... I am speaking with first-person authority even though I am not, in 
Moran's sense, avowing anything. (Finkelstein 2008, 163;165) 
Cassam points out that answering the world-directed question regarding the 
content of my attitude is often more difficult than simply answering the mind-
directed question about what my attitudes are (Cassam 2014, !04). The question 
of whether the reasons require me to want carrot cake or intend that I buy apples 
is much harder than simply answering the question of whether I do in fact have the 
desire for carrot cake or the intention to buy apples. 8 In order for me to know that I 
want a slice of carrot cake, it does not seem necessary to answer the world-directed 
question (e.g. "Is carrot cake desirable?" or "Are there convincing reasons to have a 
slice of carrot cake?"). 
The critique that rationalism is too intellectualistic and demanding leaves intact 
the idea that if one were to follow the transparency procedure, it would provide 
attitudinal self-knowledge. It merely claims that it's an odd way of acquiring self-
knowledge. We might call this the 'soft' critique on rationalism. While I take it to 
be clear that Moran's goal is to show that transparency is fundamental to (non-
alienated) self-knowledge, I also think it's fair to say that a natural reading of his 
8 Notice that this ('whether the reasons require me'-condition) is a specific interpretation of the transparency 
procedure (Cassaro follows Finkelstein 2.012., 104). I address this below. 
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view is one that claims that if you do make up your mind, what you end up with is 
attitudinal self-knowledge. In other words, one reading would be to think that there 
is nothing else you need to do in order to know your mind other than answer the 
world-directed question.9 Of course, there will be certain minimal conditions that 
the subject must meet, such as being minimally conceptually competent, having the 
concept ofbeliefand being able to deliberate at all. But apart from these minimal and 
relatively trivial conditions, it appears plausible to understand rationalism as saying 
that for someone to have self-knowledge, all she has to do is follow the transparency 
procedure. The more radical critique would be to question whether answering the 
world-directed questions actually delivers knowledge of her attitudes. 
The radical objection to rationalism would then involve showing that even if you 
do follow the transparency procedure, this does not necessarily give you knowledge 
of your attitudes. The radical objection has been made by those who have argued 
that it is not possible to acquire knowledge of some (or many) types of mental states 
by answering world-directed questions. Cassam, for instance, takes issue with the 
possible scope of rationalism, and argues that in some or even many cases, the 
world-directed question is also the wron,g question to ask in order to acquire self-
knowledge: 
The answer to the question "Do the reasons require me to adore my dog?" is 
plainly no even though the answer to the question "Do I adore my dog?" is plainly 
yes. In trying to answer the latter question by answering the former question I 
would be barking up the wrong tree. (Cas sam 2014, 105)'0 
Our emotions, in particular, are often unresponsive to reasons. Consider the case of 
phobias. Moran brings them up as an example of what he too considers a fu.miliar 
fu.ct about some emotional states: they can be irrational and "do not alter when 
9 My concerns here are not principally exegetical. I think this reading is plausible even if, in the end, the sufficiency 
claim is not one Moran actually makes, or would be willing to make. 
10 Cf. "If your doctor has told you to cut down on your drinking then you have a good reason not to want a gin and 
tonic, but that doesn't alrer the fact that you want one. So consideration ofwhatyou ought rationally to want won't 
be a good guide to what you actually want •.. If your desire for a gin and tonic is impervious to the reasons for not 
wanting one then reflecting on those reasons won't rell you what you want: you ought not to want one but you 
do. Other attitudes are no different. You shouldn't fear the spider in your bathroom but you do, and it would be 
remarkable if every one of your beliefS is one that you ought rationally to have• (Cas sam 20ISb). 
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the beliefs on which they are based are sincerely denied by the person in question" 
(Moran 2001, 54). But it's hard to see why someone would not know that she is 
afraid even if her reasons don't determine what her attitude is. As Taylor Carman 
(Carman 2003, 404) claims, we often express ourselves in various ways, not "to 
decide how I ou,ght to feel, but to get clear about how I do feel by letting my emotions 
take shape and find a voice in what I say and do". 
There is another, more serious concern about Moran's exclusive focus on 
transparent deliberation in accounting for self-knowledge. This worry does 
not concern the deliberative or rationalistic aspect of Moran's transparency 
condition for having non-alienated self-knowledge, but rather the requirement of 
transparency itself. 
4.2 Possible responses 
There are different ways in which the rationalist could respond to the more radical 
objections. One response would be to backtrack somewhat and say that it was never 
the rationalist's ambition to explain the 'full scope' of self-knowledge anyway (cf. 
Boyle 2009 b), and hence we should not be surprised that the transparency procedure 
cannot handle all our attitudes in a satisfactory way. But as we've seen, Moran and 
other rationalists mention explicitly that the transparency procedure is meant to 
explain the sort of knowledge we have of other attitudes, including our "emotional 
attitudes, and intentions" (Moran 2001, g), and indeed the suggestion seems to be 
that for these attitudes, making up your mind is (normally) sufficient for acquiring 
knowledge of them. So accepting that the scope of rationalism in the end only 
applies to our beliefs, indeed only applies to the sort ofbeliefs that we don't already 
have and that don't require making up our minds, is quite a concession. 
A response that I believe has more potential is to take issue with the way in 
which the transparency procedure is understood by (some) critics. Cassam and 
Finkelstein, for instance, define transparency, and criticize rationalism on the basis 
of, the following definition: 
The question of whether I believe that pis, for me, transparent to the question of 
what I ought rationally to believe-i.e., to the question of whether the reasons 
require me to believe that p. I can answer the former question by answering the 
latter. (Finkelstein 2012, 103) 
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If this is how we should understand the transparency procedure, then it's no surprise 
that rationalism gives the 'wrong result' when applied to our feelings, desires and 
emotions, because we can want and feel things that we ourselves may think we 
"ought rationally" not to want or feel. 
The solution, then, is to reformulate the world-directed question that the mind-
directed question (what I believe/want/feel/care about, etc.) is transparent to. The 
rationalist could suggest that instead of saying that the mind-directed question (e.g. 
"Do I want X?") is transparent to the question of whether I ought rationally to want 
X, we should instead say that it is transparent to the world-directed question, e.g. 
"Is X desirable/lovable/good/worthy/beautiful?". In other words, the transparency 
procedure gives the wrong result in a (large) number of cases only if we operate with 
the wrong world-directed question; what we need to do is formulate the right world-
directed questions for different kinds of attitudes. 
But reformulating the world-directed question seems problematic. For one thing, 
the less rationalistic formulation (which is not formulated in terms of what one ought to 
think/feel) seems to face similar problems, because one might concede that something 
is desirable/good/beautiful without having the relevant desire, and vice versa. I take this 
to be Finkelstein's point: he does not believe that goat cheese is bad or undesirable, 
and yrt he doesn't want to try any. So the same problem of answering world-directed 
questions as a way of coming to have knowledge of your attitudes remains. 
What the above examples show is that focusing on the reasons in favour of P 
might give an answer to the question of what people in general want, or should 
want, but it does not seem to be a good way of finding out what it is that I want 
(hope for, feel, etc.). Finkelstein could, and does, recognize that goat cheese is 
not undesirable 'as such'. Rather, it's just that he does not have the relevant desire. 
Likewise, when I answer the world-directed question of whether, say, pursuing a 
career in academic philosophy is a good idea, I will conclude, on the basis of the 
reasons that are available (the publication rat race, the growing pressure to produce 
societally relevant research, the endless temporary positions, and so on), that it 
isn't. But this does not answer the question of what I want, or what I believe is the 
right course of action. As Naomi Kloosterboer argues, Moran's idea that rational 
agency consists in deliberating about the truth of some subject matter "neglects 
important aspects of our practical agency, in particular that we are agents to whom 
things matter, with certain projects, relationships, vulnerabilities and peculiarities" 
(Klooster boer 2015, 265). What we would minimally need, then, is a 'self-referential' 
ro6 Chapter 4 
reformulation of the world-directed question. I will address (the problems of) the 
'self-referential' take on transparency and the general problem with reformulating 
the relevant world-directed question in more detail in the next chapter. 
For now, I want to observe that there might be a more radical response available to the 
rationalist, which would at the same time take issue with the 'soft' objection regarding 
the intellectualistic flavour of the transparency procedure. The more radical response 
is to say that transparency is not a procedure in the first place and that all of the existing 
criticism is premised on the assumption that itis. I address this response below. 
5· A transcendental take on transparency? 
Are Moran's critics taking 'transparency' too literally, as an actual psychological 
procedure when this is not how transparency should be understood? Some of 
Moran's own remarks seem to plead for a different conception of transparency: 
For a desire to belong to the "judgment-sensitive" category it is, of course, 
not necessary that it formed as the result of deliberation. For very few of our 
desires come into existence as the conclusion of an explicit exercise of practical 
reasoning. Equally, however, very few of our beliefs about the world arrive as 
the conclusion of any explicit theoretical reasoning that we undertake. It is 
nonetheless essential to the category ofbelief that a beliefis a possible conclusion 
of some theoretical reasoning. (Moran 2oor, u6 emphases in original) 
Moran explicitly claims thatitis not as if" one normally arrives at one's beliefs (let alone 
one's fears or regrets) through some explicit process of deliberation", and instead 
suggests that there must be "lo,gical room for such a deliberative question" (Moran 
2001, 63 emphases added). In more recent work, in replying to his critics, Moran 
stresses that his claim that the concepts of "rationality, responsibility, and agency" 
that he takes to be fundamental to self-knowledge are sometimes "understood to 
mean something sweeping in the exaggerated claims for the actual governance of 
rationality or responsibility in our lives", and clarifies that his goal is to try and be "as 
minimalist as possible in commitments about how far our empirical lives are governed 
by, or explainable by, the normative structures of these concepts and other ones" 
(Moran 2004.3-, 455 emphases in original). He describes his project as follows: 
Knowing Your Mind by Making Up Your Mind 107 
In the book I emphasize that the role I give to the deliberative stance is not meant to 
suggest that most of our beliefs are actually formed through explicit deliberation or 
reasoning. We'd end up with many fewer beliefs for coping with the world than we 
actually have if we could only acquire them through explicit reasoning or deliberation. 
Here again, I'm trying to keep to a claim, and show thatithas surprising consequences 
for understanding self-knowledge. The modest claim is that, while most of our beliefs 
and other attitudes either never arrive at consciousness at all, or only do so from we 
know not where, the fuctremains that it is possible fora person to draw a conclusion, reach 
a finding, determine his belief about something on the basis of his assessment of the 
reasons supporting it Put this way, I take this to mean something the denial of which 
would be equivalent to denying that people ever actually reason to a conclusion, or act or hold beli~ 
or other attitudes for reasons. (Moran 2004-ll, 458 emphases added) 
There are at least two different ways of understanding the 'modest claim': an 
implicit one and a transcendental one. An 'implicit' version of the modest claim 
comes down to saying that, even though you do not arrive at your beliefs through 
explicit deliberation or reasoning, you arrive at them through implicit deliberation 
and reasoning. And even though answering the question of what your attitude is 
by answering a corresponding question about the world is not something you do 
consciously, it can be said to be something you do implicitly. But I don't think this 
way of construing rationalism is very plausible (exegetically and otherwise). Does 
it mean that every time one 'avows' being in some mental state, one is implicitly 
following the transparency procedure? This seems hard to believe, and does not 
seem to be compatible with the overall rationalist approach, either, which makes 
no mention of unconscious or implicit processes of deliberation. Instead, it's 
more plausible to think that when Moran denies (and in this respect agrees with 
his critics) that we hardly ever follow the transparency procedure 'explicitly', this 
doesn't mean that we do so implicitly but rather that following the transparency 
procedure is something that it is possible for us to do. n 
u There's an analogous discussion regarding a well-known passage of Christine Korsgaard, which runs as follows: 
"(O]ur capacity to turn our attention on to our own mental activities is also a capacity to distance ourselves from 
them, and to call them into question. I perceive, and I find myself with a powerful impulse to believe. But I back 
up and bring that impulse into view and then I have a certain distance. Now the impulse doesn't dominate me and 
now I have a problem. Shall I believe? Is this perception really a reason to believe? I desire and I find myself with a 
powerful impulse to act. But I back up and bring that impulse into view and then I have a certain distance. Now the 
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On this understanding of the modest claim, answering the question of what we 
believe, intend, desire, and so on by answering a corresponding question about the 
world is not meant to be an accurate psychological or empirical description about 
how we acquire self-knowledge; rather, we might take it to be a description of what's 
essential to human agency. More specifically, we might understand the capacity of 
being able to follow the transparency procedure as a transcendental condition of 
the very having of mental states, and this is how we should understand the sense in 
which transparency is supposed to be 'fundamental'. 
This reading of the project seems to be suggested by Boyle, who recognizes that 
Moran could not have taken 'fundamental' in an empirical or psychological sense, 
but adds, "My own view is that there is a sense of'fundamental' on which Moran's 
claim is true" (Boyle 2oogb, 140). He explains that transparent self-knowledge is 
fundamental, because without it, one could not understand oneself first-personally 
at all (Boyle 2oogb, 155). Transparency understood in this way is something that 
is fundamental to being "a thinker and an agent" (Boyle 2oogb, r6r). And so we 
might understand the modest claim regarding transparency to be a transcendental 
claim in which the capacity of being able to follow the transparency procedure is a 
requirement for being a believer at all. '2 
A transcendental take on transparency has a number of advantages. First, this 
reading would make sense of the fact that Moran never talks about transparency as a 
method or procedure (as I and others have done). He never talks about transparency 
in this way in Authority and Estran.gement, nor in more recent work. Instead, he talks 
about the "Transparency Condition". Whereas a procedure or method is something 
one can or should follow, which has cognitive and/or epistemic connotations, it 
may be argued that a condition is something to be obeyed- it is rather more like a 
command or something one ou.ght to do. Conforming to transparency, Moran says, 
is a "normative demand" or "a normative requirement on rational agency" (Moran 
impulse doesn'tdominate me and now I have a problem. Shall I act? Is this desire really a reason to act?" (Korsgaard 
1996, 93). No my Arpaly points out that "Korsgaard describes a scenario that almost never happens" and that it would 
be "an unusual, profoundly distressing experience in the life of anyone who does not use hallucinogens regularly" 
(Arpaly 2002, 24). But maybe Korsgaard is not attempting to describe our (empirical) psychology. Arpaly goes on, 
"It is worth emphasizing that Korsgaard herself does not argue that the sort of scenario she describes happens 
often. If her goal is simply to show that human beings are reflective in a way that other animals are not, she is 
successful" (Arpaly 2002, 25). 
12 A transcendental take on transparency would see Moran's project as one that is in line with other Kantian projects, 
such as those that are meant to offer a 'transcendental psychology' (Beyleveld and Ziche 2015; see also Diiring and 
Diiwel12orsJ. 
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2001, xvi-xvii). Second, the transcendental reading of transparency would render 
irrelevant the criticism that the transparency procedure would be incomplete, 
inefficient or unreliable. 
However, the transcendental reading is also problematic, for a number of 
reasons. First, Moran himself stresses, as we've seen, that his account of transparency 
is more than 'merely logical'; he claims that one might "lose the right" to assume 
that one's judgements constitute one's attitudes (Moran 2003, 406) and thus that 
rational deliberation can fail to settle one's beliefs. These claims seem to go beyond 
a transcendental reading of transparency. I thus agree with Johannes Roessler, who 
says that "Moran is sometimes interpreted as offering a 'non-epistemic' explanation 
of self-knowledge ... This, it seems to me, is misleading. The stated aim of Moran's 
theory is to 'explain and vindicate avowal as a privileged form of knowledge of 
oneself' (Moran 2001, 134)" (J. Roessler 2013, 7). 
Second, a transcendental take on transparency is not just modest; it might simply 
be too weak if, that is, it's meant to explain how we acquire self-knowledge, i.e. that 
it is a way of comin.g to know one's own attitudes. Recall that all we need is for there to 
be 'logical room' to answer a world-directed question. As Taylor Carman notes, "[I] 
tis important to recognize how weak that claim is" (Carman 2003, 404). It tells us 
very little in terms of how we acquire self-knowledge. The claim that human beings 
have the 'capacity' to make up their minds merely means that it should be possible 
for anyone to answer the question of what she believes by answering the question 
of what is the case. A transcendental reading of transparency is compatible with the 
fact that we don't 'follow' transparency regularly- indeed, it's compatible with the 
idea that we don't follow it at a[l. What's required is that it should be possible for 
someone to do so. But how could such a weak claim, psychologically speaking, offer 
an explanation ofhow we know our own minds, which is what it was meant to offer? 
Third, the transcendental reading of transparency is incompatible with some of 
the fundamental claims of Moran's account, namely his claim that 'transparency' 
matters in relation to (avoiding) alienation and that it matters to the mental health 
of the person- a claim Moran makes at various points in his book (Moran 2001, 8, 
35, 6o, 107-8, 136-37). Moran claims that "clearly something is wrong if[someone] 
cannot consciously avow the first attitude and can only ascribe it to himself on the 
evidence" (Moran 2001, 86). Rationalism is meant to make sense of specific instances 
of adopting the deliberative stance and 'obeying transparency'. This is evident, in 
particular, in Moran's discussion of the 'analysand', the person who, through the 
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course of therapy, learns that she believes/feels X. She does so on the basis of evidence, 
namely because of what her therapist tells her. Unless she is able to avow her mental 
states, i.e. conform to the transparency condition, she will remain alienated with 
respect to her own mental states. But if transparency is all about having a particular 
capacity, then it's not clear what would be 'wrong' with people who have this capacity 
but who don't exercise it On a transcendental take on transparency, there would 
be nothing wrong with those who rarely follow the transparency procedure or with 
those who don't make up their minds in certain scenarios - there's only something 
wrong with those who are altogether incapable of doing so. It is one thing to claim 
that human beings have the capacity to 'conform to the transparency condition', and 
another to say that this is what would be 'normal', 'better' or 'healthier' for us to do, 
which seems to be a stronger claim that Moran wants to make.'3 For these reasons, I 
think transparency should not be understood (only) transcendentally. 
All of this should make clear that the transcendental take on transparency is perhaps 
plausible as a theory of what's essential to human beings, but taken as something that's 
relevant to the question of what explains (non-alienated) self-knowledge, it cannot 
be quite right. The question for the rationalist is whether there is room in between 
(r) the modest claim that it should be possible for someone to answer the mind-
directed question in terms of a world-directed one and (2) the claim that transparency 
is a genuine procedure of sorts that has its place in the actual (psychological) lives of 
persons and is a capacity they ought to exercise to avoid alienation. What rationalists 
want, it seems, is a middle position between (r) and (2), but it's hard to see what such a 
middle position would be. Despite the fact that I think the transcendental or capacity-
reading of transparency is plausible-indeed, ironically, I believe it may even be more 
plausible than any psychological rendering of it-I don't think it's compatible with 
the rationalist's key ambitions with respect to self-knowledge. 
In what follows, I therefore assume that we should take transparency to be a 
procedure. Understood in this way, it seems critics are right to take transparency to 
be a procedure. And, further, it seems they are right to argue that it's not a procedure 
we often use, and also that when we do, it doesn't necessarily provide us with 
knowledge of our attitudes and indeed might lead to self-deception. 
In the next section, I want to return to the question bracketed before, namely 
whether the transparency procedure is an inferential procedure. 
13 For discussion of the 'normative' reading of transparency, see Cassam (2014, chap. 7). 
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6. Is the transparency procedure an inferential procedure? 
As mentioned earlier, a natural way of explaining why following the transparency 
procedure provides self-knowledge at all is to understand rationalism along 
inferentialist lines. In order for me to gain knowledge of my belief that P, I need 
more than my judgement that P. The reason for this is that I also need to assume 
that my judgement (necessarily, normally, typically) constitutes my beliefs. Moran 
recognizes the fact that in order for the transparency procedure to provide self-
knowledge, some such assumption is needed: 
What right have I to think that my reflection on the reasons in favor ofP (which 
is one subject-matter) has anything to do with the question of what my actual 
belief about Pis (which is quite a different subject matter)? Without a reply to this 
challenge, I don't have any right to answer the question that asks what my belief 
is by reflection on the reasons in favor of an answer concerning the state of the 
weather. And then my thought at this point is: I would have a right to assume that 
my reflection on the reasons in favour of rain provided an answer to the question 
of what my belief about rain is, ifl could assume that what my belief here is was 
something determined by the conclusion of my reflection on those reasons. An 
assumption of this sort would provide just the right link between the two questions. 
And now, let's ask, don't I make just this assumption, whenever I'm in the process 
of thinking my way to a conclusion about some subject-matter? (Moran 2003, 405) 
The transparency procedure thus only works "insofar the person is entitled to the 
assumption that, e.g., what he believes about something on reflection is determined by 
what he has reason to believe" (Moran 200¥, 457). So for one to be justified in believing 
that P on the basis of judging that P, one has to make the assumption that one's belief 
is indeed determined by the conclusion of one's reflection on the reasons in favour ofP. 
The assumption that judgements and beliefs are linked in the appropriate way 
seems to make the rationalist account inferential (Cassaro 2014; Byrne 2ona). In 
this context, it is helpful to first address the prior question of what would make 
knowledge in general inferential. Following Jim Pryor (2005), Cassaro proposes 
to distinguish between psychological and epistemic immediacy. When we want to 
know whether someone's belief(including one's second-order belief that one has a 
certain attitude) is 'immediate', then 
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[o]n an epistemological reading the issue is what kind of epistemic support 
you have for P, and not whether you arrived at P by inferring it from other 
propositions you believe. Whether you infer that P in the latter sense is only 
relevant to whether your knowledge or justification is inferential in a psycholoBical 
sense. For your knowledge that P to count as non-inferential in an epistemoloBical 
sense it must be the case that your justification for believing P does not come from 
your justification for believing other propositions. (Cassaro 2orsa) 
On the topic of what it means for knowledge to be 'non-inferential', John McDowell 
similarly writes, 
Surely the distinction should be epistemoloBical!y, not just psychologically, 
significant. It should concern the character of a state's credentials, not the 
process by which it was arrived at. (McDowell2oro)'4 
So, then, when we are talking about the causes of one's belief, how one arrives 
at one's belief or how one's belief is formed, as well as talking about (temporal) 
structures, we are considering the psychological features (histories, pathways) of a 
person's state. If, by contrast, we are concerned with what makes it appropriate for 
one to believe that P, or what one's grounds or bases are for believing what one does, 
then we are in the epistemic domain. rs 
Returning to the relation between judgement and belief, we should now be able to 
see why Moran's account appears to be inferential. For in order to know what one's 
14 McDowell makes this remark in the context of criticizing the way Robert Brandom distinguishes inferential from 
non-inferential knowledge. Brandom considers a physicist who begins by having to infer claims about certain 
unobservable sub-atomic particles (mu-mesons) from premises about observable goings-on, and later learns 
to "respond to cloud-chamber phenomena with claims about mu-mesons directly, without needing to take an 
inferential step". McDowell goes on: "As Brandom uses the idea, she has now acquired a capacity for noninferential 
knowledge about mu-mesons. But is that the right way to distinguish inferential and noninferential knowledge?", 
which is followed by the passage just cited. What's noteworthy is that, apparently, McDowell takes the physicist's 
way of responding (as requiring no explicit making of inferences) as sufficient for psychological immediacy. 
This suggests that McDowell equates psychological inferences with something like conscious inferences, and 
that for something to be psychological immediate, it will be enough for the person not to have to draw any 
explicit inferences. The alternative is to see 'psychological' inferences as cognitive inferences, whether or not 
they are conscious. In which case, the physicist's knowledge might still be inferential. If a cognitive construal of 
psychological immediacy is to be preferred, then it seems more accurate to say that McDowell is discussing what 
we might call phenomenological immediacy rather than psychological immediacy. 
rs For a similar distinction, see, for example, Roche (20I6). 
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beliefs are on the basis of what one judges, one has to assume, as Moran recognizes, 
that judgements and beliefs are linked in the appropriate way. This is not a trivial 
assumption, nor does it seem plausible to think it's a transcendental assumption, 
because Moran allows that one can "lose the right" to assume that one's judgements 
constitute one's beliefs when he says that 
even in our more self-constituting moments, we know ourselves to be 
rationally frail creatures, and in various circumstances we can lose the right asserted 
in the Transparency condition Gust as the Kantian Transcendental Assumption 
of Autonomy does not involve the denial that there can be what he calls "alien 
influences" on the will, or that their hold on the person can fatally compromise 
the claim to autonomy). (Moran 2003, 406 first emphases added) 
For someone's knowledge of the belief that P to count as immediate, it must be the 
case that one's justification for believing that P does not come from one's justification 
for believing other propositions. But, as it turns out, one's knowledge does come 
at least in part from believing other propositions, namely from one's belief that 
judgements and beliefs are related in the right way, or what Cassam refers to as the 
'linking assumption': 
Assuming that my belief concerning P is determined by the conclusion of my 
reflection on the reasons in favour ofP is therefore equivalent to assuming that 
my belief concerning Pis determined by whether I judge that P. Call this the linking 
assumption (LA). Moran represents the linking assumption as one which I actually 
make, and am entitled to make, when I am in the process of thinking my way to 
some conclusion. The specific role of this assumption is to connect the inward-
directed and the outward-directed questions in such a way as make it intelligible 
that I am entitled to answer the former by answering the latter. (Cassarn 2ou, I2) 
As Sacha Golob puts it, "Moran's position is not epistemically immediate because 
the subject needs to be aware of the principle that when she judges Pit follows that 
she believes thatP" (Golob 2ors, I2).'6 
16 Sacha Golob makes an interesting claim when discussing the linking assumption: "to make the self-ascriptive move 
I must assume that my judgments have this power. But, as we have seen, so must Moran himself. In most cases, 
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If this is true, then this is somewhat problematic for the rationalist account 
because one of its central claims regarding immediacy must be given up. The fact 
that we need to make the above assumption regarding the relation between my 
judgements and my beliefs is precisely what makes the transparency procedure 
epistemically inferential rather than immediate. In any case, it seems that Moran's 
claim that "the basic concept of first-person awareness that we are trying to capture 
is that of awareness that is not based on evidence, behavioral or otherwise" (2001, 
u) is too quick. Transparent self-knowledge is based on evidence, even if it isn't 
behavioural evidence. 
I don't think that understanding rationalism along the inferentialist lines 
suggested above presents a very serious problem, unless one takes Moran's claims 
about immediacy to be his central claim. But this does not seem plausible to me. 
The central claim seems to be that the practical standpoint of the first person is 
fundamental to understanding non-alienated self-knowledge and that I can come 
to know what my attitudes are by deliberating on some subject matter. This claim 
could still be true (for some of our attitudes, at least). 
What's of particular interest, though, is that the discussions regarding the 
linking assumption raise the question of when one would be entitled to make 
that assumption. Usually? Always? In some cases? Moran does not seem to take 
seriously the possibility that there could be circumstances in which one would not 
be entitled to assume that one's judgements constitute one's beliefs, given that 
Moran thinks asking a rhetorical question suffices (cf. "And now, let's ask, don't I 
make just this assumption, whenever I'm in the process of thinking my way to a 
conclusion about some subject-matter?" (Moran 2001, 405)). This in turn appears to 
agents will in fact move between judging that P and self-ascribing the corresponding belief automatically; where 
they are aware of countervailing forces, they will rightly be hesitant (consider belief ascription by agents who 
have just been prompted by reading the implicit bias literature)" (Golob 2015). The sentence in brackets is quite 
surprising, and has far-reaching consequences that I don't think Golob himself takes seriously enough. For if 
Golob is right that the linking assumption can be overruled in the above sort of circumstances, which indeed does 
not seem unlikely, then this would mean that one is arguably not entitled to make the linking assumption if one is 
prompted by reading implicit bias literature, or, which seems equally plausible, if one simply 'knows about' this 
literature and this is one of the things one considers when answering the question of whether Pis true. I think 
this is quite radical, for it means that when answering the question of whether one believes all human beings are 
equal, say, one of the things to take into account when answering this question is (research on) implicit bias, in 
which case it would be conceivable that the reasons one considers when answering the world-directed question 
of whether Pis true can include insights from scientific psychology. I imagine that this is what a holist version of 
rationalism might want to accommodate, but I will not pursue the relevance of empirical psychology to the linking 
assumption here. 
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suggest that one is always entitled to assume that one's judgements and one's beliefs 
are related in the right way (the right way being judging that P determines one's 
belief that P). But mightn't there be circumstances (e.g. psychological or social) in 
which we should not assume that our judgements constitute our beliefs, and so a 
'gap' occurs between the two? If so, what sort of circumstances might those be? 
The reason for calling attention to these questions is because it matters to our 
understanding of rationalism construed along atomist lines -a topic I will take up 
in the next chapter. 
7. Conclusion 
In this chapter I have described the key points of the rationalist account and 
have discussed some of the more common objections to it and ways in which the 
rationalist might respond to them. I considered in detail the claim that says we should 
understand 'transparency' not as a procedure but as a transcendental condition, 
which I argued is a promising response in some respects, but is incompatible with 
Moran's epistemic claims about self-knowledge and normative claims regarding 
alienation. In the final section, I turned to the question of whether rationalism is 
a version of inferentialism or not, which I suggested is relevant to the question of 
whether or not rationalism is a version of atomism, which I will address next. 
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The Limits ofRationalism: 
Failures ofTransparency Part I 
I. Introduction 
Consider the Angcy Spouse. The Angry Spouse is having a fit of anger and asks herself 
"Do I believe a divorce is a good idea?". To answer this question, the Angry Spouse 
decides to answer the corresponding world-directed question "Is a divorce a good 
idea?". She deliberates over the reasons in favour of the subject matter P ("a divorce 
is a good idea"). But, angry as she is, the only reasons in favour ofP that are salient to 
her are 'angcy reasons' (e.g. "This is the third time this month we've got into a fight!", 
"I'm not happy", "Being afraid of not being together is no reason not to get divorced," 
etc.).' Reflecting on her angcy reasons, then, the spouse's deliberative reflection 
results in a positive judgement: yes, a divorce is definitely a good idea. 
The question is, does the Angry Spouse, when making up her mind, have self-
knowledge, according to the rationalist? It does not seem evident that she does. A 
well-known piece of anger-management advice, after all, is to count to ten before 
you decide to do anything. Maybe we should give the Angry Spouse similar advice 
("Don't believe what you judge"). It's not hard to imagine that when the Angry 
Spouse has cooled off, she will see the world quite differently, and so will be 
inclined to answer the world-directed question differently, too. Maybe she will no 
longer think that getting a divorce is a good idea after all- it's just something she 
thought in the heat of the moment. However, it's not evident that the Angry Spouse 
necessarily lacks knowledge of her beliefs and desires, either. Maybe her judgement 
that getting a divorce is a good idea really does reflect her attitudes. 
By 'angry reasons' I simply mean reasons that are salient to one when one is angry. Presumably, it is not just the 
content ofher reasons that is affected by her anger but also her reasoning style. 
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The question of whether or not the Angry Spouse has self-knowledge is hard to 
answer, I want to suggest, because the rationalist's proposed way of acquiring self-
knowledge is simply 'deliberate'. But deliberate how? Deliberate when? Deliberate 
with which reasons? In other words, the dictum 'make up your mind' does not tell us 
very much about what making up your mind comes down to in practice. This, in turn, 
means that it's not clear when making up your mind is conducive of self-knowledge. 
Moran and other rationalists have not paid much attention to the question of what 
exactly is required for making up your mind to be attitude-constitutive and therefore 
knowledge-conducive. In this chapter, I therefore evaluate the rationalist account of 
self-knowledge, doing so by concentrating on how it deals with the circumstances 
of deliberation. I address the question of what counts as 'failures of transparency', 
i.e. cases in which following the transparency procedure is not attitude-constitutive 
and so not knowledge-conducive. I propose that regarding the question of when and 
in circumstances making up your mind delivers self-knowledge, there are different 
possible interpretations of rationalism. One is the radical atomist rationalist view 
(hereafter radical rationalist), which is the view that by making up your mind you 
always acquire self-knowledge, no matter what the circumstances. In other words, 
the radical rationalist thinks that all circumstances are 'good' circumstances for 
deliberation. Another option is a moderate atomist rationalistversion of rationalism 
(hereafter moderate rationalist), according to which making up your mind is only 
self-knowledge conducive in normal circumstances of deliberation. In other 
words, there might be circumstances, such as anger, in which answering world-
directed questions and coming to a judgement is not sufficient for constituting 
one's attitudes and hence is not sufficient for acquiring self-knowledge. This view 
requires making a non-arbitrary distinction between what counts as the normal or 
right and what counts as abnormal or wrong circumstances of deliberation. Given 
that deliberation is so fundamental on the rationalist's view, the least s/he can do is 
recognize that we sometimes deliberate rather poorly, and address the question of 
whether or not this has any consequences for his/her account of self-knowledge. 
I proceed as follows. First of all, in Section 2, I describe what I'll refer to as the 
'Anscombean Constraint' (2.I) and describe the radical rationalist view in terms 
of it (2.2). I present some prima facie problems and challenges for this view in 
Section 3· One such problem is what I call the 'garbage in, garbage out' objection, 
which is the objection that if someone makes up her mind in the 'wrong' sort of 
circumstances, i.e. if 'bad' reasons go into the transparency procedure, then 
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the transparency procedure may likewise have a 'bad' outcome: self-deception 
instead of self-knowledge. • In Section 4, I describe moderate rationalism, the view 
according to which making up one's mind is only self-knowledge conducive if one 
makes up one's mind in the right or normal circumstances, and briefly address 
the (exegetical) question of where we are supposed to place Moran's writings 
in the radical/moderate rationalist landscape. Next, I tum to what seems to be a 
straightforward response to the 'garbage in, garbage out' objection, which is to 
filter out the wrong circumstances or the 'bad input' to the transparency procedure 
(Section 5).3 I argue that this solution fails to be convincing by arguing that the 
exceptions seem to become the rule (5.1) and that one's 'considered reasons' are 
neither necessary nor sufficient for acquiring self-knowledge (5.2). 4 
Before I begin, I need to make an important qualification, namely that I will be 
working on the assumption that a subject is actually able to follow the transparency 
procedure/make up her mind about some subject matter. After all, rationalism does 
not tell us what to say about subjects who are altogether unable to deliberate or reach 
a conclusion by reflecting on some subject matter because of whatever circumstance. 
I will thus ignore contexts or moods in which the subject fails to be able to deliberate, 
judge or avow anything at all. Such a subject, I imagine, would not acquire self-
knowledge by following the transparency procedure, but only because she would not 
be following the transparency procedure in the first place. I will concentrate on cases 
in which a subject is (capable of) making up her mind and not in those circumstances 
that make it hard or impossible for someone to make up her mind and prevent her 
fromacquiringtransparentself-knowledge. Thelatteris, though, I think, an important 
issue that is underexplored and certainly deserves more attention.5 
2 An objection with the same name has been raised with respect to Rawls's method of reflective equilibrium Oones 
2005, 66, 74; de Maagt 2016). Using the same term to describe the objection to the transparency procedure is 
deliberate. This is because the way in which the rationalist could respond to the objection is similar to the way in 
which advocates of reflective equilibrium might (or indeed have) responded, and it is problematic for similar reasons. 
3 As with the notion of'procedure', I take the notion of'input' very broadly as simply referring to 'the material one 
deliberates over'. 
4 I should add rhat, since I've already discussed why rationalism has trouble dealing wirh knowledge of attitudes 
other than belief, my focus here will be on beliefs, more specifically on whether and when one would be entitled to 
assume that one's judgement that P determines one's beliefrhat P. Beliefs are the 'home base' of rationalism, and 
hence seeing wherher and how the transparency procedure works for beliefS is of particular relevance. 
5 For an interesting discussion regarding the relevance of self-respect for being able to deliberate at all and so 
come to acquire transparent self-knowledge, see Beate Roessler's (2015) paper 'Autonomy, Self-Knowledge and 
Oppression'. See also Jan Bransen, who argues that self-love is a necessary condition for self-knowledge (2015), 
and Katrien Schaubroeck (unpublished manuscript) for an insightful take on the role that self-confidence plays 
with respect to self-knowledge. 
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2. Radical rationalism and the Anscombean Constraint 
2.1 TheAnscombean Constraint 
The rationalist's key claim is that the first-person question about one's attitude is 
"answered by reference to (or consideration of) the same reasons that would justifY 
an answer to the corresponding question about the world" (Moran 2001, 62). But 
what reasons might those be? Can they include my friends' reasons? Other people's 
reasons? Or must they be 'my own' reasons? If that's the case, then might these also 
be my .fUture self's reasons? What about my past self's reasons? If they must be my 
'current' reasons, then what are those? Should we understand a person's current 
reasons simply to be 'belief-desire pairs'? Can feelings or emotions be reasons? 
To begin answering the rationalist's reply to (some of) these questions, I want 
to start by considering a specific passage from Moran in which he appeals to 
Anscombe's work on intention, and which I take to be a good illustration of what 
Moran takes 'reasons' to be, which is as follows: 
In belief as in intentional action, the stance of the rational agent is the stance 
where reasons that justifY are at issue ... Anscombe's question "why" is asking 
not for what might best explain the movement that constitutes the agent's 
action, but instead is asking for the reasons he takes to justifY his action, what 
he is aiming at .... To do otherwise would be for him to take the course of his 
belief or his intentional action to be up to something other than his sense of 
the best reasons, and if he thinks that, then there's no point in his deliberating 
about what to do. Indeed, there is no point in calling it "deliberation" any more, 
if he takes it to be an open question whether this activity will determine what he 
actually does or believes. To engage in deliberation in the first place is to hand 
over the question of one's belief or intentional action to the authority of reason. 
(Moran 2001, 127) 
Other rationalists and agentialists have made similar appeals to the Anscombean 
account of intentional action being based on the person's reasons for acting 
(Hieronymi 2oo8; Boyle 2ooga, 2oua, Hamilton 2000, 2oo8, ]. Roessler 2013, 
2015b). On the Anscombean view, we have 'knowledge without observation' of 
our own intentions. The knowledge isn't perceptual, nor is it inferential; it's a type 
of 'practical' knowledge (Setiya 2ou). There is a "privileged relation" between 
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the question of what an agent is doing and what she takes herself to be doing (this 
formulation is from Moran's paper on Anscom be (cf. Moran 2004b, 64)). The latter 
is "not just another description, side by side with all the others, but has some claim 
to determine what the action itself is" (Moran 2004b, 44). Crudely formulated, we 
would not come to know 'what the agent was doing' when she acted the way she did 
if we did not take her own answer to the question of why she did it as giving us the 
(exhaustive) answer. On Anscombe's view, then, "you cannot be paying, hiring, or 
marrying unless you are doing so intentionally", and "in order to act intentionally, 
one must have practical knowledge of what one is doing" (Setiya 2on, 159). Such 
knowledge is, as Kieran Setiya points out, both necessary and sufficient because it 
constitutes the action it represents. Even if we did not consider the reasons she herself 
gives, whatever they are, in answer to a why-question, we could still give some account 
or 'explanation' of her doings, but it would not be one that would rationally explain 
her doings, i.e. would not explain her doings understood as an intentional action. 
Anscombe describes the sort ofknowledge that one has in acting intentionally as 
a form of practical knowledge, which she explains by using the (somewhat elusive) 
phrase that an intention is "the cause of what it understands" (Anscombe 1957, 87). 
Boyle explains the phrase as follows: 
whereA-ingis something I am doing intentionally, it is only insofar as I understand 
myself to be A-ing that I am A-ing, and it is only insofar as I understand myself 
to be A-ing on account of X, Y, and Z that I am A-ing on account of X, Y, and 
Z. My understanding makes these things the case, not by causally precipitating 
certain events whose unfolding does not itself require any contribution from my 
understanding, but by governing my activity as it unfolds, in light of the concept: 
A-ing, conceived as in something to be done. (Boyle 2009a, 140)6 
6 Cf. Hieronymi: "Anscom be ... noted that whenever one intentionally <I> 's .•. one can rightly be asked, 'Why did 
you<!>?' (or 'Why are you <1>-ing?') where this question looks, not for an explanation ofhow it came about that one 
o-ed, but rather fur the agent's reasons for <1>-ing .... A similar question is given application by belief: whenever 
one believes that P ..• one can rightly be asked, 'Why do you believe that P?' where that question looks, not for an 
explanation ofhow it came about that one believes, but rather fur considerations that one takes to bear positively on 
whether P" (Hieronymi 2008, 359). What's curious aboutHieronymi's take on Anscombe is that she formulates the 
why-question in the past tense ("Why did you<!>?"), whereas it appears to be fundamental to Anscombe's approach 
that we have the special sort of knowledge while we are acting, and so the relevant question is (only, and not also) 
"Why are you <1>-ing?" (see also Boyle 2ooga, 138). 
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The rationalist approach to self-knowledge can be understood as applying the 
Anscombean account of the type of knowledge we have of our own intentions 
regarding our other attitudes, most notably, our beliefs/ The idea is that there is 
some privileged relation between the question of what an agent cps P (believes, 
desires, hopes for, and so on) and what she takes herself to cp, the latter of which 
requires specifYing her reasons regarding P, whatever they might be. Again, the 
thought would be that we would not come to know what the agent's attitudes were 
if we did not take her own answer to the question of why she believes or wants what 
she does as giving us the (exhaustive) answer. 
The fact that Moran says rather little about what he takes 'deliberation' and 
'reasons' to be- and provides no answer to the sort of questions with which I began 
this section - is, I think, indicative of the fact that he is or wants to be neutral or 
non-committal about what deliberating or reasoning involves and what reasons 
one should deliberate 'with', so to speak. So instead of saying, as I have, that the 
problem is that Moran does not say much about these issues, what we should say is 
that he thinks rationalism does not need to say much, or anything, about them. 
2.2 Radical rationalism 
If we return to the question of what qualifies as the 'ingredients' for the transparency 
procedure, such that it delivers self-knowledge, one reading of the rationalist 
project is to see rationalism as posing only one constraint, which I will refer to as 
the 'Anscom bean Constraint'. The Anscom bean Constraint holds that the (only) 
material that can be used to answer world-directed questions in a way that results 
in that procedure having self-knowledge as its outcome is 'deliberative' material, 
i.e. the subject's own reasons, or considerations that the subject draws on to the 
question whether P is true, desirable, cute, fearful, something to be hoped for, and 
so on. 8 
The radical way of understanding rationalism comes down to saying that in order 
to acquire self-knowledge by following the transparency procedure, all you need to 
satisfY is the Anscombean Constraint. No constraints are put on the circumstances 
7 For Boyle, this is his explicit goal: "my purpose here is, not to defend Anscombe's view in its own right, but to 
draw a comparison between her understanding of our relation to our own actions and what we have seen about our 
relation to our own beliefs" (Boyle 2ooga, 140). 
8 I am sceptical about finding the right world-directed question for attitudes other than beliefs (see previous 
chapter), but here I assume for the sake of the argument that we can find the right formulations for such questions. 
I address some of these issues below. 
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in which one makes up one's mind. In other words, on this reading of rationalism, 
it is irrelevant what the psychological context is or what mood the subject is in 
while considering her reasons that she takes to bear positively on whether P is true 
or desirable. For instance, whether a subject follows the transparency procedure 
'angrily', 'nervously' or 'reluctantly', and so on, or even while depressed or 
intoxicated, is irrelevant for the epistemic potential of the transparency procedure. 
Also, it does not matter epistemically what induces or causes a subject to engage 
in transparent question-settling (was it a question, a feeling, a conversation, a 
divorce, a change of careers, a romantic dinner, a therapeutic scenario or perhaps no 
apparent cause at all?).9 If all you need to meet is the Anscom bean Constraint, then 
all you need to know is 'your reasons' regarding the subject matter of your attitude, 
where 'your own reasons' are those reasons you can here and now come up with 
in support of the subject matter. Rationalism understood in this way would thus 
appear to place no constraints on how and/or whether the reasons that the subject 
uses to answer a world-directed question coheres with the subject's other reasons or 
other attitudes (at that same time or at other times) or coheres with her plans or 
(life) projects, her character traits, personality, strengths, weaknesses, values or 
cares or her self-conception. Nor should it matter if the reasons a subject gives for 
wanting or believing something express a fundamental lack of respect for herself 
and/or violate the moral rights and/or duties she has to herself(cf. Hill rggr). 
In short, what matters is not how the subject follows the transparency 
procedure or what material (which reasons) go into the procedure, but simply that 
she follows it. Whatever reasons the subject gives, these reasons will determine 
what her attitude is, so long as they are 'her' reasons, where the possessive 
pronoun refers simply to the reasons that are salient to her in whatever moods 
she is in, at whatever time, in whatever context and whatever their content. The 
constraints the subject must meet are formal ones, not substantive ones regarding 
the content of the subject's reasons or how these reasons stand in relation to her 
values, self-conception or other attitudes she also has, nor indeed the frequency of 
deliberation (too much, too little). 
9 I rake it that the context in which subjects follow the transparency procedure can also include various social or 
political contexts, which, likewise, should be irrelevant. These moral-political circumstances require a separate, 
fuller, discussion, however, which I will address in the next chapter. 
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Ifitwere true that rationalism puts only one constraint on the transparency procedure 
to be successful, i.e. to deliver attitudinal self-knowledge, then that would explain 
why, in the context of rationalism, little has been said about what reasons are and 
whether or not all reasons are in principle good candidates that function as input 
for the transparency procedure, that is, to allow for the transparency procedure to 
issue judgements that are epistemically trustworthy with regard to self-knowledge. 
It seems that Anscombean assumptions of the above kind explain why Moran 
does not seem to take seriously the possibility that there could be circumstances 
in which one would not be entitled to assume that one's judgements constitute 
one's beliefs. Recall that Moran thinks asking a rhetorical question suffices: "And 
now, let's ask, don't I make just this assumption, whenever I'm in the process of 
thinking my way to a conclusion about som~ subject-matter?" (Moran 2oor, 405). 
This passage makes clear that whenever I answer some world-directed question, 
i.e. whenever I judge, and so, crucially, however I judge, I always have the right to 
assume that that judgement constitutes my attitude(s). This would (only) follow if 
one is an Anscom bean regarding what should 'go into' the transparency procedure. 
I am not trying to give an accurate description of rationalism or point out what it 
is necessarily committed to. The point is merely to consider one of the ways in which 
we might understand what 'deliberation' involves and what the rationalist appeal 
to making up your mind by reflecting on 'the reasons' comes down to, given that 
nothing much has been said about these issues. Having said that, it seems to me that 
the radical rationalist view faces some prima facie problems, which I turn to now. 
3· Prima facie challenges and problems for radical rationalism 
If all one has to meet is the Anscom bean Constraint, then the first worry is that it 
appears to follow that we can give a stra(gh!forward answer to the question of whether 
the Angry Spouse knows her own mind when answering the world-directed question 
while in a fit of anger. Her angry reasons would appear to satisfY the Anscom bean 
Constraint after all: they are 'her' reasons and are reasons that are available from 
her practical, first-person perspective. Assuming, with Moran, that one is entitled 
to assume that one's judgements constitute one's attitudes whenever one reasons 
one's way to a conclusion about some subject matter, it appears we must conclude 
that the Angry Spouse settled her attitudes and acquired knowledge of what she 
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believed and wanted. This conclusion does not appear to be very nuanced. This does 
not mean we have to draw the opposite conclusion, that is, that the Angry Spouse 
is entirely self-ignorant when she makes up her mind. But there are many other 
options.10 I will discuss the metaphysics ofbeliefin greater detail in Chapter 7, but 
for now, the prima facie worry is just that the radical rationalist view lacks nuance. 
A second worry is that it's not evident that the Anscom bean account of self-
knowledge of our intentions can be applied to our attitudes in general. In other 
words, the worry is that the Anscombean Constraint might work for Anscombe 
but maybe not for Moran. What arguably makes the Anscombean explanation of 
how we know our own intentions plausible is that what it is meant to explain is 
something that I am doing hm and now. It seems prima facie plausible that I can 
know that I am now, for example, watering the flowers or baking a cake, and that I 
might know this even ifi'm angry, jealous, tired, insecure, etc. All I need to know is 
that I want to water the flowers now, and to answer the why-question all I need to do 
is come up with the reasons that are available to me right now. Boyle rightly stresses 
this temporal/enduring aspect of Anscom be's approach: 
Something that is striking in Anscombe - something that sets her apart from 
many subsequent action theorists - is her resolute focus on action in progress. 
Anscombe's "why?"-question is first and foremost "Why are you doing A?" ... Her 
assumption, in effect, is that to understand the nature of intentional action, we 
must describe the specific character of the subject's relation to it as it unfolds. 
(Boyle 2ooga, 138-39; but see also Setiya 2on) 
The problem with many of our (other) attitudes, though, is that their existence is not 
restricted to the 'here and now'. My beliefs, desires, hopes, expectations, and so on 
must have "a reasonable life expectancy" (M. Fricker 2009, 52). It's not obvious to 
ro Eric Schwitzgebel (2oro), for instance, considers the following options: 
• The 'shifting view', on which the subject shifts between believing P and believing not-P, 
• The 'contradictory belief view', on which the subject believes both P and not-P, 
• The 'in-between belief view', according to which a subject neither determinately believes that P nor 
determinately believes that not-P but her attitude is (literally, metaphysically) somewhere in between (this 
is Schwitzgebel's own preferred view). (Schwitzgebel 2oro, 537) 
It's not clear whether any of these more nuanced views can be made compatible with rational rationalism. It seems 
that radical rationalism is what Schwitzgebel refers to as the pro-judsement view, on which the subject determinately 
believes that P and fails to believe not-P. Applied to the Angry Spouse, this means that she determinately believes a 
divorce is a good idea, and tails to believe that a divorce is not a good idea. 
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think ofbeliefs and other attitudes as things that 'unfold', as Boyle puts it, in the way 
that a person's actions unfold. Despite these prima facie metaphysical differences 
between intentions-in-action and things like beliefs and desires, the rationalist 
suggests the procedure is the same: I answer the question of what my attitudes 
are by coming up with reasons that are salient/available to me at this moment. By 
implication, this means that I should be able to answer the questions of whether 
I believe a career change is a good idea or whether I believe I should start learning 
French (these examples are from Moran (2oo1, ns)) by giving reasons in support of 
the subject matter I reflect upon here and now. But arguably I do not have the belief 
that 'a career change is a good idea' in the same sense as I have the intention to 
water the flowers when I'm watering the flowers. The temporal restrictions on the 
availability of my reasons may be unproblematic for 'knowing what one is doing', 
but arguably this is different for knowing (most of) one's other attitudes. 
A related worry is what we might call the 'Nietzschean worry'. According 
to Nietzsche, we often lack awareness of our motives, indeed, he claims that it's 
a "universal madness" to think that we generally know what we are doing; that 
"actions are never what they appear to be ... all actions are essentially unknown" 
(cited in Katsafanas 2015, 117, see also his 2012).u That's probably a bit strong, but 
the Nietzschean worry does bring out the fact that if we have reason to doubt that 
we generally know what we are doing, then these worries will automatically carry 
over to those theories of self-knowledge, such as Anscom bean accounts, that rely on 
some idea that one normally or always knows what one is doing. This is a potential 
weakness of the view. 
Finally, if the rationalist claims that the Angry Spouse 'has what it takes' to 
know her own mind, then this might render the rationalist account trivial. For if 
everything the rationalist wants to explain in terms of self-knowledge is present 
in the Angry Spouse's case, then it's hard to see how 'transparent' self-knowledge 
could still have "a special importance to the overall psychic health of the person" 
(Moran 2001, 136) and "matters to the well-being of the person" (Moran 2001, 137). 
II Paul Katsafunas also mentions the following passage from Nietzsche's Genealoay: "Just as the common people 
separates lightning from its flash and takes the latter to be a deed, something performed by a subject, which is 
called lightning, popular morality separates strength from the manifestations of strength, as though there were 
an indifferent substratum behind the strong person which had the .freedom to manifest strength or not But there is 
no such substratum; there is no 'being' behind the deed, its effect and what becomes of it; 'the doer' is invented as 
an afterthought, -the doing is evetything. (GM !.13)" (cited in Katsafunas 2015, 157; for discussion of Moran on 
modelling knowledge of our beliefs on knowledge of our actions, see also O'Brien 2003, 382ff) 
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It's not unlikely that it would be better for the psychic health and well-being of the 
Angry Spouse to realize that her own avowals aren't to be trusted. If she were to 
trust her own angry judgements, that may well lead to greater self-deception. The 
problem with the Angry Spouse, then, is that if only the Anscom bean Constraint 
matters, following the transparency procedure appears to be compatible with what 
we would ordinarily consider to be a possible case of self-deception. The thought 
is that if 'bad' reasons go into the transparency procedure, we should expect 'bad' 
judgements to be its outcome. I will call this the 'garbage in, garbage out' objection, 
which the Angry Spouse intuition is an instantiation of. 
Clearly, the 'garbage in, garbage out' objection is only plausible given our 
intuitions about the Angry Spouse, and so presupposes some sort of standard. 
But appealing to our 'intuitions' about specific cases is certainly not always 
unproblematic: we cannot always take our immediate intuitions at face value, if 
indeed it's clear what, exactly, intuitions are (this is something I will discuss in 
more detail in Chapter 7). But the more fundamental point is that I think it seems 
reasonable to expect of any theory of self-knowledge, including rationalism, that it 
is able to either (a) accommodate the intuition that there's something unsatisfYing 
about saying the Angry Spouse has self-knowledge or (b) explain why the intuition 
is misguided. 
In Chapter 7, I will return to radical rationalism. In what follows, I concentrate 
on the first strategy- how the rationalist might accommodate the intuition. 
4· Moderate rationalism 
Moderate rationalism, as I understand it, can be understood as having the ambition 
to provide a response to the 'garbage in, garbage out' objection. The moderate 
rationalist thinks that saying that the Angry Spouse has knowledge of her attitudes 
is problematic. But in order to rule out cases like the Angry Spouse, the rationalist 
must do more than claim that the reasons one deliberates with when making up 
one's mind must meet the Anscombean Constraint. It involves recognizing that in 
certain circumstances, such as particular states of mind (e.g. anger), following the 
transparency procedure does not deliver attitudinal self-knowledge. According to 
the moderate rationalist, then, following the transparency procedure will be attitude-
constitutive and knowledge-conducive if (I) the Anscom bean Constraint is met and 
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(2) one follows the transparency under normal circumstances. If, for instance, you 
are very angry, like the Angry Spouse, then making up your mind does not deliver 
self-knowledge, because your judgement about the world is untrustworthy and fails 
to settle your actual attitudes. The advantage of a moderate rationalist view is that 
it would allow us to give a (somewhat) more nuanced answer to the question of 
whether the Angry Spouse has self-knowledge or not. The challenge, though, for 
the moderate rationalist, is to provide a non-arbitrary cut-off point between normal 
and abnormal circumstances. 
One might wonder why the rationalist would have to appeal to 'normal' or 'right' 
processes of deliberation or judgement. In other words, the question is what would 
motivate an understanding of rationalism as requiring more than meeting the 
Anscom bean Constraint? One reason is the Angry Spouse. But I think there's a more 
important reason, which becomes salient if we consider the fact that rationalism 
appeals to the notion of'rationality', which is a normative notion. If the 'good' case 
is being rational, then presumably there are two different sorts of' bad' cases, namely 
being irrational and being a-rational. These three options (rationality, a-rationality, 
irrationality) can in turn be applied to rationalism about self-knowledge: 
(r) someone is rational: she follows the transparency procedure 'rightly', or 
'correctly' 
(2) someone is a-rational: she does not take up the deliberative stance at all 
but rather answers the question of what her attitudes are in a theoretical, 
empirical spirit 
(3) someone is irrational: she follows the transparency procedure 'incorrectly' or 
'badly' 
When discussing failures of transparency, we can take such failures to mean either 
that someone does not follow the transparency procedure at all or that she follows 
the procedure in a bad way, because she judges badly or deliberates badly. And so 
appealing to 'normal' or 'right' circumstances of deliberation and judgement seems 
to be built in to the rationalist project from the very beginning. The Angry Spouse, 
then, can be considered to have made up her mind about something, but has done 
so 'irrationally,' or 'badly'. 
The challenge for the moderate rationalist is to respond to the 'garbage in, 
garbage out' objection without begging the question. One might, after all, respond 
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to the objection by saying that the 'right reasons' are just those reasons that aren't 
the result of self-deception, i.e. ruling out self-deception from the outset.12 However, 
this move is not only ad hoc but also means that such an account would not "have 
much of a point", because we can reasonably expect theories of self-knowledge to 
be compatible with there being "room for error" (Co !iva 2009, 372). Such a strategy 
thus appears to beg important questions and would render the account circular. 
More positively formulated, the 'garbage in, garbage out' objection is not a 
knock-down argument but rather provides a challenge, which is for the rationalist to 
come up with an account of which reasons would render the procedure trustworthy 
without becoming circular. In the next section, I discuss how the rationalist might 
respond to the objection by filtering out circumstances in which only 'bad' reasons 
are salient, the result of which is that deliberation does not have the desired result. 
Before turning to the question of why an appeal to normal circumstances is 
problematic, it might be helpful to briefly consider the more exegetical issue: where 
does Moran stand in all of this? As a starting point, the following passage is of 
particular interest (where 'authority' can be understood as being short for 'having 
the capacity to constitute one's attitudes by answering a world-directed question'): 
Of course, this authority can be partial or hedged in various ways. When I know 
this to be the case, for instance when I know that I am akratic with respect to 
the question before me, that compromises the extent to which I can think of 
my behavior as intentional action, or think of my state of mind as involving a 
belief rather than an obsessional thought or a compulsion. Nor does a person 
speak with first-person authority about such conditions. (Moran 2001, 127-28 
emphases added) 
This is interesting. The passage suggests thatifi knowthatlamakratic or compulsive 
in some domain- which involves knowledge of my habits and/or character traits-
then I am not entitled to assume that my judgements constitute my attitudes, i.e. 
I am not entitled to make the 'linking assumption', and so answering a world-
directed question in such a case is not going to give me self-knowledge. Perhaps 
Moran would think that the Angry Spouse, likewise, is not entitled to assume that 
12 Crispin Wright (rg8gb) suggests something along these lines when he claims (in the context of so-called 
'C-conditions') that the subject should not be self-deceived. 
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her judgements constitute her beliefs. What's interesting about Moran's passage is 
that it allows, in principle, for a 'holist' version of rationalism, where the question 
of whether making up one's mind allows one to have self-knowledge cannot be 
answered by ruling out a few exceptional circumstances, such as knowing that one 
is compulsive or akratic, or indeed the emotional circumstances like those of the 
Angry Spouse, but can depend on whether one is tipsy, hungry, tired, depressed, 
nervous, in love, and so on. 
However, Moran does not discuss the circumstances in which one's 'authority 
can be hedged' other than akrasia and compulsion. This is compatible, of course, 
with his account being non-atomist. I take it to be more likely, however, to be 
indicative of the fact that Moran thinks the list of excusing circumstances is rather 
short and that we don't need to concern ourselves with it too much (recall also that 
Moran thinks that whenever one is in the process of thinking one's way to a conclusion 
about some subject matter, one is entitled to make the linking assumption (Moran 
200!, 405)). 
However, my interests at this point are not primarily exegetical. Given the 
rationalist's silence regarding the question of what qualifies as the right material 
(reasons) for the procedure or what sort of deliberation would make the procedure 
successful, I am primarily interested in the question of how rationalism could be 
understood by exploring answers to these questions rather than reconstructing how 
existing rationalist views are to be understood. 
Having described the different options regarding rationalism, we can now 
turn to the more critical question: are there indeed just a few obvious or trivial 
circumstances in which following the transparency procedure is not going to deliver 
self-knowledge? Can we therefore simply add 'normal conditions of deliberation' 
to our definition of what is required for the transparency condition to be successful 
and the linking assumption to be legitimate by default? 
5· The 'filtering strategy' as a response to the 'garbage in, 
garbage out' objection 
A natural way for the rationalist to respond to the 'garbage in, garbage out' objection 
is to filter out the garbage. For instance, the rationalist could filter out the 'angry 
circumstances' of making up one's mind. In this section I argue that the filtering 
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strategy faces two problems. The first problem (5.1) is that if we begin by filtering 
out certain circumstances, it's not clear when and where we should stop. In 
other words, the exceptions seem to become the rule. The second problem (5.2) 
is that many exceptions or supposed 'bad' circumstances aren't necessarily bad 
circumstances at all. 
5.1 Why it .filters out too much 
The first problem with the filtering strategy is that the case of the Angry Spouse 
generalizes. In other words, the filtering strategy will involve ruling out quite a lot of 
reasons that one ought not to appeal to when answering world-directed questions, 
at least if doing so is meant to deliver self-knowledge. For we can easily imagine a 
Depressed Spouse, an Overexcited Spouse, an Afraid Spouse, an Ashamed Spouse, a 
Jealous Spouse, and so on. Consider this example from Annalisa Coliva: 
[11ake a jealous wife who sincerely asserts with her friends that she believes that 
her husband is faithful to her-and has good reasons to do so-but, then, once 
at home, is often inquisitive, searches his belongings, etc. . .. So, she is self-
deceived, since she sincerely avows a belief and behaves in ways that run contrary 
to it. (Coliva 2009, 372) 
If the Jealous Spouse wants to know her own attitudes and does so by answering 
the question "Do I believe my husband is faithful to me?" by answering the 
corresponding world-directed question "Is my husband faithful to me?", then, in 
her jealous moments, all the Jealous Spouse can consider are 'jealous reasons' and 
so the judgement she arrives at will be a jealous judgement. The ultimate outcome 
will be self-deception, not self-knowledge.'3 The same can be said of, for example, 
overexcited reasons: if you've just gone bungee-jumping, or if you've just walked 
across a shaky bridge (as in the famous Dutton and Aron (1974) experiment), then 
this is probably not the best moment for you to try and acquire self-knowledge 
'transparently'. This is true mutatis mutandis for other emotional states of mind. 
13 This isn't the (only) conclusion Coliva herself draws, though. Coliva instead thinks, following a proposal by 
Akeel Bilgrami (20I2), that she has two different beliefS. This is the view that Schwitzgebel (2oro) refers to as the 
'contradictory belief view'. I think the contradictory belief view can make pretty good sense of the Jealous Wife 
(as believing both P and not-P), but it's not plausible when it comes to the Angry Wife, because she followed the 
transparency procedure in the heat of the moment, i.e_ the Angry Wife doesn't appear to really believe Pat all. 
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The rationalist might stick with the filtering strategy and claim that depression, 
fear, excitement, shame and jealousy don't belong to the right circumstances either. 
Excited judgements, shameful judgements, fearful judgements, and so on aren't the 
right sort ofjudgements: these judgements don't constitute one's attitudes, and so 
they don't provide the subject with self-knowledge. This, though, will amount to 
ruling out judgements made on the basis of'emotional reasons' in general, which 
is a rather radical move. 
Also, filtering out emotional reasons won't do, for it seems we should also 
rule out judgements made in particular 'noetic' states of mind, such as being, for 
example, overconfident, impulsive, closed-minded, careless, and so on (c£ Dokic 
2012). These are not emotional states of mind, but they may well sometimes be 
problematic states of mind for making up your mind in such a way that it provides 
you with self-knowledge. If you're very insecure, for instance, and don't really trust 
your own reasons, then it's reasonably likely that your judgements won't constitute 
your attitudes. Consider, for instance, the following excerpt from Simone de 
Beauvoir's diary, as discussed by Miranda Fricker in Epistemic Injustice: 
Day after day, and all day long I measured myself against Sartre, and in our 
discussions I was simply not in his class. One morning in the Luxembourg 
Gardens, near the Medici fountain, I outlined for him the pluralist morality 
which I had fashioned to justifY the people I liked but did not wish to resemble: 
he ripped it to shreds. I was attached to it, because it allowed me to take my 
heart as the arbiter of good and evil; I struggled with him for three hours. In the 
end, I had to admit I was beaten; besides, I had realized, in the course of our 
discussion, that many of my opinions were based only on prejudice, bad faith 
or thoughtlessness, that my reasoning was shaky and my ideas confused. 'I'm 
no lon.9er sure what I think, or even if I think at all,' I noted, completely thrown. (De 
Beauvoir 1959, 344; cited by M. Fricker 2009, so-sr; for discussion, see also B. 
Roessler 2015; and M. Fricker 2003) 
If Simone de Beauvoir had made up her mind under these circumstances, i.e. if 
she were to have answered a mind-directed question such as "Do I want to be a 
philosopher?" by answering a world-directed question, e.g. "Are there good reasons 
for me to be a philosopher?", then would she have come to know what she wanted or 
believed? This is a very hard question to answer. Idon'tthinkwe should conclude that 
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de Beauvoir was necessarily self-deceived because she came to think "philosophy is 
not for me", and "soon moved to identifY herself not as a philosopher but as a writer 
instead" (M. Fricker 2003, 218). The point is rather that it is possible that following 
the transparency procedure in certain states of mind, such as being very insecure or 
overconfident, could lead to self-deception rather than self-knowledge.'4 And for 
the transparency procedure to have 'self-knowledge' as output, the rationalist will 
have to filter such reasons out, too. 
The overall worry should be clear by now, namely that the filtering strategy 
makes the arsenal of reasons the subject can draw upon when answering world-
directed questions in a way that would provide her with self-knowledge rather 
limited, because so many reasons need to be filtered out. The exception seems to 
have become the rule. The second problem with the filtering strategy is that the 
reasons that remain- call them one's 'considered' reasons -are neither necessary 
nor sufficient for a judgement that would constitute and provide knowledge of one's 
attitudes. 
5.2 Why 'considered reasons' are neither necessary not sufficient for self-knowledge 
Up till now, I've suggested that the Angry Spouse (and the other Emotional Spouses) 
failed to acquire self-knowledge by following the transparency procedure for the 
sole reason that she was angry. But is this necessarily true? 
Notice that when the Angry Spouse judges that P, it's not the case that she is 
self-deceived simply because her answer to the relevant world-directed question 
was based on 'hot' or 'emotional' reasons. Emotional reasons, and judgements 
that result from reflecting on them, can be perfectly good reasons and judgements: 
there's nothing the matter with them in principle. Indeed, some have argued that 
one's emotions hold the key to acquiring self-knowledge (Mackenzie 2002). I am 
less optimistic, but I am optimistic enough to at least be sceptical of filtering out all 
emotional reasons just because emotional reasons can, on the face of it, sometimes 
be self-deceiving. 
To see why someone's judgements made on the basis of'hot', emotional reasons 
might be conducive of self-knowledge and hence should not be filtered out of 
the transparency procedure. Consider a variation on the Angry Spouse. Meet the 
14 And maybe not just in certain states of mind, but in certain sociopolitical circumstances, too (cf. literature on 
adaptive preferences, e.g. Elster 1983; Ri!ikka 2.014; Stoljar 2015). See also Chapter 7 . 
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Deferential Wife. The Deferential Wife is in many ways like the Angry Spouse: she 
too follows the transparency procedure and does so on the basis of angry reasons. 
However, the Deferential Wife is also importantly different, because, unlike the 
Angry Spouse, the Deferential Wife is utterly devoted to her husband: 
She buys the clothes he prefers, invites the guests he wants to entertain, and 
makes love whenever he is in the mood. She willingly moves to a new city in 
order for him to have a more attractive job, counting her own friendships and 
geographical preferences insignificant by comparison ... She does not simply 
defer to her husband in certain spheres as a trade-off for his deference in other 
spheres. On the contrary, she tends not to form her own interests, values, 
and ideals, and when she does, she counts them as less important than her 
husband's. She readily responds to appeals from Women's Liberation that she 
agrees that women are mentally and physically equal, if not superior, to men. 
She just believes that the proper role for a woman is to serve her family. As a 
matter of fact, much of her happiness derives from her belief that she fulfills this 
role very well. No one is trampling on her right, she says; for she is quite glad, 
and proud, to serve her husband as she does. (Hill rggr, s; Westlund 2003, 485) 
Now suppose that one day, when, for example, her husband comments negatively 
on the dinner she's made, the Deferential Wife has finally had enough and gets very 
angry. She comes to judge, by considering the reasons available to her at that time-
her angry reasons- that getting a divorce is the only right thing to do. 
It's not obvious, in the Deferential Wife's case, that her judgement that Pis true 
(that a divorce is the right thing to do) does not constitute her actual beliefjust because 
it's based on 'angry reasons'. Anger can be a good guide for what one really believes 
or how one should act. Anger may be instrumentally useful, and even necessary, 
for the Deferential Wife to secure a basic level of self-respect.'S In the example of 
the Deferential Wife, though not that of the Angry Spouse, it seems plausible to 
think that it's about time she gave her own hurt feelings and her emotional reasons 
their due. This is true even if the Deferential Wife falls back into her old submissive 
routines shortly afterwards, or perhaps even feels ashamed for having judged that a 
15 As Hill pointli out, the Deferential Wife is confused about herself: she believes she has a duty to defer to her 
husband but"shecannotfullyunderstand that she has a rightnottodeferto him" (Hill rggr, ro), thelatterofwhich 
"betrays a certain kind of self-respect" (Hill rggr, 6). 
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divorce is a good idea. Ifthatwere to happen, it would not be strange to think that it's 
unfortunate that she feels ashamed and falls back into old habits of servility rather 
than thinking she went back to being her actual self. The fact that the Deferential 
Wife might later come to regain trust in her non-emotional or 'considered' reasons is 
arguablypreciselywhatmakes her case tragic. She had self-knowledge and then los tit. 
There are many other examples in this context that strengthen the idea that the 
filtering strategy filters out reasons that would allow one to acquire self-knowledge. 
Nomy Arpaly, for instance, imagines a Victorian Lady wondering what her sexual 
desires are, if she's got any in the first place: 
If a Victorian lady experiences her sexual desires as alien, intrusive, "not truly her 
own," our natural reaction is to tell her that she is wrong, that these desires are 
in fact her own, and that only the false, asexual self-image that she acquired with 
her upbringing makes her experience them as threatening to her integrity as a 
person. We would think that she denies her real self. (Arpaly 2002, r6; 123) 
Suppose Victorian Lady tries to answer the question of what her sexual desires are 
by answering the corresponding question of what her sexual desires ought to be.16 If 
she were to do so in her cooler, non-aroused moments, then the chance will only be 
greater that this will lead to self-deception. Something similar must be said ofLynn 
(Arpaly 2002, r6), who "discovers that she is a lesbian and is deeply disturbed by that 
discovery" and whose "homosexual desires conflict with her values and her sense of 
her identity". Lynn does not "want her desires to motivate her into action under any 
circumstances-the very thought scares her more than anything else" (Arpaly 2002, 
r6). In terms of self-knowledge, Victorian Lady and Lynn are arguably better off not 
trying to figure out what their attitudes are by following the transparency procedure 
on the basis of their 'considered' reasons. 
The point here is not that one's emotional reasons are always representative of 
one's attitudes. The point, rather, is an anti-atomist one: focusing on the procedures 
or methods of acquiring self-knowledge, such as following the transparency 
procedure, just does not seem to be the right way to go. Whether or not emotional 
reasons lead to a judgement that would constitute and thereby provide knowledge 
r6 Or, if one is unhappy with this formulation of the world-directed question, we can imagine that she answers the 
world-directed question of whether such-and-such is desirable or desirable to her. 
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of one's attitudes is not something we can say is in general true, for whether or not 
certain circumstances or states of mind are 'bad' states of mind for successfully 
following the transparency procedure depends on the specifics of the case, i.e. 
the specific individual who is making up her mind. It depends, for instance, on 
what role the reasons considered by Victorian Lady, Lynn or the Angry Spouse play 
relative to their values, self~conception and other attitudes and the broader social 
circumstances in which they find themselves. The question of 'which' reasons 
are the 'right' reasons to make up one's mind with such that one acquires self~ 
knowledge is something that depends on the person one is and the life one leads. r7 
When trying to find out what we feel, want or believe, we cannot always trust 
our transparent outlook on the world, including our carefully considered reasons. 
In this context, Victoria McGeer's (e.g. rgg6, 2008) account of self~knowledge 
is particularly instructive. McGeer suggests (in her discussion of Bulstrode, a 
character from George Eliot's Middlemarch) that one's reasons may sometimes be 
"hijacked by psychological forces" that are "completely invisible" from the first~ 
person perspective. McGeer writes that if that's true, then 
Moran's Kantian ideal of "handing over the question of one's beliefs or 
intentional action to the authority of reason" cannot be an entirely happy one. 
At the very least, we must give sober consideration to how vulnerable we are to 
such corruptions of reason and how best they can be guarded against. (McGeer 
2007a, g8) 
17 Sometimes deliberating about world-directed issues and coming to a conclusion in general can lead to self-
deception. In other words, 'transparency• itself can be problematic. Jonathan Lear (2004) provides a good example 
of' Mr. A', a patient suffering from borderline personality disorderwho constantly interprets events in his life under 
the concept of betrayal. The problem for Mr. A, as Lear explains, is that the reasons he gives for supporting his 
beliefs and feelings fulfil a constraining function rather than one that facilitates (rational) freedom. The more Mr. 
A transparently avows, the more locked in he becomes to his interpretative schemas: "For Mr. A, self-conscious 
reflection is a manifestation ofhis unfreedom: for as he reflects on his reasons fur feeling betrayed, he digs himself 
ever deeper into a crabbed and constraining world. Rational, self-conscious reflection is being deployed as a 
defense, one which helps sustain the ,betrayed world. For him, avowal is the culmination of his imprisonment" 
(Lear 2004, 453). The avowal of betrayal effectively blocks, at least at that moment, assessment and avowal of 
other (and more adaptive) feelings, desires and belieli; that he also (and perhaps also currently) has, e.g. his love 
for his girlfriend, his desire for personal intimacy or his belief that most people generally mean well, etc., but 
which contrast with the general theme ofbetrayal. The case of Mr. A indicates how deliberative avowal as such may 
have an undermining effect on self-knowledge and obstruct self-understanding. For discussion, see Strijbos and 
Jongepier (forthcoming). 
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[D]eveloping deliberative autonomy or "spontaneity" in Moran's purist sense 
can be a sign of real psychic disease, indicating a capacity to manipulate oneself 
through the power of one's own reason into a condition of deep self-deception. 
(2007a, 92) 
McGeer reminds us of the fact that in everyday life, merely making up one's mind 
about something or avowing or committing oneself to some proposition in a 
deliberative spirit is often not enough to determine one's mental states. She argues 
that we need self-regulation to guard us against the more subversive inclinations 
of our rational faculty. Self-regulative agency implies that one is continually ready 
to take a step back from one's first person, rationalizing inclinations in order to 
reflect on them from a second- or third-person point of view on self, thereby making 
a more comprehensive assessment of one's own situation and the relevant factors 
(contextual, psychological, pharmacological, etc.) that shape one's reasoning and 
one's capacity to stay true to one's commitments (see also de Bruin, Jongepier, and 
Strijbos 2015). 
The upshot of all of this is that answering world-directed questions on the basis 
of the 'wrong reasons', 'bad deliberation' or following the transparency procedure 
irrationally is not necessarily going to give one knowledge of one's attitudes. 
Someone's considered reasons aren't sufficient for the transparency procedure to 
deliver self-knowledge, because one's considered reasons may be self-deceptive. It 
should also be clear why someone's considered reasons are not necessary for the 
transparency procedure to deliver self-knowledge: one's emotional reasons can be 
material that is just as 'good' as the reasons that are available to the subject in calmer 
or cooler states of mind - indeed, sometimes they are much more trustworthy. 
Judgements made on the basis of reasons that are emotional or hesitant, and so 
on aren't necessarily self-deceptive, and one's non-emotional, cool or considered 
judgements aren't necessarily self-knowledge conducive. Taking all of the issues 
just discussed into consideration, the strategy of filtering what goes into the 
transparency procedure does not seem to be very promising. 
The more general conclusion is that the moderate rationalist version of 
rationalism is problematic. The moderate rationalist holds that following the 
transparency procedure will, in normal circumstances, be sufficient for a subject to 
acquire knowledge of her attitudes. However, there are good reasons to think that 
the appeal to normal circumstances, by filtering out bad reasons for transparent 
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deliberation, is problematic, because there aren't just a few obvious or trivial 
circumstances in which following the transparency procedure does not deliver self-
knowledge. Also, the reasons that are available to someone in emotional, hesitant 
or overexcited circumstances, and the judgements that follow from them, are not 
necessarily self-deceptive, and one's considered judgements are not necessarily self-
knowledge conducive. 
It seems we must conclude that much of the work that the transparency 
procedure was supposed to do is in the end is done by the circumstances rather 
than the procedure itself. If the circumstances end up doing more work than the 
procedure, though, then the idea that we can say that the transparency procedure 
provides self-knowledge, all else being equal, becomes empty. 
The rationalist can do one of two things. One is to 'go radical' after all and deny 
that there are circumstances where making up one's mind does not constitute one's 
attitudes, or, differently formulated, to simply claim that all circumstances are the 
right circumstances to acquire self-knowledge by making up one's mind. In this 
chapter, I've only articulated some prima facie worries and challenges for the radical 
rationalist view, and so a fuller discussion will be necessary, which is the task of 
the next chapter. The alternative option would be to see whether rationalism can be 
understood along holist lines. I consider this option below. 
6. Holist rationalism: the self as part of the world~ 
What would a non-atomist or holist version of rationalism look like? Very roughly, 
we can imagine that a holist version of rationalism is something like the reverse of 
radical rationalism. A holist rationalist might claim that whether or not instances 
of a person having made up her mind - in short, her judgements - constitute her 
attitudes depends on, for example, her previous and future actions, her overall 
state or the mood she is in, the (social) circumstances in which she makes up her 
mind, or what induced her to engage in transparent question-settling, and whether 
she is disposed to take steps to live up to the commitments underlying her self-
ascriptions (cf. de Bruin, Jongepier, and Strijbos 2015). Her reasons must not just 
satisfY the Anscombean Constraint but must also cohere with the subject's other 
reasons or other attitudes (at the same time or at other times), her plans or (life) 
projects, character traits, personality, strengths, weaknesses, values, cares and self-
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conception. In short, in order to know whether someone acquires self-knowledge 
by making up her mind, we need to know more than just the fact that she has done 
so-we need to know when, where, why and how she made up her mind. 
Construing rationalism along holist lines requires tweaking or reformulating 
the world-directed question; in other words, requires redefining what counts as 
the possible material of or 'input' to the transparency procedure- what counts as a 
'reason' that one can draw on when answering world-directed questions or making 
up one's mind. The 'input' should be broadened to include not just the reasons 
that are available to me here and now, in my present mood and situation. If the 
rationalist were to 'go holist' then we would have to include values, feelings and 
emotions and the subject's plans and self-conception, and so on as belonging to the 
pool of'reasons' that she could reflect on when answering the question of whether 
P is desirable or true, etc. Put differently, a holist version of rationalism is one in 
which the world-directed question is given a 'self-referential' twist. A formulation 
of the world-directed question that includes a self-referential component, such as, 
"Is X desirable to me?" would give the right outcome, i.e. would provide one with 
self-knowledge (see e.g. Kloosterboer 2015). 
This would amount to making 'the self' part of 'the world', i.e. part of the 
world-directed question. Giving the transparency procedure a self-referential twist 
seems like the right way to go, at least if we want the procedure to actually provide 
one with knowledge of one's attitudes. When I answer the question of whether P 
is true, desirable or to be feared, then what I'm supposed to do is not reflect on P 
simpliciter, but rather reflect on how I relate toP, that is, how my self relates to the 
world. When answering the question of whether a career change is a good idea, 
I should not consider this question about whether a career change is a good idea 
in general but whether it's a good idea for me. What I'm doing then is answering a 
question not about the world as such, but 'the-world-as-I-see-it', or 'the-world -as+ 
take-it-to-be'. 
Seeing the world-directed question as having a self-referential component might 
also go some way to dissolving an important 'puzzle' that those who have written 
on transparency have been much concerned with: the puzzle of how it's possible to 
answer a question about one subject matter- one's mind- by answering a question 
about a completely different subject matter, namely the world (Cas sam 2ou, 2014, 
Byrne 2005, 2oua; O'Brien 2007; Golob 2015; J. Roessler 2013). What would give 
one the right to assume that answering the question of whether P (something 
I40 Chapter 5 
about the world) provides one with an answer to the question of what one's belief 
is (something that concerns my mind)? Those who accept there is a puzzle here 
suggest that we need some sort of story to explain how answering the question of 
what one believes by answering the question about another subject matter - the 
world - can be made intelligible. Alex Byrne, for instance, writes that the idea of 
transparency is that "one can know that one believes (or knows) that it's raining by 
checking on the rain" and goes on, "But surely meteorology sheds little light on 
psychology!" (Byrne 2005). 
But if we give the transparency procedure a self-referential twist, as it seems we 
must, there is a catch. Recognizing the fact that the self is something to be taken 
into consideration when answering a world-directed question, or, differently put, 
that the world-directed question has a self-referential component, means that the 
transparency procedure is not really very 'transparent' after all. This is how Moran 
describes transparency: 
from the first-person point of view, the question "Do I believe that P?" is 
transparent to a corresponding question "Is P true?," a question which involves no 
essential riference to oneself at all. (Moran 2oor, xvi; ro6 emphases added) 
But on the self-referential view, the question of whether P is true/desirable/to be 
feared, and so on does involve an "essential reference to myself", because when 
answering the question of whether P is true, I am asking whether accepting that P 
would, for example, cohere with my other reasons, attitudes and values. In short, 
in answering the question of whether P is true, I am trying to answer the question 
of whether P being true would be compatible with the sort of person thatl am. The 
transparency procedure thus has a crucial, ineliminable "reference to oneself" and 
in that respect isn't transparent. 
This also has consequences for how and whether the self-referential formulation 
handles the 'puzzle' mentioned above. On the self-referential version of transparency, 
the puzzle dissolves, but only because we're answering a mind-directed question 
by answering another mind-directed question. The puzzle dissolves because we're 
no longer dealing with two different subject matters (mind and world). What we 
have ended up with is that the mind-directed question "Do I want X?" is answered 
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by answering the question "Is X desirable to me?" / 8 If the transparency procedure 
ought to be construed along self-referential lines, then the procedure can hardly 
be said to be a useful procedure for acquiring self-knowledge. It seems that what 
we're doing is answering one mind-directed question by answering another mind-
directed question, which seems to make the procedure trivial. 
There's a general problem with reformulating the world-directed question in 
general, which is that any reformulation that is going to work will work only because 
it appears that the self-knowledge we want to account for has to be assumed from 
the beginning. What we're doing is reformulating the transparency procedure such 
that it has the right outcome (self-knowledge), but we weren't supposed to know 
what the 'right outcome' was, because that's what the transparency procedure 
was meant to tell us. The general strategy of trying to find the right formulation of 
the world-directed question appears to have to assume what our attitudes are and 
involves adjusting the world-directed questions to them accordingly. 
In short, if we take rationalism to offer a theory of how we know our own 
attitudes, then modest rationalism is implausible, and a holist version of the 
transparency procedure may not have much of a point. But I don't think this is the 
end of the story. Maybe transparency isn't meant to be a procedure for acquiring 
self-knowledge at all - rather, it's a normative theory that is meant to tell us what 
it means (not) to be alienated with respect to one's own attitudes. This version of 
rationalism will be addressed and evaluated in Chapter 7. The other option is to 
stick with the claim that rationalism is meant to offer an account of self-knowledge, 
and to 'go radical' and avoid making an appeal to normal circumstances from the 
start. 
7. Conclusion 
In this chapter I have addressed the question of whether the circumstances of making 
up one's mind are relevant to the question of doing so provides the subject with self-
knowledge. To this end, I have distinguished between two different atomist versions 
of rationalism, a 'radical' and a 'moderate' version. On the former view, making up 
18 Or imagine you wanted to answer the mind-directed question of whether you believe a career change is a good idea 
and someone suggests that you do so by answering the corresponding self-referential world-directed question 
"Does a change of careers seem like a good idea to ~ou?". This is not going to help. 
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your mind is always sufficient for acquiring self-knowledge, whereas on the latter 
view, it's only sufficient in 'normal circumstances'. 
I have suggested that radical rationalism faces what I've referred to as the 
'garbage in, garbage out' objection, according to which deliberating on the basis 
of bad or suspect reasons has self-deception rather than self-knowledge as its 
outcome. I then concentrated on a possible rationalist response to this objection, 
which seems available to the moderate rationalist, which is to filter out the garbage, 
i.e. bad circumstances of deliberation. 
I argued that the 'filtering strategy' requires specifYing what the right 
circumstances or states of mind are in which making up one's mind is. a way of 
constituting one's attitudes and allows the subject to acquire knowledge of them. 
I argued that the filtering strategy is not a satisfYing response to the 'garbage in, 
garbage out' objection, because there are no 'right' circumstances or states of mind 
that the rationalist can appeal to, at least without ruling out self-deception from the 
outset by saying that the 'right' circumstances are just those in which making up 
one's mind is self-knowledge conducive, which would make rationalism a rather 
uninformative, even question-begging, view. 
In the final section, I briefly considered what changes we would need to make 
to rationalism in order for it to be construed along holist lines. I have tried to show 
that it's not evident that rationalism can even be construed along holist lines, again 
without begging the question. A natural next move would be for the rationalist to 'go 
radical' and avoid appealing to the right or normal circumstances of deliberation. 
This is the view I will consider in the next chapter. 
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The Limits of Activism 
1. Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I discussed the moderate atomist version of rationalism. I 
described this as a view according to which it is possible for a subject to judge that P 
without believing that P, and according to which judging that Pis only sufficient for 
self-knowledge in the 'right' circumstances, namely those circumstances in which 
one is entitled to assume that one's judgement actually constitutes one's belief. I 
then argued that this theory is problematic because there is no way of defining what 
the right or normal circumstances should be such that they lead to self-knowledge 
rather than self-ignorance or self-deception that does not beg the question. 
However, I also mentioned that the rationalist may instead refrain from appealing 
to right or normal circumstances altogether and opt not for a moderate but for a 
radical version of rationalism. One could avoid appealing to normal circumstances 
if one thought that judging that P entails, or is sufficient for, believing that P. 
The aim of this chapter is to critically evaluate this version of rationalism. I 
will explore, specifically, Matthew Boyle's account (2ooga, 2oogb, 2oua, 2oub), 
according to whom (I) judging that P entails believing that P and (2) belief and 
knowledge ofbelief are one and the same state. I will contrast and compare Boyle's 
so-called 'Activist' account of what beliefs are, and how we should understand the 
relation between judging that and believing that P, with alternative 'Dispositionalist' 
accounts thereof.' For, as Bertrand Russell wrote, "Psychology, theory ofknowledge 
and metaphysics revolve about belief, and on the view we take of belief our 
philosophical outlook largely depends" (Russell I92I, Lecture xii). The more 
I borrow the label'Activism' from Cassam (2or4, II2-II9-ISJ), though his use of the term is somewhat different 
than mine. 
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general aim of this chapter, therefore, is to show that when we want to answer or 
indeed properly understand the question of what is required for a subject to know 
her own attitudes, we first of all need to be clear about the question of what we take 
'attitudes' to be, in order to evaluate different proposals. 
The structure of the chapter is as follows. In the next two sections, I begin by 
describing Boyle's account of self-knowledge (Section 2) and his account of belief 
(Section 3). I then describe two versions of the 'Dispositionalist' view that Boyle 
argues against (Section 4) and discuss Boyle's overall worries and what I take to be 
his principal objection, which is that Dispositionalists cannot respect the intuitively 
correct constraint "I believe Q because I believe P" (Section 5). I respond to Boyle's 
principal objection and claim that the objection fails to convince (Section 6). This, 
then, leads to the question central to Section 7: who has the better 'metaphysical 
cards', the Activist or the Dispositionalist? I propose to answer this question by 
considering a number of examples in which a subject seems to judge that P without 
believing that P, and so an apparent gap between the two emerges. I suggest that 
there are two ways in which the Activist may respond to such cases, one of which 
involves saying that these subjects did not genuinely (really, truly) judge that P, 
which I argue is implausible (7.2). The other is a more 'fiat-footed' response,> 
which would involve denying that the examples show a gap between judgement and 
belief at all. I argue that this response is problematic because it forces the Activist to 
decouple action-related features of belief. However, in Section g, I critically reflect 
on the common strategy of assessing metaphysical theories ofbelief on the basis of 
considering our intuitions about paradigm cases and claim that the metaphysical 
dispute between Activism on the one hand and Dispositionalism on the other is not 
so easily settled after all. It's not clear which intuitions are being 'pumped', or indeed 
what intuitions are, where they come from and why they matter. I conclude that 
when addressing the question of what is required in order for someone to know her 
own attitudes, we not only need to be clear about the metaphysical question of what 
we take attitudes to be but also need to reflect on meta-theoretical questions such as 
how we should go about adjudicating between different theories ofjudgement and 
beliefin the first place. 
2 I borrow this term from Wright (rg8ga, 177). 
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2. Boyle's epistemic view: reflectivism 
Boyle defends what he calls a 'reflective' approach to transparency. His central 
claim is that we should not think of transparency as involving a subject making an 
inference from 'P' to 'I believe that P' but instead should 
think of the subject as taking a different sort of step, from believin.g P to rqlectively 
jud.gin.g (i.e. consciously thinking to himself): I believe P. The step, in other 
words, will not be an inferential transition between contents, but a coming to 
explicit acknowledgment of a condition of which one is already tacitly aware. 
(Boyle 2onb, 226 emphases in original) 
On the reflectivistview, transparency involves "shifting one's attention from the world 
with which one is engaged to one's engagement with it-an engagement of which 
one was already tacitly cognizant even when one's attention was 'directed outward"' 
(2oub, 228). So believing that P and knowing that you believe that Pare not distinct 
states, but different aspects of one and the same state: "in the normal and basic case, 
believing P and knowing oneself to believe Pare not two cognitive states; they are two 
aspects of one cognitive state-the state, as we might put it, ofknowingly believing P" 
(2onb, 228). The transparency procedure is not an explanation of how we get self.. 
knowledge, because there is no 'procedure' by which we acquire self-knowledge. Self-
knowledge is something we somehow get for free: it's just built in to believing that 
P- if you really believe that P, then you know that you believe that P. 
Boyle's view is thus best described (somewhat paradoxically, perhaps) as a 
metaphysical account of self-knowledge, or that he is doing epistemology by doing 
metaphysics.3 He seeks to explain self-knowledge in terms of"the nature ofbelief 
itself" (2onb, 228). It is the metaphysical nature of the very states themselves, on 
Boyle's account, which "implies that their subject has tacit knowledge of them" 
(2oub, 235). All that's needed for self-knowledge of one's Gudgement-sensitive) 
mental states is to reflect and articulate what one already knew at a tacit level. In 
other words, second-order beliefs are built in to the notion of what mental states are: 
one cannot be in a mental state without knowing that one is (if only tacitly). Hence, 
3 This is Boyle's own description. He writes, for instance, that refiectivists offer an account "that is primarily 
metaphysical rather than epistemological" (Boyle 2oub, 235). 
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Boyle's account can be understood as a version of constitutivism regarding self-
knowledge (cf. Shoemaker 1994; Coliva 2009; Bilgrami 2012) according to which 
self-knowledge is not a cognitive achievement but comes down to a conceptual truth 
that becomes apparent by reflecting on what rationality is. 
Boyle's account of self-knowledge raises many interesting questions, such as 
what 'knowingly believing' should be, that is, why and how first-order attitudes 
come attached to second-order beliefs that the subject tacitly knows about. These 
questions concern Boyle's theory of self-knowledge. In what follows, however, I 
want to focus on a different question, namely on the metaphysical account of belief 
that underlies Boyle's account, in particular on how Boyle understands the relation 
between judgements and beliefs. 4 
The guiding assumption of the discussion that follows, an assumption that I take 
Boyle to have drawn attention to, is that if we want to assess the respective strengths 
of different theories of self-knowledge, the question of which theory is to be preferred 
cannot be answered without considering the underlying metaphysical view of what 
beliefs and attitudes are. The metaphysics of mind, however, is not something that 
gets much explicit attention in the debate. Moran, for instance, has remained largely 
silent on the underlying metaphysical questions, and hence, what's particularly 
praiseworthy about Boyle is that at least he has put his cards on the table.s So I shall 
bracket, for the sake of the argument, the question of whether if you believe thatP, you 
know that you do. I don't think this constitutivist assumption is very plausible; indeed 
it strikes me as wrong. There seem to be good reasons for thinking that I can have 
an attitude but don't believe that I do or to believe that I have some attitude without 
actually having that attitude. However, it might well be the case that the fact that the 
constitutivist assumption strikes me as wrong is simply because I have a different 
metaphysical view of what attitudes are. This, at least, is what I would imagine Boyle 
would say. Therefore it is crucial to be clear about the different metaphysical options 
about belief and other attitudes that are available. IfBoyle's metaphysical view of what 
beliefs are is true, then maybe the reflectivist idea becomes more plausible, i.e. that 
believing something and knowing that one believes it aren't two distinct states. 
4 The terminology here is admittedly somewhat confusing because Boyle's epistemic account described above is 
typically referred to as a metaphysical account. To clarifY, we might say that we can either focus on the attitude as 
had by a subject or once the attitude is 'in place'- and evaluate Boyle's reflectivist proposal- or on the prior question 
of what is required for a subject to have an attitude, which is what I will be centrally concerned with. 
Boyle is of course not the only exception. Other views, such as Schwitzgebel's, will be discussed and contrasted 
with Boyle's account below. 
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3· Boyle's metaphysical view: Activism 
A more or less standard view in philosophy of mind is to think of judgements as 
conscious or occurrent mental activities, as something like the inner analogue of 
assertions, and ofbeliefs as standing or dispositional states. Consider Shoemaker: 
[B]elieving something- having the standing belief that so and so is the case-
is not an act. Judging, thought of as a mental occurrence rather than a standing 
state, is an act. (Shoemaker 2.009, 36; cited in Boyle 2ooga, 12.0) 
OrCassam: 
It will save time and help to prevent various kind of misunderstanding ifl make 
a few things clear at the outset ... The attitudes I'm talking about are "standing" 
rather than "occurrent". Standing attitudes remain in existence when you are 
asleep; they aren't mental events like judging or deciding. It's controversial 
whether a belief can ever be occurrent but when I talk about beliefl'm talking 
about beliefs understood as standing states. Ditto for desires, hopes, and so on. 
(Cassaro 2014, 138) 
Because of the metaphysical difference between judgements and beliefs, there is 
room for a potential gap to emerge: judging that P without having the belief that P. It 
is this gap, I argued in the previous section, that requires the rationalist to recognize 
that one might follow the transparency procedure or make up one's mind by coming 
to judge that P,6 but that does not constitute the person's attitudes, and so require 
the rationalist to invoke ceteris paribus conditions. 
Boyle, however, has defended an alternative account of the relation between 
judgements and beliefs that he suggests underlies rationalist accounts like Moran's. 
On the 'Activist' version of rationalism that Boyle defends, there can be no gap 
between judging and believing that P, and so having attitudinal self-knowledge 
requires no extra conditions (apart from being conceptually competent and being 
capable of practical reasoning). The appeal to the 'right' circumstances is only 
6 Recall from the previous chapter that I take 'following the transparency procedure' to be equivalent to (I) 'making 
up one's mind', (2) 'answering the world-directed question' and (3) 'coming to a judgement by reflecting on the 
reasons in favour of the subject matter'. 
150 Chapta6 
necessary if we think that it's possible for there to be a gap between one's judgements 
and one's beliefs in the first place. Ifthere can be no gap between one's judgements 
(one's conclusions on the reflection on the reasons in favour ofP) and one's beliefs, 
then the arguments from the previous chapter do not work, because any of one's 
judgements constitute one's beliefs, since judging that P entails believing that P, 
whatever reasons one's judgement was based upon. Boyle thus argues against the 
orthodox view that judgements are occurrent states and beliefs are standing states. 
Boyle's account is somewhat complex, so I will spend some time trying to explain 
his view. His central claim is that believing something is an exercise of one's agency, 
not a standing state. To believe something is not a passive affair, but an active one. 
Hence, Boyle talks about a person's capacity to 'actively believe'. 
Boyle's metaphysical account of what beliefs are can be explained by returning 
briefly to some Anscombean themes discussed earlier (Chapter 5). Recall that 
on Anscombe's view, the special sort of knowledge the subject has is a sort of 
knowledge she has 'in action'. The special sort ofknowledge I have of my intentions 
is something I have while watering the flowers or while making coffee. The relevant 
Anscom bean why-question is "Why are you doing A?" and not "Why did you do A?". 
Answering the latter question, after all, arguably involves making inferences from 
memory, whereas the former does not, or so the Anscom bean story runs. But it's only 
while I am doing something- acting- that I have the relevant sort of self-knowledge, 
i.e. that I can know without 'self-observation' that I am doing something, and why. 
Boyle explicitly stresses this point when explaining his view: 
Something that is striking in Anscombe - something that sets her apart from 
many subsequent action theorists - is her resolute focus on action in progress. 
Anscombe's "why?"-question is first and foremost "Why are you doing A?" ... Her 
assumption, in effect, is that to understand the nature ofintentional action, we 
must describe the specific character of the subject's relation to it as it unfolds. 
(Boyle 2ooga, 138-39) 
If we want to apply the Anscom bean model not just to intentions but also beliefs, 
hopes, desires, and so on, this raises a challenge, because the relevant 'Anscom bean' 
version of the why-question applied to beliefs would seem to be "Why are you 
believing that P?" which, intuitively, seems rather different from the more passive 
question "Why did you believe that P" or "Why do you believe that P?". It makes sense 
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that I am now drinking coffee, or watering the plants, and that I have a peculiar sort 
of self· knowledge because the action unfolds or is in progress. But this does not 
straightforwardly apply to attitudes like beliefs, for, ordinarily, we don't think of 
beliefs as things that 'unfold' at all. 
I think we have two options here. The first is that it needs to be recognized that 
the application of the Anscombean view to attitudes other than intention does not 
have a straightforward application, despite what many who defend some account 
of'transparent' self-knowledge have suggested (Hieronymi 2008; Hamilton 2ooo, 
2oo8). An explanation needs to be provided of why an account that focuses on a 
person's present doings can be applied to a person's attitudes that, at least prima 
facie, do not involve actions 'in progress'. Alternatively, one might challenge the 
orthodox metaphysical view of belief in philosophy and claim that we do need to 
think of beliefs in the active sense, as things that unfold, just as Anscom be suggests 
is true of intentions, and thus to opt for a more straightforward application of 
Anscombe's account 
As I read Boyle, this is his project. He recognizes that the Anscombean view of 
thinking about (the knowledge we have of our) intentional actions is "controversial", 
but adds that his purpose is "not to defend Anscombe's view in its own right, but to 
draw a comparison between her understanding of our relation to our own actions 
and what we have seen about our relation to our own beliefs" (Boyle 2ooga, 140), 
and thus Boyle sees the "relation to our own beliefs [as] structurally comparable to 
our relation to our intentional actions" (Boyle 2ooga, 144). 
How does Boyle propose to achieve his purpose? According to the traditional 
view, believing something is not itself an activity, because 'belief' is a standing state. 
Boyle disagrees, and suggests that we should think of 'belief' along the following 
lines: 
As in the case of action, so too in the case ofbelief, a rational subject normally 
stands in an active affirmative relation to her own present beliefs. Her persisting 
belief that P is grounded in her assent to P as meeting the measure that a 
proposition must meet to merit belief, namely truth. This assent is not an act 
that precedes her belief and produces it; the very existence of her belief that P 
is constituted by her persisting assent to P. Her believing P, we might say, just 
is her enduring act of holding P true, and hence to-be-believed. This act is not 
occurrent - it need not involve any bustle or commotion . .. [The] relationship 
152 Chapter 6 
between her believing and her sense of what is reasonable is brou9ht to theforifront 
of her attention when she occurrently considers whether she accepts P and what 
grounds she has for doing so, but it is present- actually, not merely potentially 
- even when she does not occurrently reflect. Her holding the belief she does is 
itself an enduring act of her power to assent to whatever proposition she deems 
reasonable. (Boyle 2ooga, 144) 
Boyle's suggestion is thus that belief is a persisting act, and that in an important 
sense it's correct to say that I am believinB it is cold outside. A beliefis "an enduring, 
non-occurrent act of assenting to a proposition" (Boyle 2ooga, 143), and so it 
'persists' or 'endures', and thus believing something appears to have some sort 
of temporal dimension. However, Boyle later seems to have changed his view 
somewhat, claiming that "the primary form of agency we exercise over our beliefs 
in deliberation is not an agency exercised over time" (2ona, 3). Boyle's suggestion 
seems to be that thinking that it has a temporal dimension is to make some sort 
of mistake relating to category. Believing that Amsterdam is the capital of the 
Netherlands is not something that's either short lived or long lived. It seems to be 
a-temporal. I do not discuss these exegetical issues further, because they don't 
matter much to understanding Boyle's overall account. 
His central claim, I take it, is that judgements and beliefs are very much alike: 
judging that P entails believing that P. Boyle's view thus takes the idea of'maker's 
knowledge' quite literally: I come to know that I believe that P by making it the 
case that I believe that P, and I do this by simply judging that P. Boyle's account is 
distinctively Kantian in the sense that the capacity for judgement is absolutely central 
to believing anything and to knowing one's beliefs, as well as the idea that there is 
a fundamental difference between knowing our own judgements and beliefs about 
what we should believe or do on the one hand and knowing our own sensations and 
appetites, etc. on the other/ Interestingly, on Boyle's Kantian metaphysical picture 
7 Boyle states: "A way of putting the thesis ... is to say that our immediate, authoritative knowledge of our own 
judgments is a necessary byproduct of our ability to reason about what is the case and what to do. It seems clear, 
though, that our knowledge of our own sensations and appetites is not in this sense maker's knowledge. However 
we explain our privileged knowledge of our own sensations and appetites, we should acknowledge that these are 
states that come to pass with us, not states we arrive at through deliberation. And this sounds strikingly like what 
Kant says: that whereas our apperceptive knowledge of our own judgments is a knowledge of'what we do [thun] ,' 
our knowledge of our sensations and appetites through inner sense is a knowledge of what we 'undergo [leiden]'" 
(Boyle 2oogb, 158). 
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of what beliefs are, it seems we don't need to appeal to normal circumstances 
of making up our minds, because there could be no cases in which judging that 
P would not entail believing that P. The metaphysical nature of belief rules out that 
there could be a gap between one's beliefs and one's judgements. 
According to Activism, the relation between judgements on the one hand and 
beliefs on the other is tighter than tight. However, the claim that the relation between 
judgement and belief is close is not what is distinctive of Activism, because those 
who think of beliefs as standing states can also think that this is so. For instance, 
by claiming that judging that P typically leads to, or causes, the belief that P. What is 
distinctive about Activism, rather, is a specific conception of why the relation is close. 
According to the view Boyle rejects, judgements and beliefs can, in principle, come 
apart, even though typically they come together. For an Activist, though, judgements 
and beliefs necessarily come together. The relation is constitutively 'tight'. 
But what, exactly, is the positive account that Boyle puts in place of the view that 
beliefs are standing states? Towards the end of his more recent paper, Boyle writes 
that for a rational subject to believe something "is for him to have his power to be 
persuaded by reasons actualized in a present and persisting act- where an act in this 
sense is not a species of event or process, but an act of an altogether different type" 
(Boyle 2oua, 22). In explaining the activity of making up one's mind, Boyle refers to 
Aristotle's notion of ener,geia, translated as "activity" or "actuality". Aristotle's notion 
of ener,geia, Boyle writes, 
is an actualization of a capacity "in which the end is present": one whose existence 
does not consist in the unfolding of a process proceeding towards a certain result, 
but rather in a mode of active bein,g, every moment of whose existence constitutes 
a moment of the completion of this activity. (Boyle 2ona, 20) 
holding a belief might itself be an "energetic" act of rational self-determination 
... The relevant agency is at work not primarily in the installation or modtllcation 
ofbeliefs, but in the kind ofbelievin,g characteristic of rational creatures, as such. 
This believing is self-determined, not in virtue of some precedent process or 
event, but by being the special kind of self-affirmed condition that it is. (Boyle 
2ona, 23) 
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It's not entirely clear what we should make of this. But whatever the Aristotelean 
appeal comes down to, it seems clear what the view is that Boyle rejects, namely 
the view according to which beliefs aren't acts. This idea must be false, Boyle says, 
because it contradicts our nature as rational animals who have the capacity to judge· 
and-thereby-believe or who have the capacity to, as he calls it, 'actively believe'. 8 
In the next section, I discuss the view that Boyle argues against, which is the view 
according to which the existence of a potential gap between judgements and beliefs 
is possible, even if it's rare. 
4· Radical versus moderate Dispositionalism 
We can crudely distinguish between two traditional, 'non-Activist' views of 
how we should think about the relation between judgement and belief: radical 
Dispositionalism and moderate Dispositionalism.9 Radical Dispositionalists think 
8 There's a somewhat controversial issue that I want to flag here regarding the question of whether there are such 
things as occurrent propositional attitudes, orthatone might 'consciously' believe something, and that it's possible 
to believe something fur a very brief moment. Even though many philosophers seem to think that there are such 
things as occurrent or momentary beliefs, this view is not uncontroversial. According to Tim Crane, for instance, 
though "there is such a thing as being conscious of one's belief, that does not mean that there is such a thing 
as consciously believing. 'Occurrent belief' is a myth" (Crane 2001, 108). Cassam shares Crane's view, noting, 
"When I judge that P I do not occurrently believe that P because there is no such thing as occurrently believing" 
(Cassam 2on, r6). Though I am tempted to think that occurrent beliefS don't exist (I agree with Dennett (rg8r, 
303) that "when such judgments are called occurrent or episodic beliefS, this is a serious misnomer"), I doubt that 
discussions regarding occurrent beliefs amount to more than a terminological dispute, given that it seems to come 
down to the question of whether someone's mental state is a very 'long' judgement or a 'short' belief. The question, 
though, is whether Activism is only meant to apply to such occurrent states if they did exist. For instance, in a recent 
paper, Antonia Peacocke (2016) has defended a constitutivist view similar to Boyle's, but one that explicitly appeals 
to the notion of occurrent beliefs. She claims, "Actively recognizing the truth of p--that is, judging that p--must 
involve at the very least having a momentary beliifthat p" (A. Peacocke 2016 emphases mine). Crucially, Peacocke 
only thinks her claim holds for such momentary beliefs: "I do not ... endorse the claim that judgement at some 
timet is sufficient for belief at any other timet', or for any interval of timeT" (ibid.). This gives the impression that 
the sort of view Boyle and Peacocke defend only applies to these momentary states, which means Activism would 
have a very limited application, and this in turn suggests that the epistemic account of self-knowledge is limited 
in this way, too. However, while this might be the case for Peacocke, I don't think it is true of Boyle's account, for 
Boyle does not seem to think that there can be such things as occurrent beliefS in the first place, given that he thinks 
that beliefs cannot be had at a time or over time (at least in his later paper). And so it seems plausible that Boyle's 
constitutivist view has a more ambitious scope, namely our "'judgement-sensitive' attitudes such as belief, desire 
and intention" (Boyle 2oub, 223). 
9 Schwitzgebel (2oro, 2013) offers a more encompassing list of views. Making finer-grained distinctions becomes 
especially important once we consider complex cases of whether someone believes that P and shifts to believing 
not-P, or should be described as having contradictory beliefS or as having in-between beliefS, etc. For present 
purposes, however, three views- Activism and two versions ofDispositionalism- should do. 
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that judgements aren't necessary for belief; moderate Dispositionalists think that 
they are necessary but not sufficient. Both are incompatible with the Activist view, 
according to which judgements are necessary and sufficient for belief. I discuss the 
two varieties ofDispositionalism below. 
A radical Dispositionalist thinks that propositional attitudes like beliefs or desires 
can be explained exhaustively in Dispositionalist terms: to believe that P just is for one 
to be disposed to behave in the relevantway(s), where the disposition to judge or assert 
that Pis not taken to be particularly special. For radical Dispositionalists, judging that 
Pis something that might, but need not, happen. Someone can be said to believe that 
P without judging that P. One might take Donald Davidson's and Daniel Dennett's 
views as radically Dispositionalist in this sense. On the radical Dispositionalist view, 
beliefs and other propositional attitudes are considered, primarily, as explanatory 
entities: things by which another's actions, or line of thinking, is made intelligible or 
predictable. Beliefs and desires are identified "by the sorts of actions they are prone 
to cause, given the right conditions" (Davidson 2001, 216). Dennett (1987) thinks that 
having a propositional attitude simply means being treated as having it: 
It is notthatwe attribute (or should attribute) beliefs and desires only to things in 
which we find internal representations, but rather that when we discover some 
object for which the intentional strategy works, we endeavor to interpret some 
ofits internal states or processes as internal representations. What makes some 
internal feature of a thing a representation could only be its role in regulating the 
behavior of an intentional system. (Dennett 1987, 32) 
On this approach, someone who behaves according to P's being true, believes that P 
is true. On the radical Dispositionalist approach, it's not only possible to believe that 
P without judging that P; it's also possible to believe that P while judging that not~P. 
Christina Borgoni, for instance, thinks that there can be what she calls 'resistant 
beliefs': "A resistant beliefis a recalcitrant cognition that persists in an indi~idual's 
psychology despite the individual's epistemic reasons against the belief'' (Borgoni 
2015, 212; see also Cassaro 2014, e.g. 107-n1). This would happen when a person 
judges his or her belief to be false but is unable to stop believing it. Borgoni gives 
the example ofEmelia, who was "raised in a sexist community, where from infancy 
she heard her family and friends claiming that women were unfit for politics". This 
resulted in the fact that Emilia eventually forms the belief that men and women are 
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not equally competent in politics. Later in life, however, Emilia comes to judge that 
men and women are equally competent in politics, but notices that "she is sexist 
in most of her unguarded, instinctive and automatic behavior when it comes to 
assessing female performance in politics" (Borgoni 2015, 212). But despite Emilia's 
deliberative efforts and willingness to change her behavioural responses, she does 
not succeed. According to Borgoni, Emilia has a resistant belief: she believes that 
not-P while failing to judge accordingly. 
One might wonder why one would not simply say that Emilia believes, later in life, 
that men and women are equally competent in politics rather than 'merely judges' that 
this is so? This depends on what one thinks beliefs are, and the point here is precisely 
to emphasize the fact that this is not how radical Dispositionalists would understand 
such a case, for radical Dispositionalists think that judgements aren't (always) 
necessary for belief. (I come back to the sort of example Borgoni discusses below.) 
By contrast, both moderate Dispositionalists and Activists think that taking P 
to be true, or judging P, is necessary in order to believe that P. One of the principal 
arguments against the radical Dispositional view is given by Moran. In an early 
paper, Moran (1994) takes issue specifically with Dennett's and Davidson's accounts 
and argues that their accounts miss out on a fundamental dimension of belief and 
approach the question of what beliefs someone has purely from an outsider's 
perspective, overlooking the first-person perspective of the believer (Moran 1994; 
see also Brandom's critique ofDennett's view in Brandom 1998, ss-62).1° Coming 
10 According to Moran, radical Dispositionalism only explains one aspect of belief- namely, its 'theoretical', third-
personal dimension. The limits of this approach become evident, Moran suggests, once we adopt the perspective 
not of the interpreter but of the interpretee. When you consider your beliefs from a first-person rather than a third-
person perspective, you do not ask the theoretical question "Do I believe that P?", where you consider your own 
beliefs merely as dispositions to behave in certain ways and things that have explanatory merits, but rather the 
deliberative question "Is P true?". This second question isn't settled by facts about you (how you behave, etc.) but 
facts about P. The agent herself cannot answer the question of how she is disposed to act, or which attitudes she 
in fact has, bqore having settled the question of whether P is true, whether Q is desirable or whether R is worth 
pursuing, and so on, or so Moran argues (1994, 170). His main point is that it is not irrelevant for the agent herself 
whether her beliefis true or fulse (Moran 1994, 169). If the subject thinks that her own belief that horse A is most 
likely to win the race is fulse, then she cannot continue to believe that horse A is most likely to win. The asymmetry 
here with the third person is obvious. I can attribute to A the belief that horse A will win, while believing (or even 
knowing!) this belief to be fulse, without any apparent contradiction or conflict. For the interpreter it is possible to 
attribute a belief even if it is fulse. This is why Moore's paradox of saying "P, but! don't believe it" only applies in 
the first-person case. Moran's idea, then, is this: if, in the first-person case, one brackets the question of the truth 
of one's belief, one would not be a believer. More positively, taking-as-true is a condition of having beliefs at all. 
Moran writes that the first-person stance is "not eliniinable" from a theory of what it means to believe something. 
We cannot, he says "take the purely third-person project of explaining and predicting the behaviour of others to 
define and exhaust the meaning of psychological terms", as Dennetrand Davidson appear to do (Moran 1994, 170). 
The Limits of Activism 157 
from a different angle, Schwitzgebel refers to what I have referred to as radical 
Dispositionalism as the 'anti-judgement view' and says that this view 
omits what the subject explicitly endorses, how she is disposed to judge the 
overall state of affairs all things considered, what side she would take in an 
argument, how she is disposed to reason about the case in reflective moments, 
her best conscious assessment of the evidence. (Schwitzgebel 2010, 542) 
Both moderate Dispositionalists and Activists disagree with a view like Davidson's, 
Dennett's or Borgoni's, because they think that to believe or want something is not 
just to be disposed to do X but must also involve a person's taking something to 
be true; must involve her reasons to do or believe that P. The latter is something 
that cannot be explained simply from the interpreter's stance, but crucially involves 
considering the stance of the interpretee, i.e. the believer herself. II 
The difference between moderate Dispositionalism and (Boyle's) Activism is that 
moderate Dispositionalists do not think that judging that Pis sufficient for believing 
that P. Nicholas Silins, for instance, claims that "GJudging that p is insufficient 
for believing that p, I take it, because believing that p requires having various 
dispositions, where judging that p is insufficient for having those dispositions" 
(Silins 2012). On the moderate Dispositionalistview, then, one does not necessarily 
know what one's beliefs are if one knows one's judgements. In the end, the issue 
is between radical atomism and moderate atomism; between those who think that 
making up one's mind by judging that P entails or implies believing that P and that 
judging that P necessarily leads to self-knowledge and those who think that making 
up one's mind by judging that P entails or implies believing that P, and thus that 
judging thatP potentially leads to self-knowledge. 
n Curiously, Moran and others seem ID have fitiled tn take note of Dennett's distinction betWeen 'opinions' and 
'beliefs,' where opinions are described by Dennett as being remarkably similar to what Moran refers tD as beliefs. 
Dennett explicitly says that his intentional stance theory only applies to beliefS, not opinions. In How to Change your 
Mind, Dennett writes, for instance, that "making up your mind is coming to have an opinion" (Dennettig8r, 307). 
Consider also this passage: •an cases of making up or changing one's mind is that changes of mind are a species 
of judgment, and while such judgments arise from beliefs and are ultimately tD be explained by one's beliefs, such 
judgments themselves are not beliefs - when such judgments are called occurrent or episodic beliefs, this is a 
serious misnomer- but acts, and these acts initiate states that are also not states ofbe!ief, but of something rather 
like commitment, rather like ownership. I trust it sounds at least fitintly paradoxical tD claim that when I change 
my mind or make up my mind, the result is not a new belief at all, but this is just what I want tn maintain" (Dennett 
1g8r, 303). Maybe, then, Dennett is a radical Dlspositionalistabout beliefs, but not opinions. 
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I should note that my description of moderate Dispositionalism is deliberately broad. 
It includes the view defended by, for example, Schwitzgebel, but it can also include 
Moran's view, depending on whether or not Moran in the end thinks judgements entail 
beliefs or rather thinks that it is only in the right circumstances that judging that P 
constitutes the beliefthatP, and so a 'gap' between the two is possible. Needless to say, 
there will be deep differences between various moderate Dispositionalist positions. 
We might perhaps think of moderate Dispositionalism as a spectrum, ranging from 
those who are optimistic and think that judging that P normally leads to- but does not 
entail- the belief that P to those who think that believing that P requires a lot more 
than being disposed to judge that P, such as Schwitzgebel: 
On one approach to belief, the sincere endorsement of [certain propositions] 
is sufficient, or nearly sufficient, to qualifY as believing them, if you really do 
wholeheartedly judge these propositions to be true when you reflect upon them. 
On an alternative approach- the one I will defend- it is not enough to sincerely 
embrace such propositions in reflective moments. To qualifY as someone 
who genuinely believes such things, you must live that way. (Schwitzgebel 
unpublished manuscript) 
Moderate Dispositionalists think of the relation between judging that P and believing 
that P as one where believing itselfis not, pace Boyle, an 'activity'. Instead, as Boyle 
suggests, on the moderate Dispositionalist view, believing that P appears to be the 
product of our judgements.', Boyle goes on to describe the view as one that sees the 
relation between judgement and belief (or some other attitude) as a process of some 
sort, and describes the view thus: 
12 Notice that moderate Dispositionalism can be construed either atomistically or holistically, depending on how we 
understand the way in which judgements 'produce' beliefs. The moderate Dispositionalist might, for instance, 
appeal to the idea that judgements normally or typically produce beliefs, or do so when all else is equal, etc. 
Christopher Peacocke seems to adopt a view along these lines: "I said that for some ways of coming to make 
knowledgeable self-ascriptions, the nature of belief and judgement is part of the explanation of their correctness. 
It is not the full explanation, and my exposition was peppered with occurrences of the qualifYing phrase 'when all 
is working properly'. Someone can make a judgement, and for good reasons, but it [may] not have the effects that 
judgement normally do- in particular, it may not result in a stored belief which has the proper influence on other 
judgements and on action. A combination of prejudice and self-deception, amongst many other possibilities, can 
produce this state of affairs" (C. Peacocke rgg8). Peacocke is one of few authors to make explicit the implicit appeal 
to these ceteris paribus clauses, which suggests that, in my terminology, the sort of view Peacocke is defending is 
not of a radical atomist sort. Peacocke does not appear to want to claim that judgements constitute beliefs in any 
circumstances. 
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If we exercise agential control over our own beliefs, [Dispositionalists] maintain, 
this must consist in our performing occurrent acts ofjudgment that give rise to 
new beliefs, or cause extant beliefs to be modified. (Boyle 2ona, 4) 
Deliberation whether P is a process that culminates, if things go well, in a 
judgement on the truth ofP. Judgement is an occurrent act by which a subject 
installs a new belief in herself, or modifies one she already holds. Beliefitselfis 
not an act but a state. (Boyle 2ona, 5)'3 
Boyle's description seems applicable to representationalist or cognitivistapproaches 
to the mental or those who think ofbeliefs and other propositional attitudes as things 
'stored' in the mind or stored in Belief or Desire 'boxes', caused by the subject's 
judgements (when the new belief gets 'installed') and which in its turn causes 
certain dispositions to behave in certain ways. I am sceptical, however, about the 
idea that Dispositionalists must think of attitudes along these lines (see e.g. McGeer 
and Schwitzgebel2oo6; McGeer 2007b; Schwitzgebel2013; Slors 2012). But Boyle's 
more general suggestion that the moderate Dispositionalist appears to think of 
beliefs as products rather than acts seems plausible. This leaves the question of what 
Boyle thinks is wrong with this view. This question is important because if Boyle's 
arguments against moderate Dispositionalism are successful, then we may have 
reason to accept the view according to which judging that P implies believing that 
P, which in turn paves the way towards Boyle's preferred account of self-knowledge 
described at the beginning of this chapter. 
To briefly recap, in this section I have described the metaphysical view thatBoyle's 
Activist account is meant to challenge and offer an alternative to. I have described 
the radical Dispositionalist view as the view according to which a subject believes 
something if she can be suitably interpreted as believing that P, whether or not she 
judges that P, whereas a moderate Dispositionalist further claims that the question 
of whether a person believes something requires her to have capacity to judge, i.e. 
to answer world-directed questions such as whether P is true, X is desirable or Y is 
to be feared. Activists, lastly, think that the latter is all there is to believing something. 
13 Since so few theorists are explicit about what they think judgements are and whether and how they differ from 
belief, and what their relation is, it's hard to give any references here. Boyle describes what he calls the Process 
Theory, and with those who adopt this view he includes Shah and Velleman (2005), Christopher Peacocke (1998) 
and Cas sam (201o, 2on). 
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The reason for discussing these different metaphysical views is that doing so allows 
us to be able to evaluate Boyle's metaphysical proposal by comparing it to alternative 
conceptions of what beliefs and other attitudes are. This allows us to evaluate Boyle's 
approach to attitudinal self-knowledge, given that Boyle himself rightly stresses 
that the question of self-knowledge is intimately connected to the question of how 
we should understand the objects we have knowledge of 
The next step is to consider why Boyle thinks that the view according to which 
judgements lead to or cause beliefs, and so a view on which a gap is conceivable, is 
false, which is the question I address in the following section. 
5· The Activist argument against moderate Dispositionalism 
5.1 Prima fade doubts against moderate Dispositionalism 
Why should we accept Activism over moderate Dispositionalism? Before turning to 
whatl take to be Boyle's principal argument, I first want to briefly review some of the 
other criticisms he has voiced. 
Boyle writes, for instance, that the moderate Dispositionalist, or what he calls 
the 'process theorist', holds that "judging is an act whereas believing itself is not", 
so "is forced to represent our actually believing that Pas at most a product or result 
of our agency". As a result, this approach, he thinks, "leaves our agency standing in 
a too extrinsic relation to the condition of belief itself" (Boyle 2ona, 6). The view 
"distorts our understanding of the basic sense in which we are capable of doxastic 
self-determination and gives rise to difficulties about the very rationality of this 
activity" (Boyle 2ona, 7). 
I agree with Boyle that, if one is an Activist, this is a problem. But one wonders 
why this should be a problem for the moderate Dispositionalist (hereafter 
dispositionalist). For only if you think that beliefs are acts, in the strong sense that 
Boyle does, does it seem to follow that Dispositionalism distorts our understanding 
of the basic sense in which we are capable of doxastic self-determination. And 
so it isn't obvious that Activists, or at least Boyle, have a real argument against 
those who adopt moderate Dispositionalism rather than simply presenting a 
different metaphysical paradigm and rejecting the one that lies at the basis of 
Dispositionalism. It seems we need something more robust in order to embrace 
Boyle's metaphysical and, ultimately, his epistemic account. 
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Boyle also discusses a paper by Shah and Velleman (2005), which he takes to reveal 
a problematic approach to what 'believing' involves. Shah and Velleman discuss 
the distinction between what one already believes and what one now believes, and 
argue that the transparency procedure only applies in 'making up your mind' cases, 
i.e. cases in which you don't already have a belief about P, but in which you still 
have to decide what to think. Boyle points out that Shah and Velleman's account is 
motivated by a "basic feature" of the Dispositionalistview, namely 
its assumption that we actually exercise our capacity for doxastic self-
determination only on those occasions when we now reflectively make a 
judgement about whether P, whereas when we merely hold a belief without 
reflection, we are not presently exercising this capacity. On closer examination, 
however, I think this assumption should seem suspect. (Boyle 2ona, ro). 
Shah and Velleman do not recognize "the right sort of connection between our 
capacity for doxastic self-determination and our presently believing what we do" 
(2ona, rr). But, again, I don't think we need to abandon Dispositionalism on 
this basis. What we need is not that the Activist finds it suspect, but that Shah and 
Velleman, too, would have to recognize that the assumption is suspect. But Boyle 
gives no reasons to think that those who think judgements cause beliefs would 
have to think that the assumption is suspect, other than giving a description of 
his preferred Activist metaphysics, which, again, is presumably one that Shah and 
Velleman would reject."~ And so we seem to have made no progress. 
Boyle concedes he mostly offers mere "prima facie doubts" (2orra, n). I am not 
sure that what Boyle offers are prima facie doubts about Dispositionalism rather 
than prima facie confidence in Activism. But, in any case, Boyle comes with a "more 
direct objection" (2ona, n) that I describe below (5.2) and to which I then respond 
(Section 6). I argue that Boyle's objection fails to convince and that this means 
that we are left with the question of whether the Activist metaphysics ought to be 
preferred over (a version of) moderate Dispositionalism, which I go on to address 
in Section 7.'s 
14 In all fairness, Boyle does go on to level his principal objection against Shah and Velleman, which I tum to below. 
But Boyle's rhetoric may be taken to suggest that more is going on, argumentatively, which I doubt is the case. 
IS I should say that the discussion ofBoyle's objection, as well as my reply to it, keeps very close to Boyle's text and is 
in that respect a rather internal discussion . Some readers may therefore want to proceed directly to Section 7. 
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5.2 The principal objection: meeting 'Boyle's Constraint' 
Boyle's central objection boils down to the idea that Dispositionalists are unable to 
respect the following constraint (C): "I believe Q because I believe P". Boyle does 
not give concrete examples, but we might imagine the constraint to be applicable 
to 'making up your mind' beliefs and to beliefs you already have, given that Boyle 
stresses that both beliefs are 'active' in his sense. '6 So let's consider an example of 
each, in order to get a better understanding ofBoyle's objection: 
(I) I believe that the streets are wet (Q) because I believe that it's raining 
(P) 
(2) I believe that the UK is headed for a recession (Q) because I believe 
that Brexit is going to happen sometime in the future (P).'7 
In these sorts of cases, I believe that Q because I believe P. The questions then are, 
how would a dispositionalist approach these two cases and, more particularly, in 
what sense would s/he fail to respect Boyle's Constraint (C)? 
Boyle's reconstruction of the Dispositionalistview is as follows: "I believe thatP, 
and that ifP then Q, and on this basis I judge that Qat time t. A cause must precede 
its effect, so if my judging Q is the cause of my believing Q, then I come to believe 
Q only after t" (2ona, I2). It may be helpful to try to unpack this a bit and say that, 
on the Dispositionalist interpretation of what's going on in cases like (I) and (2), 
at some point in time, (tt), I judged that P, e.g. that Brexit is going to happen. This 
judgement gave rise to, or caused, at ti+ the belief that P. Assuming that ifi believe 
that P, and further believe that "ifP then Q", then I come to judge, at u, that the UK is 
headed for a recession. This judgement causes, at t2+, the corresponding belief that 
Q. Assuming a cause must precede its effect, I come to believe that Q only after u. 
r6 Cf. "one's capacity for doxastic self-determination plays a role even in one's knowledge of one's extant beliefs" 
(Boyle 20IIa, IO). 
17 I am not sure whether my example is a plausible example of a case of'making up one's mind', but the reader might 
imagine his/her own preferred example. 
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(ti) judgement that P -> (ti+) belief that P 
ifPthen Q 
(1:2) judgement thatQ-> (1:2+) beliefthatQ 
Ifi understand Boyle correctly, his worry is that the Dispositionalist must say that my 
belief that Qat 1:2+ can only be explained by a belief that was caused earlier, namely 
at ti+. According to Boyle, "The relevant psychological causes are, it seems, all in 
the past", and so it's hard to see how the Dispositionalist can deliver the "intuitively 
correct explanatory claim expressed in (C)" (2ona, 12). What we want to say in 
these examples, or so I understand Boyle, is that I believe that Q because I believe 
(present tense) that P. Boyle goes on to say that the Dispositionalist, who thinks of 
the relation between judgement and belief in terms of a process, must say that my 
belief that Q can only be explained by my having believ£d that Patti+, and so fails 
to respect (C): that a subject is in a position to know he believes that Q because he 
believes (present tense) that P. 18 What should we make of this? 
6. Response to Boyle's Constraint 
Boyle's discussion seems to me to be confused. This is because Boyle fails to distinguish 
or equivocates between a psychological and an epistemic understanding of the 
notion "because" that's central to his constraint (C). If so, then the "intuitively correct 
explanatory claim expressed in (C)" (Boyle 2oua, 12) is unclear, because itis ambiguous. 
In Chapter 4, I suggested that when we are talking about the causes of one's 
belief, how one 'arrives at' one's belief or how one's belief is formed, as well as talking 
of (temporal) structures, we are considering the psychological features (histories, 
pathways) of a person's state. Epistemic considerations, on the other hand, have to do 
with the state's 'credentials', and concern the question ofhow appealing to one's belief 
r8 Boyle also discusses a non-causal variant ofPT "on which my judging that Q does not cause my believing thatQ but 
is itself an event of funning or acquiring the beliefthatQ" (Boyle 2ona, 14). The causal variant, however, seems to 
me much more common, so I will stick to that version here, especially because ultimately Boyle's objection to the 
non-causal version, with which I agree, is "that the meaning of the proposal is unclear•. 
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that P can make it appropriate for one to believe that Q, or what one's grounds or bases 
are for believing what one does (Pryor 2005; Cas sam 2015a). 
With this distinction in mind, we can tum to the question of how we must 
understand Boyle's Constraint (C) "I believe Q because I believe P". Should we take 
the "because" to be an 'epistemic because' or a 'psychological because'£'9 I think 
Boyle leaves the answer to this question unanswered (perhaps deliberately so - I 
tum to this option in a moment). What I want to do, therefore, is consider a specific 
passage from Boyle in which psychological and epistemic features seem to run 
together. The epistemic claims are in bold, whereas the psychological claims are 
underscored (notice some concepts/phrases are both bold and underscored): 
On the causal variant of [the process theory], the objection is straightforward. 
Suppose I believe that P, and that ifP then Q, and on this basis I judge that Q 
at time t. A cause must precede its effect, so if my judging Q is the .caJJ.Sf of my 
believing Q, then I come to believe Q only aftei t. What explains my then believing 
Q? The relevant psychological causes are, it seems, all in the past: the proximate 
.cau&: is my judging Qat t, and the more remote causes are the beliefs I held at 
t that gaye rise to this judgement. Given these assumptions, it is difficult to see 
what basis there can be for the intuitively correct explanatoey claim expressed in 
(C). In what sense can I be said to believe Q because I believe P? My belief that P 
may indeed p.ers.W, and it may be true that ifit were changed, this would bring 
ab.rul.t a change in my belief that Q. But it seems that the only actual explanatozy 
connection whose existence is entailed by the fact that I have reasoned "P, so Q" 
... is a relation between my believing that Q and my havin9 believed that Pat t. How 
then could reasoning in this way put the subject in a position to know that he 
believes Q because he believes P? (Boyle 2ona, 12) 
Three phrases, which seem to be the crucial phrases, are both bold and underlined, 
i.e. are ambiguous between epistemic and psychological readings ("What explains 
my then believing Q?", the "explanatory claim expressed in (C)" and "explanatory 
connection"). More generally, it seems that notions like 'explanation', 'because' or 
19 These two questions are arguably still too coarse-grained, especially since the notion of'psychological', even if we 
go with Pryor's description of it, is still ambiguous because 'psychology' can refer to a myriad of things. If so, then 
matters may be worse regarding how we're supposed to understand Boyle's Constraint (C), though I will have to 
ignore these complexities here. 
'fhe r imits of .'l.ctivism r6s 
'why' are ambiguous in this way. This would mean there are potentially two different 
ways of understanding (C). Which is the one that Dispositionalism is supposed to 
fail to respect? 
Suppose we take (C) to be an epistemic constraint, one that would make appealing to 
one's belief that P appropriate for one to believe that Q. On the epistemic understanding 
of (C), the constraint is not "about what psychological processes you've undergone" 
nor is it about whether you did or did not "arrive at P by deriving or inferring it from 
other beliefS" (cf. Pryor 2005). When Boyle asks "why" someone believes thatP (2oua, 
8) or ''what explains my then believing Q" (2ona, 12), on an epistemic reading, he is 
not after a psychological explanation, but rather an explanation of the basis of one's 
belief, or one's justification for believing what one does. 
But if (C) is an epistemic claim, which seems to be the most plausible option, 
then I see no direct reason why Dispositionalists do not or could not 'respect' (C). 
Boyle describes, after all, what he calls the process theory, and what I have referred to 
as Dispositionalism, as a theory about how we arrive at our beliefs, i.e. how they are 
formed. It's a theory that's mostly concerned with the psychology, not the epistemology, 
of attitudes. Dispositionalism is the view according to which judgements notmally or 
typically lead to or cause beliefS. On Boyle's reconstruction (which I've been assuming 
is true), "Deliberation whether Pis a process that culminates, if things go well, in a 
judgement on the truth ofP" where such a judgement is "an occurrent act by which a 
subject installs a new belief in herself, or modifies one she already holds. Beliefitself 
is not an act but a state" (Boyle 2ona, sl!o 
Clearly, then, Dispositionalism is a psychological account of attitudes. 
Understood as such, I see no reason why Dispositionalists could not be neutral on 
(C) taken as an epistemic constraint. Why should the fact that my belief that P was 
caused earlier on, as the Dispositionalist claims (or so I'm assuming, as Boyle does), 
commit the Dispositionalist to deny the epistemic claim "that I believe Q because 
I believe P", i.e. to deny that my belief that Q fails to respect (C)? Epistemic-based 
relations are a-temporal, so it should be irrelevant how the belief that Q comes 
about or how one arrives at one's belief. The Dispositionalist can say "I believe that 
Q because I believe that P", while claiming that, as a psychological matter of fact, "I 
believe that Q because I believed that P", i.e. because there was an earlier moment at 
which some new belief was 'installed', or something similar. 
2 0 Again, I don't think (all) Dispositionalists have to accept this description ('installing', eli:.), but I will ignore this here. 
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The above assumes that (C) is an epistemic constraint, not a psychological one. 
This seems to me to be the most natural reading of (C). But of course it's possible 
that (C) is a psychological constraint after all, i.e. a constraint on how we (ought 
to) arrive at our beliefs. But taken as a psychological criterion, I don't see why the 
Dispositionalist is in trouble, either. It's not clear why it would be incoherent for the 
Dispositionalist to hold, simultaneously, the following claims: (r) judgements cause 
beliefs and (2) causes precede their effects, and so agree with (3) the belief that Q 
came after the judgement thatQ (as well as after the belief that P) but to insist that (4) 
I still believe that P, so long as I still have the relevant dispositions (am still disposed 
to judge that P, and so on). And so it seems to me that the Dispositionalist can deny 
Boyle's suggestion that the Dispositionalist would be forced to say that I believe that 
Q because of"my having believed that P". 
And even if we were to assume for the sake of the argument that the 
Dispositionalist would have to say "I believe Q because I believed that P" (or because 
I judged that Q, or something similar), the Dispositionalist might say that this 
explanation of one's belief that Qis only implausible or absurd if, without realizing, 
we took the notions of'explanation' or 'because' to have an epistemic meaning. But 
this would mean that we would, again, be equivocating between psychological and 
epistemic understandings ofthe notions of'explanation' and 'because', etc., which 
I have just suggested we had best avoid doing. 
There might be an even more radical response available to the Dispositionalist. 
S/he might say that, taken as a psychological criterion, it's not really clear what it 
means to 'respect' (C). Suppose I tell you that I believe that the UK is headed for 
a recession and you ask me 'why' I believe this, or ask me to 'explain' my belief. If 
this is a psychological why-question, then what am I supposed to say, exactly? My 
thought here is that if we want to give psychological explanations of people's mental 
states, it's not clear that what the subject herself will say in response to the question 
of why she believes a particular thing (again, taken as a psychological question) 
is going to be a good strategy. Maybe the right answer is one that appeals to my 
virtuous or vicious epistemic character (maybe I believe that Q 'because' of closed-
mindedness (cf. Zagzebski rgg6; Cassam 2016, 2017)). Or maybe I was primed, 
nudged or manipulated to have the belief that Q, in which case, the confabulatory 
reasons I give to answer the why-question probably won't square with the available 
psychological explanation. Maybe the story is even more complex, and requires 
considering theoretical psychology, cognitive science, and so on. If we have to believe 
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Daniel Kahneman (2013) and others (1\rersky and Kahneman 1974; Thagard and 
Nisbett 1983; Ariely 2010) who have suggested that we're (predictably) irrational, 
then it's not obvious that when I answer the psychological why-question by saying 
"because P", it is accurate, taken as a psychological description of how I arrived at 
the belief that Q. This more radical response would bring us back to the idea that, 
most plausibly, Boyle's Constraint probably isn't a psychological constraint but an 
epistemic one. 
There's one final possibility, which is that Boyle's Constraint (C) is both an 
epistemic and a psychological constraint. But how would that work? This would 
mean that as a psychological matter of fact, my belief that Q really did come from my 
belief that P. If that is the case, the psychological question of how I, as a matter of 
fact, came to believe that Q, and the epistemic question of what my grounds are for 
believing that Q have the same answer: what grounds my belief that Q is also how I 
arrived at my belief that Q, namely my belief that P. 
But why would we think epistemic and psychological explanations would 
'conflate' in this way? For (C) to be both an epistemic and a psychological constraint, 
we must take what the subject says about the causes or aetiology of her belief that Q 
as giving us the truth about the epistemic grounds of her belief. I find this hard to 
believe. More fundamentally, though, given Boyle's overall project, it seems much 
more plausible to take his constraint to be an epistemic constraint and the relevant 
why-question to be a question about the subject's credentials, grounds or bases for 
believing that Q: 
The relevantwhy-question does not inquire into the explanation ofhis cominB, 
at some past time, to hold the beliefin question, except insofar as the subject's 
knowledge ofhow he came to hold the belief speaks to the reasonableness ofhis 
continuing to hold it now. Our interest is not in his psychological history, but in 
the present basis ofhis conviction. (Boyle 2orra, 1o-u) 
But if it's true that (C) is neither a psychological constraint nor a psychological-
cum-epistemic constraint but a distinctively epistemic constraint, as I think the 
above passage suggests, then Boyle's argument against the Dispositionalist fails to 
convince. 
Where does all of this leave us? If the Activist's principal objection against 
Dispositionalism does not convince, then what is left in support of Activism 
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is simply whether its metaphysical framework is more plausible than the 
Dispositionalist metaphysical framework. In order to assess the respective merits of 
Activism and Dispositionalism, I consider, in the next section, how the Activist deals 
with the examples of where there is an apparent gap between a person's judgements and 
her beliefS. I suggest that unless Activism were to build in certain crttris paribus clauses 
(in which case it ends up being a version of moderate atomist rationalism criticized in 
the previous chapter), the Activist way of dealing with these cases has counter-intuitive 
results, and this would speak in favour of adopting Dispositionalism instead. However, 
I also point out that arguably it leads to these counter-intuitive results only given certain 
implicit assumptions about what we should expect from a metaphysical theory of mind 
in the first place, and that we should not expect the Activism-Dispositionalism dispute 
to be settled in any easy way by considering 'hard cases'. 
7. The apparent gap between judgement and belief 
In this section, I want to consider some examples (7 .I) which illustrate that there is 
a gap between judgements and beliefs where, according to the Activist view, there 
couldn't be one. I then discuss two ways in which the Activist might deal with these 
examples, which I refer to as the 'no proper judgement' response (7 .I) and the 'what 
gap?' response (Section 8), and assess the implications of each. 
7.1 The Implicit Racist, the Unethical Professor and the Family Man 
Stuart Hampshire gives a good illustration of a situation in which one might 
'distance oneself' from one's passing (occurrent) thoughts: 
The FealjUI Flyer 
In the airplane, the thought that it is going to crash comes to me, and perhaps 
I find that I cannot help thinking that it will crash. But I may dismiss the 
persisting thought as imagination, and not belief, since I am far from ready to 
commit myself to the thought that the plane will crash. I do not think, in a strong 
sense of "think", which is equivalent to "believe," that the plane will crash, 
and more than I do those things, in a strong sense of"do," when I find myself 
unintentionally doing. (Hampshire 20I5, IOI-2; for discussion see Cassam 2on, 
7; a similar example is discussed in Shah and Velleman 2005, 507) 
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Hampshire's example plausibly suggests there can be a gap between (passing) 
thoughts and one's beliefs. But judging that P, one might argue, is very different 
from having a mere passing thought that P. I might entertain the thought that 
pink elephants exist, without judging, i.e. 'actively' considering it to be true, that 
they exist. So it's not clear that the fearful flyer judges that the plane will crash (as 
Hampshire notes, "I am far from ready to commit myself to the thought that the 
plane will crash"). What we need, therefore, is a case in which one genuinely judges 
that P, while, intuitively, not believing that P. 
In the previous chapter, I've already discussed a case that was meant to illustrate 
that one might judge that P without constituting one's attitudes accordingly, 
namely the Angry Spouse. To recall, the Angry Spouse made up her mind 'angrily'. 
She followed the transparency procedure, i.e. came to a conclusion regarding P 
(whether a divorce was a good idea) by considering the only (Anscombean) reasons 
that were available to her in the mood she was in, namely angry and self-deceptive 
reasons. If judging that P would have constituted her belief that P, she would have 
constituted the beliefthata divorce was desirable. Given that this belief was strongly 
incompatible with most of her other attitudes and values, and was, as Schwitzgebel 
would say, strongly incompatible with how she lived, I suggested we must conclude 
that the Angry Spouse is an example of where judging that P was not constitutive of 
the belief that P. 
I've argued that ruling out the sort of circumstances the Angry Spouse was in is not 
a plausible strategy and hence that rationalists cannot just ignore her or hide her in 
implicit ceteris paribus clauses. But let's assume my argument to that effect does not hold, 
and hence that we need an example of someone who made up her mind, or followed 
the transparency procedure, in less abnormal circumstances, that is, in circumstances 
where the person seems to be "in her right mind". Here, considering the phenomenon 
ofirnplicit bias might help. Consider Schwitzgebel's example ofJuliet: 
juliet the Implicit Racist 
[Juliet] is prepared to argue coherently, sincerely, and vehemently for equality of 
intelligence and has argued the point repeatedly in the past. Her egalitarianism 
in this matter coheres with her overarching liberal stance, according to which 
the sexes too possess equal intelligence and racial and sexual discrimination 
are odious. And yet Juliet is systematically racist in most of her spontaneous 
reactions, her unguarded behavior, and her judgements about particular 
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cases. When she gazes out on class the first day of each term, she can't help 
but think that some students look brighter than others - and to her, the black 
students never look bright. When a black student makes an insightful comment 
or submits an excellent essay, she feels more surprise than she would were a 
white or Asian student to do so, even though her black students make insightful 
comments and submit excellent essays at the same rate as do the others. This 
bias affects her grading and the way she guides class discussion. She is similarly 
biased against black non-students. When Juliet is on the hiring committee for a 
new office manager, it won't seem to her that the black applicants are the most 
intellectually capable, even if they are; or if she does become convinced of the 
intelligence of a black applicant, it will have taken more evidence than if the 
applicant had been white. When she converses with a custodian or cashier, she 
expects less wit if the person is black. And so on. (Schwitzgebel2oro, 532) 
Christopher Peacocke gives a similar example ofwhatappears to be a case ofjudging 
that P without believing that P: 
The Unethical Professor 
Someone may judge that undergraduate degrees from countries other than their 
own are of an equal standard to her own, and excellent reasons may be operative 
in her assertions to that effect. All the same, it may be quite clear, in decisions 
she makes on hiring, or in making recommendations, that she does not really 
have this belief at all. (C. Peacocke rgg8, go) 21 
Finally, consider the following example, again from Schwitzgebel: 
The Family Man 
I say I value family over work. When I stop to consider it, it seems to me vastly 
more important to be a good father than to craft a few more essays like this one. 
Yet I'm off to work early, I come home late. I take family vacations and my mind 
is wandering in the philosopher's ether. I'm more elated by my rising prestige 
than by my son's successes in school. My wife rightly scolds me: Do I really 
believe that family is more important? (Schwitzgebel 2012) 
21 Saying that she does not believe that P doesn't necessarily mean that she believes the converse (that not·P). 
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I take it to be a key strength of the Dispositionalist view that it is able to handle 
complex cases like those discussed above in a way that recognizes that it's possible 
to make up your mind and come to judge that P while failing to believe that P, and 
hence that there is what Schwitzgebel (2o1o) refers to as a 'gulf' between judgements 
and beliefs. As Cas sam remarks, it seems that in the above examples "the belief that 
P fails to stick despite the acknowledged presence of good reasons in favour ofP, 
reasons which lead one to judge that P" (Cassam 20n, 15). This, in turn, suggests 
that knowing what you believe is not the same as knowing what you judge: even if 
you know what you judge, you might fail to know what you believe, because judging 
that P does not entail believing that P. So knowing what you believe requires further 
(interpretative or inferential) work to be done. Your judging that P can be evidence of 
your belief that P- very good evidence, but fallible evidence all the same. 
But notice that the intuition that there is such a gulf only emerges on a broadly 
dispositionalist metaphysical view of belief We should therefore expect the Activist to 
think about these examples very differently and to be able to respond to the above 
suggestion that only the Dispositionalist is able to make proper sense of the sort of 
cases discussed above. I discuss two responses below. 
7. 2 The 'no proper judgement' response 
When considering the apparent gap between judgement and belief that appears to 
occur in the examples ofJuliet the Implicit Racist, The Unethical Professor and the 
Family Man, the Activist can choose between either of two strategies. One option 
is what I'll call the 'no proper judgement' response, which is to say that none of 
these subjects ,genuinely judged that P, which would explain why they did not end up 
genuinely believing that P, either. The other is the 'what gap?' response, i.e. the 
denial that in these examples there is a gap between judgement and belief, which I 
discuss in the subsequent section. There is, of course, a third strategy, which would 
be to say that the subjects really did judge that P but failed to believe that P, because 
judgements do not always lead to, constitute or cause beliefs. But this would be 
tantamount to giving up Activism, and will mean that the arguments against the 
moderate atomist version from the previous chapter will re-emerge, so I will be 
assuming this is not an option. 
The 'no proper judgement' response involves the claim that the subjects merely 
seemed to judge that P; that is, they merely seemed to take P to be true. This means 
that Juliet has not truly endorsed the proposition that all races are intellectually equal; 
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the Family Man has not truly 'staked himself' 22 when it comes to valuing family 
over work; and the Unethical Professor has not really asserted that undergraduate 
degrees from countries other than her own are of an equal standard to her own. 
I suspect this is not a particularly appealing road for the Activist to go down. The 
'no proper judgement' response is problematic, first of all, because we seem to have 
no good reason to think that Juliet and the others are not judging that P. Nothing 
seems out of order- we have no reason to think that Juliet or any of the others are, 
for example, emotional or hesitant or are not fully rational or self-conscious or 
something similar. And so this would mean that any account of'judgement proper' 
is going to have to be ad hoc. One begins to suspect that, at the end of the day, it just 
so happens that only rationalists will be able to tell us what judgements really are. 
This should make us suspicious. 
Also, if]uliet and the other characters haven't made a judgement, this would 
make the notion of judgement a technical one, which would be fine if it weren't for 
the fact that it seems that rationalists want it not to be a technical one. On closer 
inspection, judging that P is no longer equivalent to what we would normally take 
it to be, e.g. taking P to be true and endorsing P, etc. (unless the subjects were not 
taking P to be true either, but then it would be a mystery what taking something to 
be true would be). If that's the case, then that means that the question of whether 
someone has (really) judged that P is not something that can be answered from the 
subject's first-person perspective. The question of whether or not someone has 
'really' judged that P is something she herself might not have the answer to. This 
would be bad news for the rationalist, I take it, given that the first-person perspective 
is so central to the rationalist view- and rightly so. 
All in all, I think the 'no proper judgement' response is a no-go. This leaves the 
'what gap?' response, i.e. the denial of the fact that in these examples there really is 
a gap. 
22 Cf. Moran: "At some point, I must cease attempting to infer from some occurrence to my belief; and instead stake 
myself, and relate to my mental life not as something of symptomatic value, but as my current commitment to how 
things are out there." (2001, 150 emphasis in original). 
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8. The 'what gap?' response 
If judgements entail beliefs, and ifJuliet has really judged that P, which I think we 
mustacceptifwe want to avoid begging the question, then the Activist must conclude 
that Juliet simply cannot fail to believe that P. The Activist says that judging that P 
entails believing that P, and so Activism is committed to construing certain cases, for 
example Juliet's case, in this way. She does not 'sort of' believe this, or 'in-between' 
believe it, but believes it determinately. This amounts to saying that, assuming the 
subject is minimally self-conscious and is able to deliberate on the basis of reasons, 
no appeal to circumstances is needed. Judging that P entails believing that P even 
when one is angry, depressed, in love, nervous, hungry, hypnotized, nudged, and 
so on. On the assumption that judging is something one does knowingly, it would 
seem to follow that one comes to know one's attitudes in these circumstances. 
My main worry boils down to the fact that this has the implication that the 
'what gap?' response wiggles loose the action-related features of a belief, and, 
more generally, that Activism ultimately cannot avoid decoupling action-related 
dimensions from what is involved in having attitudes. This will need some 
unpacking. 
The basic intuition appealed to by the Dispositionalist is that whether or not 
someone has a certain attitude and can be said to know that she does is something 
that depends on how the subject is inclined to act in the future and how she has 
acted in the past. Believing, wanting or hoping for something is not just something 
that happens 'in the head'. As Krista Lawlor puts it, someone's "having a special 
prerogative to speak about his or her own states of mind" derives from "reliable 
correlations between what one is inclined to say and what one is inclined to do, 
between the attitudes one sincerely asserts and the attitudes one acts upon" (Lawlor 
2003, 549; s6o)!3 An Activist, on the other hand, will have to insist that such reliable 
connections regarding the subject's future (or past) conduct are not a necessary aspect 
of believing, wanting, hoping or intending. One can believe something, and know 
that one does, without 'acting like it'. 
23 Lawlor's argument centres around a number of psychological studies (esp. Seligman, Fazio, and Zanna rg8o; T. D. 
Wilson, Hodges, and LaFleuri995), but! think her general argumentative strategy, and responses to her argument 
by Ferrero and Bortolotti, which I turn to below, can be discussed in abstraction from these studies. 
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The latter is a conclusion that has been explicitly accepted recently by Luca Ferrero 
(2003) and Lisa Bortolotti (2009), who defend what seems to be an Activist 
conception of what beliefs and other attitudes are. Ferrero writes, "The distinctive 
first-person authority of [someone's] self-ascriptions concerns ... whether she 
takes responsibility for them, not whether the self-ascribed attitude is both correct 
and a reliable guide to future conduct" (2003, 570). So someone has self-knowledge 
of her beliefs even if it isn't a reliable guide to her future conduct. Bortolotti claims 
that subjects can have knowledge of their attitudes "no matter how representative of 
their future behaviour those attitudes would [turn] out to be" (Bortolotti 2009, 639). 
And Ferrero claims, as indeed I think the Activist must, that the sort of diachronic, 
action-related considerations that are central to Lawlor's critique are "only a 
regulative ideal of deliberation, not a necessary condition ofit" (Ferrero 2003, 575; 
see also Bortolotti 2009). 
We can, I think, imagine Boyle giving a similar sort of response to the examples 
ofJuliet, the Unethical Professor and the Family Man. All of them have followed 
the relevant rationalist self-knowledge procedure, that is, all have judged that P and 
have come up with reasons for P, and they have done so successfully. Hence, they all 
came to believe that P, and acquired self-knowledge in the process. 
This is quite a revisionist proposal if we stop and think about it. If reliability, 
diachronicity or stability is really merely a "regulative ideal", then this means 
that the concept of belief (desire, etc.) does not in and of itself involve any claims 
about the subject's future-directed actions. Activists may want to take issue with 
the crude behaviourist account of what counts as having 'dispositions to act' and 
point out that inner, deliberative actions, such as judgings, decidings, reasonings, 
calculatings, acceptings and attendings to something (c£ C. Peacocke 2009) are all 
actions too, albeit of a 'mental' (inner) rather than behavioural (outer) kind, and 
I would not disagree (c£ de Bruin, Jongepier, and Strijbos 2015; but see also G. 
Strawson 2003, who disagrees). It seems essential to the belief that '2+2=4' that 
you are able to judge, reason or infer that adding another 2 equals 6, that the answer 
times two equals 8 and to think that '+' means addition, and so on. These mental 
actions are part of the 'future conduct' that your self-ascription of the belief that 
2+2=4 should be a reliable guide of. If you're not prepared to 'mentally behave' in 
the relevant ways, then we have a good reason to think that you don't really have 
the belief that 2+2=4, and so we must conclude that you couldn't know that this is 
what you believe. The question is whether beliefs other than such simple beliefs like 
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2+2=4 can be treated in the same way, i.e. whether it's plausible think that in order 
to know one's beliefS it's sufficient to know one's 'mental' future dispositions. To 
say that this is all there is to what it means to have beliefS generally (whatever their 
content), let alone attitudes generally, is hard to accept. 
I should stress that the Activist is certainly not committed to saying that the 
subject's not acting in accordance with the belief that P is irrelevant all things 
considered, or indeed that someone like, for example, Juliet should not be held 
responsible for 'not practising what she preaches'. The point is, rather, the fact 
that acting in accordance with the belief that Pis, on the Activist view, irrelevant to 
the metaphysical question of whether someone believes that P. This has a curious 
implication, namely that the Activist will have to treat cases as similar that we would 
normally regard to be very different, in terms of their beliefs. Suppose the Family 
Man is married to the Family Wife. Both say and judge that they value family over 
work. But, whereas the Family Man goes off to work early and comes home late, 
and his mind is wandering in the philosopher's ether, the Family Wife's mind is 
at home, wandering about in thoughts about her son. Apart from the fact that 
the Activist, seeing the wider action-related dimensions of a self-ascription as a 
"regulative ideal", must say that the Family Man genuinely believes (rather than 
'sort of' believes, or wishfully believes or something similar) that family is more 
important than work, the Activist is forced to treat the Family Woman the same in 
terms of what she believes. 
If this is hard to accept, then the Dispositionalist view, according to which we 
need a more nuanced account of what it is to believe something, one that would 
allow a metaphysical difference between the two, seems more plausible. As Jane 
Heal puts it, in such cases we might say that the self-ascription "retains a kind of 
shadowy credence" and is a case in which we are "inclined to say that the person 
'sort of' believes or intends as she insists she does" (Heal2oo2, r-2). But the 'sort 
of' must be recognized as having important metaphysical ramifications, which, 
it seems, only the Dispositionalist can account for. Someone's acting contrary to 
the judgement that P, we must conclude if we were to adopt the Activist view, is 
irrelevant to the metaphysical question of what someone believes. The Activist thus 
appears to decouple the action-related features of an attitude and consider it non-
essential. This, I think, provides strong reasons against the Activist metaphysics, 
and, in turn, against the Activist epistemology of what is required in order to know 
our attitudes. 
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Another worry with the Activist metaphysics of belief is that it makes believing 
something, and knowing what one believes, too easy. On the Activist view, as 
Schwitzgebel writes, it is "easier than it should be to regard ourselves as free of 
racist, sexist, elitist, and other objectionable attitudes" (2010, 546). A second line 
of argument against Activism is that the Activist view has counter-intuitive results. 
The Dispositionalist might suggest, for instance, that what we should do is imagine 
that Juliet decides not to invite Jim, the only non-white candidate, for a job interview, 
and we ask her to explain her decision. Now suppose Juliet explains her decision by 
saying "I believe Jim was an unpromising candidate". On the Activist view, Juliet is 
right- that is indeed what she believes. This, the Dispositionalist might say, flies 
in the face of our intuitions and/or immediate practical concerns. Maybe Juliet's 
response is not as problematic as a theoretical position in metaphysics, but it's 
rather counter-intuitive outside philosophy. If we further imagine that Juliet is one 
of our colleagues, we would certainly take offence at her 'Activist' response and if 
she told us that given that she's got her judgements right, she's got her beliefs right. 
The Dispositionalist might say this answer is highly unsatisfYing. If we imagine 
that Activism is a position that actual people would actually adopt, this makes it 
evident that Activism must be false, or at least that moderate Dispositionalism is 
more plausible. 
This raises a rather fundamental question, though. Is appealing to intuitions or 
practical concerns the best way to settle on one theory or another? The argument that 
Activism is false because it has counter-intuitive results appears to be premised on 
implicit assumptions about what we should expect from metaphysics of mind in the 
first place. In other words, the conclusion that Activism should be abandoned, and 
that we had better do so, appears to depend on certain meta-metaphysical and/or 
meta-philosophical assumptions. But it's not unlikely that Activists think this is the 
wrong way to assess metaphysical accounts of mind. In the next and final section, I 
therefore turn to some of these more abstract issues which, I think, at the end of the 
day, may (co-)determine which metaphysics of mind should be accepted, which, in 
turn, largely determines which theory of self-knowledge ought to be preferred. 
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9· Meta-theoretical questions about metaphysics of mind: 
'intuitions' and 'practical concerns' 
Earlier, I argued that the Activist's argumentagainstDispositionalism (that it fails to 
respect Boyle's Constraint) fails to be convincing (Section 6). The result of this was 
that, ifindeed there are no good arguments against Dispositionalism, we needed to 
tackle the more fundamental question of whether Activism or Dispositionalism was 
the right view. This was the aim ofthe previous section, where I tried to show that 
the 'what gap?' response comes with two significant 'costs', one that concerns the 
fact that 'believing' something is decoupled from one's future conduct, and another 
which means that Activism has counter-intuitive implications. However, the latter 
cost only emerged by appealing to intuitions and practical concerns and, more 
specifically, after considering a variety of everyday examples, and imagining that 
Activism would be a metaphysical view adopted by one of our colleagues in real life. 
The Dispositionalist view appears, in this respect, to be a 'pragmatic' view of 
what beliefs are. Take Schwitzgebel, who has made explicit that his concerns are 
importantly pragmatic: 
It's not a passion for factually correct metaphysics that animates me here. 
Actually, I think there's no such thing as factually correct metaphysics. There 
are just better and worse ways of conceptualizing the world, given our values 
and the empirical facts. I hope the interest of this essay doesn't hinge on that 
controversial meta philosophy; but you may not fully understand the argument 
now coming if you don't see that it is intended as a pragmatic argument. ... The 
practical question is this: Do we want to highlight this empirical fact about 
ourselves- what I'd call the gulfbetween occurrent judgement and dispositional 
belief- or do we want to marginalize it as anomalous? (Schwitzgebel 2010, 
546)24 
24 In a recent manuscript, Schwitzgebel explains his notion of'pragmatic' thus: "The approach I favor is pragmatist 
in rwo ways. First, it fits with the pragmatist tradition ofBain (r868/I973), Peirce (1877, r878), James (r896lr9I2, 
1907/2004), and Dewey (1920/1957, 1938) in emphasizing behavioral patterns as the core of belief. Second, it 
is metaphilosophically pragmatist in relying on pragmatic criteria to choose among competing metaphysical 
approaches• (unpublished manuscript). 
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A somewhat similar pragmatic appeal to the role of our intentions or 'responses' 
is also present in Lawlor's work. Her strategy is to "[c]onsider our reactions" to 
certain psychological experiments, and she assesses the rationalist view relative to 
these reactions (Lawlor 2003, 558). She writes, "I believe that the findings under 
discussion ... cast light on our commonsense commitments regarding when 
self-reports are authoritative and when not" and that "[w]e react to the social 
psychological cases the way we do, precisely because we have this commitment" 
(Lawlor 2003, s6o-6r). 
Arguably, this reveals an important methodological position- a general view of 
how we might assess philosophical theories. But the pragmatic view may not be a 
view that Activists would share. An Activist might think that we should not be led 
by our everyday intuitions when considering the question of what beliefS essentially 
are. By implication, the worries voiced in the previous section will fail to convince 
Activists, because for them, these worries beg important methodological questions. 
There's also another possibility, namely that the Activist also thinks that 
considering our intuitions matters, though I doubt the Activist would be happy to 
call them intuitions and would prefer to refer to them as our 'practical concerns'. The 
Activist isn't interested in offering a clinical or "factually correct" metaphysics, i.e. a 
sort of metaphysics that is decoupled from the sort oflives of (real) human beings. 
Instead, the Activist could plausibly say that s/he is precisely interested in (real) 
human beings, and real lives, but is concerned not with our immediate reaction to 
cases but rather with our practical self-understanding- the sort of understanding 
we have of ourselves (and others) in our capacity as beings who have the capacity 
to judge (see also the appendix to this chapter). What does it mean to understand 
oneself as an agent, as someone who has reasons to judge that P or act in this way 
or another? When faced with examples like Juliet or any of the other examples, these 
are the sort of questions the Activist will be interested in. Juliet has the capacity to 
judge, and this is fundamental to our reactions (concerns) to the case. 
The Activist might say that it is Dispositionalism, not Activism, that fails to 
respect our intuitions (understood here as 'practical concerns'). If a "pragmatic 
metaphysics requires that there not always be a single best way of classifYing things, 
independent of our projects and interests" (Schwitzgebel unpublished manuscript), 
then we can see Activism, too, as offering a 'pragmatist' metaphysical account. For 
when it comes to intuitions/practical concerns, there's actually quite a lot to say in 
defence of Activism. Imagine Juliet told Dylan the Dispositionalist that she believes 
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all human beings are equal or something similar. Suppose Dylan were to respond 
by saying "No you don't''. This, the Activist might say, would also fly in the face of 
some of our 'intuitions' and important practical concerns. Dylan would be failing 
to treat her as a being who has the ability to form judgements and would thereby be 
disrespecting her. 
A good, though rather sad, illustration of the role of intuitions about what it 
means to believe something and to know that one does, is the 'Black Pete' debate in 
the Netherlands. In the Netherlands, there is an annual folk tradition, involving St. 
Nicholas, aimed at young children, in which a tall, old white man is accompanied 
by his helpers: blacked-up men with bright red lips, curly wigs and golden earrings, 
referred to as 'Black Petes'. A large part of the Dutch population does not want to 
change the tradition, but a growing number of people (and the UN) have urged the 
Netherlands to change the tradition because it is unethical- it reinforces negative 
stereotypes and impedes the struggle against racism. The annual Black Pete 
discussion has taken on rather grim proportions, though, and has resulted in a 
number of protests involving many arrests. People in the pro-Pete camp insist they 
have no racist beliefs, whereas those in the anti-camp claim that the people who are 
pro-Pete do have racist beliefs.'5 (This issue isn't nearly as simply or as clean-cut as I 
describe it, but this will have to do for now.) 
The discussion bears striking parallels to the Activist/Dispositionalist dispute 
about what beliefs are and what is required to know one's own beliefs. When pro-
Petes deny that they have racist beliefs, they do so by appealing to something like the 
Activist conception of belief. They sincerely judge, after all, that racism is bad and 
oughtto be dealtwith; what more is needed to believe something? The anti-Pete camp, 
on the other hand, seems to appeal to a broadly Dispositionalist notion ofbelief: you 
can saywhateveryou like, and give reasons against racism as much as you want, but at 
the end of the day it's a further question whether or not this amounts to having racist 
beliefs or not. The Black Pete tradition "accentuates the kind of implicit racism that 
25 As Catarina Dutilh Novaes observes in a blog on NewAPPS: "it seems pretty obvious that the association between 
being black, fun-oriented, not vecy bright and being a servant is not likely to fuster associations between being a 
black person and being a highly capable professional, for example. What effects will this have when these children 
grow up and become those in a position of power, e.g. in charge of hiring employees? There is the vecy palpable 
possibility that these associations established at an early age will influence negatively a person's perception of 
black people for the rest of their lives- if not explicitly, at least implicitly. This is indeed the likely negative effect of 
the tradition that worries me most: it establishes problematic associations at a very young age, which thus become 
deeply entrenched in people's minds. In other words, the Black Pete tradition accentuates the kind of implicit 
racism that we are all prone to, and as such is highly problematic- and racist" (Novaes 2013). 
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we are all prone to, and as such is highly problematic- and racist" (Novaes 2013). 
A possible reconstruction of what is going on (and, I think, what is going wrong) 
is that individuals in the pro-camp are denied self-knowledge about their professed 
anti-racist beliefs, which in turn induces in them a feeling of being wronged. This, 
in turn, by the look of things, causes the pro-Petes to take up a rather aggressive 
stance with respect to those who deny them self-knowledge. 
Now, when confronted with such scenarios, we might be tempted to ask "Who's 
got it right?". Arguably, Activists would have to say that the pro-Petes have got their 
metaphysics right. But Dispositionalists seem to be right to point out that this 
seems wrong, or in any case incomplete. Then again, Dispositionalists don't give 
a satisfactory answer either, given that they must, it appears, side with the anti-
Pete camp and deny anti-Petes' knowledge of what they believe. In other words, 
Dispositionalists have a hard time securing the principle of first-person authority 
-that we are not prepared or entitled to simply correct, ignore or overrule people's 
sincere self-ascriptions. 
But maybe both views are wrong. I agree with Schwitzgebel that there is a lot 
to say in defence of a pragmatist account of belief and other attitudes, but it's not 
obvious that this points (only) towards Dispositionalism, let alone towards a specific 
version ofDispositionalism, such as the sort that takes our "day-to-day choices and 
habits as more central than our judgements". Defending a metaphysical theory "on 
practical grounds" (cf. Schwitzgebel) does not have an unequivocal meaning. 
A third option is to deny that we can formulate a (more or less) determinate answer 
to the question of 'who's right' - the Dispositionalist or the Activist. Considering 
our intuitions and practical concerns about certain cases is a complex matter, if only 
becausetheverynotion of' intuition' can mean a myriad of things, and because theorists 
don't necessarily agree in this respect. As a result, it is not clear what conclusion(s) we 
can or should draw on the basis of certain cases. An account that could make room for 
both Activist and Dispositionalist concerns and that would deny that either of these 
views has the ultimate answer would arguably be a genuine liberal or pragmatic view. 
Maybe such a view is worth exploring- or maybe it isn't. As Schwitzgebel says, "The 
human mind is a complex, fuzzy-bordered thing, right at the center of our values." I 
absolutely agree. But I think this means that we should see both Dispositionalism and 
Activism as trying to articulate what these values are. 
Where does this leave us? The Activist's claim is that Juliet determinately believes 
all races are equal and has knowledge of her belief. This is implausible or absurd 
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only on a broadly Dispositionalist metaphysical view. Or, differently formulated, 
it's only implausible or absurd on the assumption that the metaphysics ofbeliefl 
mind is something that is determined at least in part by a specific conception of our 
everyday intuitions and practical concerns, namely, as something that is principally 
concerned with people's habits and (unreflective) behaviour. 
But now if we switch perspectives and try to see things from the Activist's 
perspective, then the Dispositionalist's epistemic claim that someone like Juliet does 
not know that she believes all races are equal is, in turn, absurd. After all, the Activist 
thinks that beliefs, not their effect, are exercises of rational agency, so how could 
Juliet fail to have the relevant belief? It's arguably even more absurd assuming, as we 
may imagine the Activist to do, that the metaphysics (of belief) is something that is 
not determined by ourimmediate and superficial intuitions about a number of cases. 
The Activist might not be happy with the notion of'intuitions' at all, and, given the 
Activist's Kantian roots, s/he may instead think that what matters is Juliet's practical 
self-understanding: how she understands herself as a being who has the capacity 
to judge. It's such practical self-understanding, and its (moral) implications, that 
matters most, not our intuitions (unless we understand 'intuitions' in terms of the 
notion of practical self-understanding). 
If it's true that Activists and Dispositionalists have different- incompatible -
views, then the discussion about whether we should prefer one over the other is 
starting to look a lot like a stalemate, and this appears to be bad news. However, I 
think the discussion is at the same time fruitful in terms of what it teaches us about 
what we should expect from theories of self-knowledge, as well as how different 
theories should be evaluated. First of all, Boyle has shown that we cannotjustassume 
or leave implicit our answers to the metaphysical question of what beliefs or other 
attitudes are when we are trying to answer the epistemic question of what is required 
in order to know them. The conclusion to draw is that the question of whether, for 
example, the Activist epistemic account of self-knowledge is true depends on one's 
prior (implicit or explicit) metaphysical account of what attitudes are. The latter 
account, may or may not depend on our 'intuitions' and/or 'practical concerns'. The 
content, relevance and the implications of what we consider out 'intuitions' and/ 
or 'practical concerns' to be is likely to depend on one's meta-metaphysical views, 
such as whether "questions of metaphysics really have answers" (Manley 2009, r) 
and whether these answers are "substantive or just a matter of how we use words" 
(ibid.) or what the best procedure is for arriving at these answers, for example an 
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appeal common sense, conceptual analysis, transcendental arguments. If an appeal 
to common sense is made, one might subsequently ask whose common sense we 
are trying to get at, that is, how we should determine what common sense even is. 
These are not impossible questions to answer, but they are important questions to 
consider when determining what mental states are. 26 
So, if it has achieved nothing else, I hope the discussion has shown where 
the attention should be in the philosophical debate on self-knowledge. It should 
not be on the different methods or procedures of self-knowledge but on (r) the 
metaphysical question of what attitudes/beliefs are and (2) the more fundamental 
meta-theoretical questions of what one takes the metaphysics relevant to self-
knowledge to be and how different metaphysical views can and should be assessed, 
if this is possible at all. 
Though there are some exceptions (Boyle and Schwitzgebel, for instance), 
metaphysics is not usually the topic of discussion in the self-knowledge debate, let 
alone the more abstract questions mentioned above. Hence, even ifi have not been 
able to give sufficient arguments against Activism or for Dispositionalism, it would 
seem that the above conclusion should still be worth something, because it shows 
where the action should be. 
10. Conclusion 
I ended the previous chapter with a dilemma: either the moderate rationalist 
must 'go holist' and concede that appealing to so-called 'normal circumstances' 
of deliberation is not an option, or s/he must retreat to radical atomism and deny 
that circumstances can stand in the way of someone's judgements constituting her 
attitudes. The main goal of this chapter was to consider a view that comes closest 
to denial of the relevance of circumstances, namely the view defended by Matthew 
Boyle, who claims that judging that P entails believing that P. In particular, the aim 
26 One's answers to meta-metaphysical questions (of how we should settle the question of whether we should prefer 
one metaphysics over another) may after all be influenced by one's meta-philosophical commitments. If that is 
possible, then answering the metaphysical question of what attitudes are may in the end even involve addressing 
certain meta-philosophical questions, e.g. what philosophy is, whether it can be defined, what philosophy is for, 
how it should be done, and so on ()oil 2or6). It's certainly not meant to be obvious that one's (implicit) answers to 
meta-philosophical questions are relevant to what one's preferred theory of self-knowledge is, but it's not ruled out 
that one's preferred answers to such questions can play a role. 
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was to examine how an Activist understands the relation between (knowledge 
of) one's judgements on the one hand and (knowledge of) one's beliefS on the 
other and how this view contrasts with and compares to the view according to 
which the existence of a potential gap between judgements and belief is possible. 
This exploration took the shape of assessing the relative merits of Activism and 
what I've referred to as moderate Dispositionalism, according to which even though 
believing that P requires being disposed to judge that P, judging that P does not 
necessarily amount to believing that P. I considered Boyle's main argument against 
moderate Dispositionalism, namely that it cannot satisfy the constraint that "I 
believe that Q because I believe that P", and concluded that it fails to be convincing, 
because the constraint was ambiguous between a psychological and an epistemic 
reading ofit But on either reading it isn't obvious that the moderate Dispositionalist 
fails to be able to meet it, or that s/he ought to meet it at all. 
Given that the moderate Dispositionalistview of the relation between judgements 
and beliefs did not appear to be false after all, this brought us to the question of what 
can be said in defence of Activism relative to moderate Dispositionalism. I attempted 
to answer this question by considering a number of examples in which an apparent 
gap exists between what someone judges and what she believes and asking what the 
Activist might say about them. I claimed that the 'no proper judgement' response 
was a no-go area, which left the flat-footed 'what gap?' response. By drawing on 
work by Lawlor and Schwitzgebel, I suggested that the 'what gap?' response leads 
to counter-intuitive results. However, I ended by pointing out that the question of 
whether our responses to or intuitions about the examples matter, and whether one 
even has these intuitions, is something that depends on much more fundamental 
issues, such as those having to do with one's general take on what 'metaphysics' 
(relevant to self-knowledge) is, as well as the more fundamental meta-philosophical 
question of how one should go about answering the metaphysical question. 
One important conclusion to draw from all of this is that what I've called 'radical 
atomism' arguably cannot be dismissed as easily, without argument, as I suggested in 
the introduction, for its dismissal is dependent on certain meta-theoretical assumptions. 
Another important conclusion is that these more fundamental discussions are fundamental 
to understanding the question of how we know our own minds, as well as to assessing the 
theories that have been developed that have aimed to answer this question. 
What's next? In this chapter and the previous one, I have been concerned with 
rationalism in so far as it offers a theory of how we come to know our own attitudes, 
and have argued that it falls short in this regard, at least the moderate version 
thereof. In the next chapter, I want to consider (yet another) take on rationalism, 
which is to understand it principally as a normative project that seeks to explain 
not self-knowledge in general, but non-alienated self-knowledge in particular. This 
leads me to consider the question of what (not) being alienated from your attitudes 
involves, and to assess rationalism in this light. 
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APPENDIX: 
A DispositionalistAccount of Self-Knowledge and an Activist 
Account of First-Person Authority 
I have assumed that Activists and Dispositionalists are interested in the same 
question: what attitudes are and how we acquire knowledge of them. This is not 
just an assumption I have made; it is an important assumption of those whose work 
I have discussed. Ferrero and Bortolotti, for instance, respond directly to Lawlor's 
argument against the rationalist/Activist view, which suggests they agree on the 
explanandum/question. Butit's possible that, despite appearances, Dispositionalists 
and Activists may have been talking at cross-purposes, and taking them as being 
interested in a different explanandum might be helpful, for it allows for a possible 
way of unifYing Activism and Dispositionalism. 
The idea would be as follows: Dispositionalists are discussing self-knowledge, 
whereas Activists are talking about first-person authority. First-person authority, as 
discussed in Chapter 2; is the idea that the subject is the 'authority' on what state 
she thinks (or says) she is in. Having first-person authority involves other people 
not being prepared, indeed not being entitled, to override, question or correct 
someone's sincere self-ascriptions. If this is how we understand the notion of 
first-person authority (c£ Bar-On 2004), then it seems the Activist has the best way 
of making sense of it: being granted first-person authority just is being considered 
to be a person with the capacity to judge. Therefore, to simply override, correct or 
ignore someone's sincere self-ascription might, on this line of thinking, amount to 
a specific form of disrespect, namely wronging someone in her capacity as a 'judger' 
and failing to recognize her as having the capacity to make up her mind. 
It's true that, typically, first-person authority is explained in terms of self-
knowledge (or even equated with self-knowledge): people's self-ascriptions are said 
to be authoritative because self-ascribers know their own attitudes, and so the two 
usually come together (see also Jongepier and Strijbos 2015). But this is not the 
only way of understanding the relation. One might instead say that one can have 
first-person authority without having self-knowledge. Even when someone's self-
ascription is false, and even if we know it is false, we might still not be entitled 
to deny first-person authority to her. In other words, first-person authority and 
self-knowledge do not necessarily come together; the former may require a non-
epistemic explanation. On this line of thinking one might, coherently, accept a 
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Dispositionalist account of what it means to believe (want, intend) something and 
insist that believing that P and knowing one believes that P requires more than 
judging that P, while adopting an Activist account of first-person authority that 
is grounded in people's capacity to judge. When someone says "I'm tired", "I am 
going to go to bed early" or "I believe I treat my (fe)male students as intellectually 
equal", such claims are authoritative- deserve our respect- whether or not they are 
true. Whether, on such a 'unified' account, either Activism or Dispositionalism is 
'more fundamental' depends on whether self-knowledge or the capacity to judge is 
more fundamental. 
Clearly, such a proposal is not without costs. The Dispositionalist will have to 
accept that his/her theory does not ipso facto amount to an explanation of first-
person authority. This is a cost because many theorists of self-knowledge have 
explained and justified their interests in self-knowledge in terms of it - maybe 
rightly so. We would need some other reason why having self-knowledge matters 
(on this topic, see esp. Cassaro 2014, chap. rs; Schwitzgebel, n.d.). The costs for 
the Activist are also clear: s/he hasn't given us an account of what s/he said she is 
giving an account of, namely how we know our own attitudes. But it's still possible 
for the Activist to argue that s/he has explained knowledge of our own conscious or 
'present beliefs' (see also footnote 7). However, the question of whether there are 
such things as conscious beliefs is not uncontroversial, and also, if that is the case, 
the rationalist view seems to be that 'by deliberating about some world-directed 
question and coming to a judgement, you thereby come to know your judgements'. 
This seems a rather trivial thesis to me. 
Needless to say, this is just a very rough sketch of how elements of Activism and 
Dispositionalism may be accommodated, and much more needs to be said about it. 








Failures of Autonomy 
1. Introduction 
In Chapter 5, I discussed the respective examples of the Angry Spouse and the 
Deferential Wife. The two were similar in so far as both followed the transparency 
procedure, i.e. made up their minds, and did so during a fit of anger, but they 
were also importantly dissimilar in so far as I described the Angry Wife as being 
autonomous, whereas the Deferential Wife, who believes that the proper role for 
a woman is to serve her family, was not. The question I want to address is how we 
should think about the capacity for making up one's mind in autonomy-undermining 
circumstances. 
In my discussion ofrationalism in the las tcouple ofchapters, I have been concerned 
with rationalism as a theory of self-knowledge and have taken 'transparency' as the 
procedure for acquiring such knowledge. Thus understood, my conclusion was that 
the moderate version of rationalism is unable to give us a satisfYing, non-arbitrary 
distinction between normal and abnormal circumstances of deliberation and that 
radical rationalism is only plausible on the (not uncontroversial) assumption that 
attitudes are not states, but activities that 'endure' or 'unfold'. 
However, as Moran puts it in the introduction to Authority and Estrangement, 
his goal is to place "the more familiar epistemological questions in the context 
of wider self-other asymmetries which, when they receive attention at all, are 
normally discussed outside the context of the issues concerning self-knowledge" 
(Moran 2oor, r). Arguably, though, Moran's critics, myself included, have ignored 
these "wider self-other asymmetries". For Moran explicitly claims that the non-
deliberative, i.e. 'theoretical', stance is also a route to self-knowledge. This means 
that making up your mind is not principally a claim about 'how we acquire self-
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knowledge'; rather, it's a claim about how we acquire aspec!fic sort of self-knowledge, 
namely 'autonomous' or 'non-alienated' self-knowledge.' His goal is not simply to 
say something about self-knowledge but to say something about the nature of the 
first-person perspective and what it means for that perspective to be autonomous 
or non-alienated. Moran describes 'transparency' not as a procedure but as a 
"normative demand" or "a normative requirement" (Moran 2001, xvi-xvii). 
Moran's critics have hence overlooked the rationalist's non-epistemic claims 
concerning these normative issues and focus almost exclusively on Moran's epistemic 
claims, in particular whether and how making up your mind is a way of acquiring 
self-knowledge and whether such self-knowledge is immediate, as Moran claims it 
is (see Chapter 4).' The rationalist might thus think that these critics have overlooked 
precisely what is essential about the rationalist view, namely the practical rather than 
the purely epistemic or psychological stocy it tells. This means that what appears to be 
central to the rationalist view may not have been systematically evaluated so far. 
I should say, though, that rationalists, like Moran, are themselves partly to blame 
for this situation. Although Moran explicitly positions his theory of self-knowledge 
in the context of normative concepts such as freedom, autonomy and alienation, 
he is largely silent on the question of what deliberation is, and is mostly concerned 
with arguing against introspectionist and interpretationistviews rather than against 
other theories of freedom, autonomy and alienation (except for Moran 2002). 
The goal of this chapter is therefore to reconstruct and evaluate rationalism as 
a distinctly practical/normative project. I do so by centring my discussion around 
concrete examples of deliberation and by situating Moran's account of rational agency 
in the theoretical landscape of theories of authenticity and autonomy. I address the 
question of what is needed for rationalism to be defended as a plausible practical/ 
normative theory, and aim to show that if we take rationalism to be a normative 
theocy of non-alienated self-knowledge, then, at present, it is underdeveloped. 
To show this, I compare the 'rationalist' take on alienation and autonomy to two 
general approaches towards autonomy, a 'procedural' and a 'relational' approach. 
If we understand rationalism along proceduralist lines, then it is susceptible to the 
same line of critique that proceduralist views are susceptible to, such as those put 
forward by relational and feminist theorists of autonomy. Or so I argue. 
For the moment, I'll use these notions (non-alienation vs autonomy) interchangeably- I return to this later. 
2 A notable exception is Alec Hinshelwood (2013), who discusses Moran's account in relation to the work of Harry 
Frankfurt and Michael Bratman. 
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The goal of this chapter is not so much to defend a specific account of autonomy (or 
rationalism) but rather to study the relation between self-knowledge and autonomy, 
which has not received much attention, at least not within the confines of the debate 
on self-knowledge (but see B. Roessler 2015; Christman 2005). Relational and 
feminist theories of personal autonomy are of particular interest because these focus 
specifically on the social and/or moral circumstances of agency and deliberation. 
Insights from discussions about autonomy provide a more sophisticated and 
realistic account of what it means to be an autonomous agent and what (some of) 
the preconditions are of'judgement' that is relevant to rationalism, but, I want to 
suggest, considering these discussions in other areas of philosophy also teaches us 
something about (the limits of) atomism about self-knowledge. 
The chapter is structured as follows. I start by explaining why Moran's project 
is a normative one in Section r, and suggest that some of its normative daims are 
often overlooked in the self-knowledge literature. This in turn raises the question 
of how the theory fares as a normative project, which the remainder of this chapter 
is concerned with. In Section 2, I introduce examples of making up one's mind in 
contexts of oppression and brainwashing and address the question of what we should 
say about such cases on the basis of a rationalist account of self-knowledge. Can you 
make up your own mind if you have no mind of your own? In Section 3, I consider 
a possible way for the rationalist to say that oppressed subjects do not have non-
alienated self-knowledge, and consider in more detail possible ways of understanding 
the elusive phrase 'having a mind of one's own'. In Section 4, I locate the rationalist 
account of 'rational autonomy' in the theoretical landscape of theories of personal 
autonomy more generally, and point out that on one interpretation, rationalism can be 
understood as a proceduralist account of autonomy. In Section 5, I turn to relational/ 
feminist approaches to autonomy, which provide an alternative way of looking at 
the examples, and the conclusions we should draw from them. In the final two 
sections, I explore the implications of the relational framework for thinking about 
self-knowledge and observe that the considerations regarding what is necessary for 
an agent to be autonomous cannot be translated directly to the question of what is 
necessary for an agent to have self-knowledge (Section 7.1). Instead, I suggest (7.2) 
that we should not (just) distinguish, as Moran does, between different routes to self-
knowledge, but that it may be helpful to talk about different types of self-knowledge 
-introspective, non-alienated and autonomous self-knowledge- and allow for a sort 
of pluralism that at present is absent in the self-knowledge debate. 
rg1. Cha.pter 7 
In the final section, I take a step back and abstract away from the details of rationalism 
in order to reflect on what we might learn about atomism and holism in light of the 
discussion on what is required for reasons and attitudes to be 'one's own' and what 
is required for a subject to know them. 
2. The deliberative account of self-knowledge as a normative project 
Let me begin with a brief recap. According to what Moran calls the 'transparency 
condition' of first-person statements of, for example, one's beliefs, one should treat 
the question of one's belief about Pas equivalent to the question of the truth ofP. 
This means that one defers answering the self-directed question "Do I believe that 
P?" and instead answers the world-directed question "Is it the case that P?" This 
second, world-directed question is, Moran claims, a deliberative question, issued 
from the first-person. 3 Answering world-directed questions in a transparent fashion 
requires that one take an active stance towards the subject matter by thinking about 
it and judging whether or not P is true, desirable, and so on. The basic idea is that 
by deliberating one comes to a judgement, and by making such a judgement, one 
constitutes one's beliefs. To obey the transparency condition, then, one must (r) 
raise a world-directed question, (2) deliberate, (3) come to a judgement and thereby 
constitute one's beliefs. One subsequently acquires knowledge of one's beliefs 
on the assumption that one is entitled to assume that the inward-directed and the 
outward-directed questions are linked in the right way. 
Critics of Moran's view rightly claim that "his concerns are plainly 
epistemological" (Cassam 2015a) in so far as Moran's account is after all a theory 
of self..knowled.9e. As such, it seems only fair that his rationalist view is assessed, 
and criticized, as a theory of self-knowledge. However, it's also plain that 
Moran's concerns are not exclusively epistemological. Many of Moran's critics take 
transparency to be a 'method' or 'procedure' -just as I have done in the previous 
chapters. But Moran himself never talks about transparency in this way in Authority 
3 Cf. "I address myself to the question of my state of mind in a deliberative spirit, deciding and declaring myself on the 
matter, and not confront the question as a purely psychological one about the beliefs of someone who happens also 
to be me" (Moran 2oor, 63). 
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and Estrangement, nor in more recent work. Instead, he talks about the 'transparency 
condition'. Whereas a procedure or method is something one can or should follow, it 
may be argued that a condition is something to be obeyed- it is rather more like a 
command or something one 'ought to do'. The latter is compatible with the fact that 
we don't do it regularly, or that it does not give an accurate psychological description 
of how we normally come to acquire self-knowledge.+ Moran is explicit about the 
fact that he is interested in "trying to do justice to a certain tension in our thinking 
about the possibilities of self-knowledge" and "the distinctiveness of the first-person 
perspective more generally" (Moran 2001, xxx). Conforming to transparency, Moran 
says, is a "normative demand" or "a normative requirement" (Moran 2001, xvi-xvii). 
But what are the normative claims, exactly? Transparency matters to 'rational 
.freedom' (e.g. 2001, 107, 138) and/or 'rational autonomy' (2001, 31, 117, 139), and the 
'practical' self-relation that Moran aims to describe has a "deeper relation to freedom 
or rationality than any other one (e.g., various modes of perception)" (Moran 2001, 
xxvi). He places his theory of self-knowledge in the context ofKantian and Sartrean 
discussions about agency: 
The basic point can be expressed in a loosely Kantian style, although the idea is 
hardly unique to Kant. The stance from which a person speaks with any special 
authority about his belief or his action is not a stance of causal explanation but 
the stance of rational agency. In belief as in intentional action, the stance of the 
rational agent is the stance where reasons that justifY are at issue, and hence the 
stance from which one declares the authority of reason over one's belief and 
action. (Moran 2001, 127) 
The view Moran defends, he says, is one that "aligns, or even identifies, reflective 
consciousness with rational freedom" (Moran 2001, 138). He writes, 
the Sartrean and Kantian language ... is meant to convey [the] idea of different 
stances toward what is in some sense the same state of affairs, the same person. 
When I avow a belief, I am not treating it as just an empirical psychological fact 
4 As Boyle writes, "the importance of Moran's work is not primarily that it identifies a connection between doxastic 
self-knowledge and a special way of arriving at beliefs-by 'making up one's mind'-but that it shows how normal 
doxastic self-knowledge reflects something about what believing is" (Boyle 2onb, 23 5). On my reading of Moran, 
though, Moran's project is about what being an autonomous agent is. 
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about me; and to speak of a transcendental stance toward it is meant to register 
the fact that it is explicit in the avowal that it commits me to the facts beyond my 
psychological state; and as a commitment it is not something I am assailed by, 
but rather is mine to maintain or revoke. (Moran 2001, 8g)s 
Now, Moran makes what appears to me to be two distinct claims. One is about 
being unable to make up one's mind, which, for the sake of simplicity, I'll assume 
is the same as being unable to answer world-directed questions or to judge that P, 
that is, being unable to adopt a 'transcendental stance' and unable to 'conform to 
transparency'. Formulated positively, the claim is that making up one's mind is 
crucial to human agency.6 However, Moran seems to (want to) make a different, 
less general, claim, which is connected to his use of the concept of alienation. This 
second claim concerns being unable to make up one's mind Gudge, answer world-
directed questions, etc.) in specific cases. If one cannot answer the question of what 
one believes by directly reflecting on its content, if one cannot 'avow' one's attitude, 
then one is alienated from that attitude. 
These two claims are importantly different. After all, cats do not have the ability, 
or so I assume, to 'make up their minds' or adopt a transcendental stance, but it 
seems farfetched too think they are somehow alienated. For human beings, the 
capacity to make up our minds or to come to judgements about certain matters 
seems an inescapable aspect of our agency (even if it's not a capacity we exercise 
very often). It's possible to argue that this capacity to judge is itself somehow 
'valuable' (rather than inescapable), and one might argue that in that regard cats and 
cows somehow miss out on something. But this does not seem to be the sort of 
claim Moran wants to make. The claim is rather that human beings have the relevant 
5 This passage of Moran's, in particular the phrase that there are facts 'beyond' one's psychology, echoes the 
following passage by Christine Korsgaard: "When you deliberate, it is as if there were something over and above 
all your desires, something that is you, and that chooses which one to act on. The idea that you choose among your 
conflicting desires, rather than just waiting to see which one wins, suggests that you have reasons for or against 
acting on them. And it is these reasons, rather than the desires themselves, which are expressive of your will. 
The strength of a desire may be counted by you as a reason for acting on it; but this is different from its simply 
winning. This means that there is some principle or way of choosing that you regard as expressive of yourself, and 
that provides reasons that regulate your choices among your desires. To identifY with such a principle or way of 
choosing is to be 'a law to yourself,' and to be unified as such. This does not require that your agency be located in 
a separately existing entity or involve a deep metaphysical filet. Instead, it is a practical necessity imposed upon you 
by the nature of the deliberative standpoint" (Korsgaard 1989, cf. 2009, 36, see also 1996, 100). 
6 This is, roughly, what I've described in Chapter 4 as the 'transcendental' take on transparency, which I claimed is 
implausible for reasons I turn to below. 
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capacity and that not exercisin.g that capacity, with regard to one's attitudes, leads to 
alienation. For instance, discussing someone undergoing therapy, Moran writes, 
he person might be told of her feeling ofbetrayal, and she may not doubt this. 
But without her capacity to endorse or withhold endorsement from that attitude, 
and without the exercise of that capacity making a difference to what she feels, 
this information may as well be about some other person, or about the voices 
in her head. From within a purely attributional awareness of herself, she is no 
more in a position to speak for her feelings than she was before, for she admits no 
authority over them. (Moran 2001, 93 Moran's emphases) 
She is alienated because her feeling betrayed is, Moran says, "detached from her 
sense of the reasons" (Moran 2001, 93). If someone can only take a 'theoretical' or 
'empirical' stance on herself and is unable to learn ofher attitude by reflection on the 
content or object of that attitude, i.e. if she is does not conform to the transparency 
condition, then this leads to alienation. It is only by putting to use our capacity 
for practical reason, if we avow our own attitudes, that they are truly 'our own' in 
Moran's sense. Conforming to the transparency condition is a way of avoiding 
alienation, or, more positively, a way of having authorship over one's own attitudes. 
Moran mentions akrasia and self-deception as examples of where there is "the clash 
between these two perspectives on oneself" and where there is "a split between an 
attitude I have reason to attribute to myself, and what attitude my reflection on my 
situation brings me to endorse or identifY with" (Moran 2001, 67). 
Crucially, Moran explicitly claims that the theoretical or alienated route to self.. 
knowledge is also a route to self-knowledge. This means that making up your mind is 
not, principally, a claim about 'how we acquire self.. knowledge'; rather, it's a claim about 
how we acquire a specific sort of self-knowledge, namely non-alienated self-knowledge. 
Making up one's mind (avowing) versus theorizing about one's mind (attribution) are, 
he says, "seen as different routes to knowledge of the same thing" (Moran 2001, xvili; 8g). 
The language of alienation brings out the fact that although alienated self-knowledge is 
also self-knowledge, it's not the right or proper way of gaining self-knowledge. Moran's 
project, therefore, is importantly normative, as is evident from Moran's claims that 
there's something "wrong" with the person who can only rely on behavioural evidence 
to report on his mental states (Moran 2001, 68) and that transparency matters to the 
psychological or psychological health of the person (Moran 2001, e.g. 107-108, q6-137). 
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The language of alienation and ownership that is central to Moran's work does 
not normally play a role in the self-knowledge debate. Instead, we find discussions 
about alienation, identification and ownership most notably in discussions about 
(personal) autonomy and/or authenticity (Christman and Anderson 2005; Oshana 
2006; J. S. Taylor 2005). There are many (important) distinctions to be drawn, 
e.g. between personal and moral autonomy, local and global autonomy or indeed 
between autonomy and authenticity. Some of these distinctions will become relevant 
later on/ For the moment, though, we can take the notion of autonomy to follow 
Christman and Anderson's definition and can 
finds its core meaning in the idea of being one's own person, directed by 
considerations, desires, conditions, and characteristics that are not simply 
imposed externally on one, but are part of what can somehow be considered 
one's authentic self. (Christman and Anderson 2005, 3) 
A common view is to think of authenticity as a requirement for autonomy (or to 
equate these notions) and to define authenticity in terms of non-alienation (see e.g. 
Christman 2009; B. Roessler 2015; Noggle 2oo8). As Robert Noggle writes, 
The adjective "authentic" is commonly applied to elements of the person's 
psychology that are part of or produced by this true or real self. Thus, to say 
that an impulse is not authentic is to say that it does not lie within that part of a 
person's psychology that must be in charge if she is to be genuinely autonomous 
(or that must be the source of her actions if they are to count as autonomous). 
(Noggle 2008, 88) 
7 The personal!moral distinction is controversial, and (sometimes) leads to greater confusion. Though let me say 
here that personal autonomy is often understood as something that is centrally concerned with knowing which 
maxims, principles, intentions, projects, roles, desires, and so on are 'truly my own', and hence is often connected 
to notions such as 'alienation' or 'externality'. As Jeremy Waldron writes, personal autonomy "evokes the image of 
a person in charge ofhis life, not just following his desires but choosing which of his desires to follow" (Waldron 
2005, 307). Or as Marlyn Friedman describes it, personal autonomy is "largely a term of philosophic art, yet it 
encompasses an array of notions familiar to ordinary people, notions such as being 'true to myself,' doing it 'my 
way,' standing up for 'what! believe,' thinking 'for myself,' and, in gender-egalitarian reformulation, being one's 
'own person."' (Friedman 2003, 3). Moral autonomy, on the other hand, at least on a (broadly) Kantian conception, 
has to do with which maxims can be adopted universally. Personal autonomy is, in a sense, primarily about how 
the individual relates to herself and her life, whereas moral autonomy is concerned with acting in a way that can 
be recommended to others or offering reasons that others could likewise adopt as principles of action (cf. O'Neill 
2000, 25). 
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One reading of Moran's view, then, is to see his rationalist view of self-knowledge as an 
articulation of the authenticity component, i.e. as providing a criterion of non-alienation. 
Though Moran usually only talks about "rational autonomy" in his work on 
self-knowledge, he has suggested that his account can be applied to debates about 
autonomy, authenticity, alienation and ownership more generally. Though a great 
number of philosophers have engaged with the question of what it means for 
reasons or actions to be one's own, to which I turn later, in his central work, Moran 
does not engage much with this literature. When he does engage with contemporary 
discussions regarding authenticity, ownership and identification, which he only 
does once, Moran (2002) argues that his account of making up one's mind answers 
the question of what makes an attitude one's own. So one's 'own' reasons are 
just the reasons that one draws on to answer world-directed questions (in earlier 
terminology, just those reasons that meet the Anscombean Constraint). In his paper 
on the work ofHarry Frankfurt, for instance, Moran writes that 
our concern with autonomy, both inside and outside of the study of philosophy, 
is not restricted to a concern with what we can be held responsible for, or how 
we may be proper subjects of praise and blame .... [T]he value of autonomy is 
broader than the requirements of moral evaluation, and is intimately connected 
with seeing oneself as living a life at all, rather than simply as a thing with a 
particular career through time. (Moran 2002, r8g) 
He adds that the latter brings with it "the distinction between what is 'one's own' and 
what is experienced as other or alien" and that "it is only with respect to something 
with a quite particular kind of unity that we can speak of either identification or 
alienation" (Moran 2002, r8g). 
What I propose to do, then, is to take Moran's rationalism as a theory of non-
alienated or autonomous self-knowledge and to ask whether it's plausible in that 
respect. On the rationalist view thus understood, what you need to do to make an 
attitude 'yours'- so that you are not alienated with respect to it- is to 'conform to 
the transparency condition'. Moran is not explicit about whether 'conforming to 
transparency' is a necessary condition for non-alienated self-knowledge or whether 
it is also meant to be sufficient. Moran does not mention any other conditions that 
would have to be in place over and above (being able to) meeting the transparency 
condition, or whether there are any preconditions for being able to make up one's 
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mind, but this might just be because the target he is arguingagainstis introspectionist 
accounts. My strategy will be to assume, for the sake of the argument, that obeying 
the transparency procedure is sufficient for non-alienated self-knowledge, and I will 
consider what the implications of this are. 
In the subsequent section, I turn to three examples in order to examine the idea 
that the circumstances of deliberation are irrelevant and that transparent question-
settling is sufficient for non-alienated self-knowledge. 
3· Deliberation in oppressive circumstances: three cases 
The first example of the Deferential Wife should be familiar from Chapter 5: 
The Diferential Wife: She buys the clothes he prefers, invites the guests he wants 
to entertain, and makes love whenever he is in the mood. She willingly moves 
to a new city in order for him to have a more attractive job, counting her own 
friendships and geographical preferences insignificant by comparison ... She 
does not simply defer to her husband in certain spheres as a trade-off for his 
deference in other spheres. On the contrary, she tends not to form her own 
interests, values, and ideals, and when she does, she counts them as less 
important than her husband's. She readily responds to appeals from Women's 
Liberation that she agrees that women are mentally and physically equal, if not 
superior, to men. She just believes that the proper role for a woman is to serve 
her family. As a matter of fact, much ofher happiness derives from her belief that 
she fulfils this role very well. No one is trampling on her right, she says; for she is 
quite glad, and proud, to serve her husband as she does. (Hill 1991, 5; Westlund 
2003, 485) 
As Thomas Hill stresses, a woman does not have to be servile when she works to 
make her husband happy; she might "freely and knowingly choose to do so from 
love" (Hill rggr, 6). But the Deferential Wife is different. As Hill points out, the 
Deferential Wife is confused about herself: she believes she has a duty to defer to 
her husband but "she cannot fully understand that she has a right not to defer to 
him" (Hill 1991, ro), the latter ofwhich "betrays a certain kind of self-respect" 
(Hill rggr, 6). 
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Though the example of the Deferential Wife raises many questions, I want to address 
a specific question: does the Deferential Wife have non·alienated knowledge 
of her attitudes? To answer this question, we need to ask whether she is able to 
deliberate over world-directed questions and come to a judgement. This, it seems, 
is something she is able to do (after all, there merely has to be "logical room" for her 
to do so.) So we can imagine that the Deferential Wife is able to consider a world· 
directed question such as "Is moving to X a good idea?". Given that she considers 
her own values and interests as less important than her husband's, she ignores her 
own prudential reasons and answers the world·directed question by considering her 
husband's reasons or by imagining what his reasons would be. She comes to the 
judgement that yes, moving to X is a good idea, and settles her attitudes accordingly. 
Thus, if we apply the rationalist account to the Deferential Wife's case, it seems the 
conclusion is pretty straightforward: she constitutes her attitudes by answering a 
world·directed question and acquires non-alienated self-knowledge in the process. 
Second, consider the case ofPatty Hearst, as discussed in Kathleen Taylor's book 
Brainwash in.!): 
Patty Hearst: On 4 February 1974, Patricia Hearst, heiress and granddaughter of 
the powerful US media magnate William Randolph Hearst, was kidnapped by an 
organization calling itself the Symbionese Liberation Army (SLA). She was kept 
bound and blindfolded in a closet for several weeks, physically assaulted, forced 
to have sex with SLA members, and threatened with death. Meanwhile the SLA 
demanded a ransom from the Hearst Corporation, including not only requests 
for money but for a food give·away worth millions of dollars and the release of 
two SLA members jailed for murder. 
On 14 April of the same year Patty Hearst caused a sensation by participating in 
the SLA robbery of a bank in San Francisco, after which she publicly denounced 
her family and expressed her commitment to the SLA. (K. Taylor 2006, ro-r3) 
In order for Patty to know in a non-alienated way whether she believes, for example, 
that the SLA is an admirable organization or that her family is despicable, she has 
to answer the corresponding world-directed question "Is the SLA an admirable 
organization?" (or "Is my family despicable?"). Patty, we can imagine, considers the 
reasons, deliberates, weighs pros and cons and finally issues a verdict (a judgement): 
yes, the SLA is an admirable cause. So we can suppose that Patty thereby makes 
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up her mind and constitutes her attitudes. And so the rationalist view would say 
that Patty has made up her own mind and must have acquired non-alienated self-
knowledge. She knows what she believes and what she wants, and these desires and 
beliefs are genuinely her own. 
Third, consider Marina Oshana's (2003, 2006) example of the Taliban Woman: 
The Taliban Woman: Some persons may deliberately forge lives in which 
autonomy is absent, though they possess the capacity and the freedom to do 
otherwise. Consider the situation of a woman living under a Taliban regime 
such as that which controlled Afghanistan until2oor. Suppose that this woman 
has embraced the role of subservience and the abdication of independence 
that it demands, out of reverence, a sense of purpose, and an earnest belief in 
the sanctity of this role as espoused in certain passages of the Qu'ran. Having 
previously enjoyed a successful career as a physician, this woman has since 
chosen, under conditions free of whatever factors might disable self-awareness, 
and with a considered appreciation of the implications of her decision, a life 
of utter dependence. She can no longer practice medicine (indeed, she is no 
longer permitted access to information about the science of medicine). She is 
not permitted to support herself financially. She has no voice in the manner and 
duration of any schooling that her children, particularly her daughters, may 
receive. She must remain costumed in cumbersome garb-a burqa-when in 
public. She is forbidden to enter common places of worship. She knows that 
any transgression, any show of independence counts as heretical defiance and 
invites punishment both swift and harsh. But a life of subservience is consistent 
with the Taliban woman's spiritual and social values, provides her with a sense 
of worth, and satisfies her notion of well-being. (Oshana 2003, 104) 
It appears that the conclusion we have to draw about whether or not the Taliban 
Woman has non-alienated self-knowledge is the same as in Patty's case. The Tali ban 
Woman can raise a world-directed question, deliberate over it, come to a judgement 
and thereby constitute her beliefs. Everything points towards the fact that, on the 
basis of Moran's account, we should conclude that the Taliban Woman, too, has 
what it takes to know her own mind in a non-alienated way. 
But despite the ease with which we can make sense of the examples by applying 
the deliberative account to them, it seems the result is somewhat unsatisfYing. 
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It overlooks what seems to be central to the examples, namely the coercive or 
oppressive circumstances in which the Deferential Wife, Patty and the Taliban 
Woman deliberated and answered world-directed questions. Consider, for instance, 
the following dictionary definition ofbrainwashing: 
The systematic and often forcible elimination from a person's mind of more 
established ideas, especially political ones, so that another set ofideas may take 
their place; this process regarded as the kind of coercive conversion practised by 
certain totalitarian states on political dissidents. (K. Taylor 2oo6, 3) 
To brainwash someone is to "change a mind radically so that its owner becomes a 
living puppet-a human robot-without the atrocity being visible from the outside. 
The aiin is to create a mechanism in flesh and blood, with new beliefs and new 
thought processes inserted into a captive body" (Hunter 1956; inK. Taylor 2oo6). 
If Patty's agency is severely limited or infringed upon- if she has become a 'living 
puppet' - then should we really say that in Patty's case the preconditions for what is 
required in order to have the capacity to judge and/or that she is able to 'make up her 
own mind' through transparently answering the questions of whether Pis true, Q is 
desirable, and so on, are satisfied? 
This would seem to be a rather simplistic way of understanding what's going 
on in these cases. If conforming to transparency is sufficient for non-alienated self-
knowledge, then the circumstances in which deliberation takes place appears to be 
irrelevant, unless these women have not truly made up their minds, which appears 
to be a rather patronizing thing to say. But it is hard to overlook the fact that the 
answers that these subjects in the examples give to the world-directed questions 
are mere echoes of something else: the Deferential Wife echoes her husband, Patty 
echoes the SLA and the Taliban Woman echoes the oppressive cultural-religious 
norms around her. Can they really be said to know their own minds if, in some 
sense, they appear to have no mind of their own? 
This is not meant to be a rhetorical question. The point here is certainly not that 
it should be obvious that the two women don't have non-alienated self-knowledge. 
The point is merely that it also does not appear to be obvious that they do, either. My 
point is that either the way in which Moran defines alienation, in terms of adopting a 
deliberative stance versus adopting a theoretical/empirical stance to one's attitudes, 
is unsatisfYing or their having non-alienated self-knowledge does not seem to be the 
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most important thing to say about such cases, and so Moran's account is too limited 
to deal with them. 
It's surprising that the deliberative account, which is so intimately connected 
to notions of freedom and autonomy, seems committed to treating the above three 
examples in the same way that it treats the example of, for example, knowing 
whether one believes a third world war is coming (Moran 2001, 61ff) or knowing 
that one believes it's raining (Moran 2001, 7off). This is not to say that rationalism is 
committed to the conclusion that these women have non-alienated self-knowledge. 
But the rationalist view, in its current form, does not seem to have the materials to 
handle cases like those above in a satisfactory manner, i.e. in a way that respects their 
subtleties and intricacies, because it fails to differentiate between self-knowledge as 
it occurs in non-oppressive circumstances of deliberation and self-knowledge as it 
occurs in oppressive circumstances of deliberation. In its current form, rationalism 
appears to treat knowledge of one's belief that it's raining in the same way that it 
treats knowledge of one's desire to wear a burqa or the desire to remain faithful 
to those who kidnapped you. 8 This does not mean that rationalism is false, but it 
does mean that Moran does not, at present, have the resources to deal with cases 
like those considered and that more needs to be said about what it means to have 
autonomous or non-alienated self-knowledge. 
In the next section, I consider whether rationalism, as presently understood, 
may be able to say that the women in the examples are alienated after all, and reflect 
more generally on the question of how we might understand the notion of having 
reasons, attitudes or a mind of one's own. 
8 This is symptomatic not just ofMoran's theory of self-knowledge but also, it seems, of most if notal! contemporary 
theories of self-knowledge. I have chosen to focus on Moran's account, though, because his account at least 
engages with notions of alienation and the broader Sartrean/Kantian tradition of thought that identifies "refiective 
consciousness with rational freedom" (Moran 2001, 138). 
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4· Having a mind of one's own 
As we've seen, Moran contrasts the first-personal, deliberative standpoint of making 
up one's mind with the theoretical, third-person standpoint of simply attributing 
states to oneself. He contrasts the stance of'avowal' with the stance of theoretical 
'attribution', and writes that "attributional self-knowledge ... is the expression of an 
essentially third-personal stance toward oneself'' (Moran 2001, 106). The only way, it 
seems, for the rationalist to say that these women are somehow alienated from their 
attitudes or that there is something not quite right, epistemically, in the above cases, 
would be to say that their route to self-knowledge is 'theoretical', not practical or 
deliberative. This comes down to the claim that they are not really 'avowing' their 
attitudes and, for example, that Patty takes a third-person perspective on herself. 
Maybe this option should not be dismissed too readily. After all, it appears, 
for example, that Patty was not answering the question "What should I believe/ 
desire?" by answering the corresponding world-directed question. Instead, she 
was answering the question of what she believes by answering the corresponding 
question "What does the SIA believe/desire?". And so she does not, the rationalist 
might argue, properly make up her own mind, because she does not treat herself as 
an agent- she is, by deferring to the SLA, adopting a third-person perspective on 
herself. Understanding the cases ofpatty, the Taliban Woman and the Deferential 
Wife as examples of taking a theoretical or attributional stance, would allow the 
rationalist to resist the simplistic conclusion that they have non-alienated self-
knowledge. 
This strategy does not seem very plausible, though. It does not seem as if, for 
example, Patty's route to self-knowledge is theoretical or attributional in Moran's 
sense. Attributional self-knowledge involves ascribing an attitude to oneself on the 
basis of psychological or other sorts of evidence, and is contrasted with expressing 
or avowing one's mind. But it's not as if their self-ascriptions take place in the 
context of a psychological experiment or psychotherapy. The non-alienated first-
person perspective is one that "involves no essential reference to oneself at all" 
(Moran 2001, xvi), and the third-person perspective on oneselfis defined in terms of 
a perspective thatdoesn'tlook through one's attitudes but at them. Adopting a third-
person perspective is giving "a description of the person who happens to be myself" 
(Moran 2001, 160 emphases added). But it's implausible to think, for example, that 
Patty considers herself in this way. The women in the examples are adopting a first-
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person perspective. They're looking 'through' their own attitudes directly onto the 
world, and are not taking a detached or distanced perspective onto themselves. We 
have no reason to think that the subjects in the examples are not really coming to a 
judgement regarding some world-directed subject matter or that they are avowing 
their own attitudes, unless 'judgement' and 'avowal' are technical terms.9 
Actually, the above line of reasoning presents a possible problem for the rationalist 
account. It seems that for the Taliban Woman or Patty to be able to get a better 
understanding of their own attitudes, it would be helpful if they were capable not only 
of adopting the deliberative stance and looking 'through' their attitudes (transparently) 
but also oflearning to look precisely at their attitudes, that is, of considering their 
beliefs and desires as psychological states. It would be good, in some sense of that 
term, ifPatty came to realize that what she believes and why she believes what she does 
was due to being brainwashed by the SLA, or if the Deferential Wife came to realize 
that some of her desires and values are the result of oppressive circumstances. Even 
though taking a critical distance towards the sources of one's attitudes is certainly no 
guarantee of well-being or (full) autonomy, it does seem helpful in at least some cases, 
perhaps especially those involving oppressive socialization. 
Such self-understanding, though, is not of a 'transparent' kind. It involves an 
understanding of the representational nature of one's states and so understanding 
oneself at least in part as a 'mere' psychological creature. It also involves placing these 
attitudes in a wider sociocultural context or "horizon of significance" (cf. C. Taylor 
rg8g) in which one finds oneself. The problem, clearly, is that adopting such a bird's-
eyeview of oneselfis incredibly difficult- notjustfor the women in the above examples, 
but for anyone. However, what is surprising is that the demandingness or difficulty 
of adopting such an opaque or non-transparent perspective on oneself would not be 
the central problem for the rationalist. According to Moran, adopting a distanced 
perspective or looking at oneself and one's attitudes rather than through them leads to 
alienation: "avowing one's belief is strictly incompatible with maintaining reference 
to oneself' (Moran 2oor, ro6). If, therefore, any of these women were to consider their 
attitudes as having oppressive sources, which they would not upon reflection endorse, 
then arguably this opaque stance of looking at one's attitudes would lead to more 
estrangement on the rationalist account, not less. 
9 The problem here is parallel to the discussion of avowal in Chapter 3, as well as to the discussion of the 'no proper 
judgement' response in Chapter 6. 
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The sense in which the Taliban Woman and the others arguably lack a mind of their 
own in some sense of that term does not seem to have much to do with the two 
perspectives that Moran describes- it seems to have to do, principally, with the fact 
that no other life and no other reasons were possible or imaginable to them. The 
issue is arguably not what makes reasons or attitudes 'one's own' in the sense of 
identification and/or alienation, but rather what makes reasons or attitudes one's 
own in the sense of not being subjected to the will of others. The relevant notion 
of 'autonomy' should not be defined in terms of features such as identification 
and/or alienation that are principally relevant to 'authenticity', including Moran's 
proposed deliberative approach, but in terms of what the preconditions are ofbeing 
a deliberative agent. The central questions are what these preconditions are and 
whether or not being a deliberative agent in Moran's sense is compatible with being, 
as the women seem to be, subject to the will of others. 
In this context, Michael Garnett (2013, 2014) presents an interesting distinction 
between two different ways of making sense of the idea ofbeing autonomous, or 
what it means to have reasons (attitudes) of 'one's own'. One is what he calls the 
'deep self'-view, according to which "[a]n agent is self-ruled just in case she is 
ruled by her deep self", that is, a person is autonomous when the 'self' is doing 
the 'ruling'. In this view, Garnett includes not just the sort of views as defended 
by, for example, Harry Frankfurt (1971, 1988) but also Moran's account and those 
of others who identifY the real or deep self with one's capacity for practical reason 
(Garnett 2013, 23). Garnett argues that "even if we do have deep selves, this view 
does not represent a good way of thinking about self-rule" (Garnett 2013, 23). 
Instead, Garnett suggests that we should take the 'self' out of 'self-rule' and define 
autonomy negatively, or socially, in terms of being resistant to the will of others. 
Thus understood, the women in the examples arguably don't have a mind of their 
own, which in turn raises questions with respect to whether making up their minds 
would be self-knowledge conducive. 
These different approaches to 'autonomy' and how rationalism can be 
understood in light of them, require more careful discussion- this is whatl plan to 
do in the remainder of this chapter. Whether or not Garnett's proposed view is the 
right view, it seems that the rationalist is left with two options. Either s/he claims 
that the women in the examples and similar cases did not make up their own minds, 
because the reasons they used to answer world-directed questions were not 'their 
own' in a yet to be specified sense. This means we've got some explaining to do, 
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for such claims are presently no part of the rationalist account. Alternatively, the 
rationalist could say that they did make up their minds and so have non-alienated 
self-knowledge and are autonomous. If that is the case, though, we m4st accept that 
'making up one's mind' and knowing one's mind in the process is possible even in 
circumstances of oppression and/or brainwashing. 
The second option has a rather dominant position in the debate regarding 
personal autonomy. In the subsequent section, therefore, I discuss the second 
position in more detail by locating Moran's account in the theoretical landscape of 
discussions regarding personal autonomy. 
5· Procedural accounts of autonomy 
If 'making up your mind' is a sufficient condition for non-alienated self-knowledge, 
then rationalism would bear striking similarities to so-called 'proceduralist' views of 
autonomy, which define autonomy in terms ofinternal, reflective criteria. Proceduralism 
is arguably the conception of autonomy that lies at the heart of most modern varieties of 
liberalism and has been the dominant view in the literature on (personal) autonomy (e.g. 
Frankfurt rg88; Dworkin rg88). Natalie Stoljar describes the view thus: 
Procedural conceptions characterize autonomous agents-agents whose 
preferences and desires are genuinely their own-as those who critically reflect in 
the appropriate way to evaluate their preferences, motives, and desires. (Stoljar 2015) 
On the proceduralistview, personal autonomy depends "only on the structural and/ 
or historical character of a person's psychological states and dispositions, and on 
an agent's judgments about them" (Oshana rgg8, 83). To be autonomous means 
that one's attitudes or values are 'one's own' and that the answer to the question 
of what makes an attitude one's own lies in one's capacity for self-reflection or 
one's deliberative capacities. Marilyn Friedman, for instance, writes that "when an 
agent chooses or acts in accord with wants or desires that she has self-reflectively 
endorsed, then she is autonomous" (Friedman 2003, 5). Ronald Dworkin endorses 
a similar view of autonomy, which he suggests consists in "the capacity to raise 
the question whether I will identify with or reject the reasons for which I now act" 
(Dworkin rg88, 15). 
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An important element of proceduralist accounts is that they are 'content-neutral' or 
not 'substantive'. The content of someone's attitude- what she believes or wants- is 
"irrelevant to the issue of whether the person is autonomous with respect to those 
aspects oilier motivational structure and the actions that flow from them" (Mackenzie 
and Stoljar 2ooo, 13). Mackenzie and Stoljar go on to say that proceduralist views 
"implicitly assume that the content-neutral procedural conditions they identifY 
are both necessary and sufficient for autonomy", whereas so-called 'substantive' 
theories suggest that there are "further necessary conditions on autonomy that 
operate as constraints on the contents of the desires or preferences capable ofbeing 
held by autonomous agents" (Mackenzie and Stoljar 2ooo, 19). 
If we regard the rationalist view as an account that aims to answer the question 
of what non-alienation or authenticity consists in, we can say that it principally 
consists in a person's capacity to make up her mind, i.e. the capacity to conform 
to transparency. Autonomy, thus understood, consists in having the "capacity to 
endorse or withhold endorsement" from one's attitudes (Moran 2001, 93). The 
rationalist account could then be considered to be 'proceduralist' in the sense 
that it likewise proposes that deliberative capacities are central and does not add 
any substantive or content-based conditions to what's required to conform to the 
transparency condition. 
However, the rationalist account also differs in important ways from dominant 
proceduralist views of personal autonomy. Most procedural views of autonomy are 
hierarchical. In order to explain what makes an attitude truly one's own, proceduralists 
often distinguish between 'higher' attitudes, with which one identifies, and 'lower' 
attitudes, from which one feels alienated - an idea that is often associated with 
Harry Frankfurt's work (Frankfurt 1971, 1976). A famous example is Frankfurt's 
case of the unwilling addict, who is alienated from her alcoholic desires and so 
these aren't 'her own' , but this desire is still hers in some more minimal sense, or so 
hierarchical proceduralists are inclined to think. The appeal to hierarchies is evident 
in Friedman's account, for instance, when he says that 
to realize autonomy a person must first somehow reflect on her wants, desires, 
and so on and take up an evaluative stance with respect to them. She can endorse 
or identifY with them in some way or be wholeheartedly committed to them, or 
she can reject or repudiate them or be only halfheartedly committed to them. 
If she endorses or identifies with her wants and desires, she makes them more 
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truly hers, more genuinely a part of who she is, and thus, more a part of her very 
identity as a particular, distinctive self than are the wants and desires that she has 
not thus self-reflectively reaffirmed. When she chooses or acts in accord with 
wants or desires that she has self-reflectively endorsed, and her endorsement is 
somehow a part cause of her behavior, then, according to this familiar generic 
account, she is behaving autonomously. (Friedman 2003, 4-5) 
Self-reflection is central to hierarchical proceduralist accounts (only) because self-
reflection makes identification with one's attitudes possible. Self-reflection allows 
one to ask whether an attitude 'belongs' to oneself or not. 
Hierarchical accounts are known to face the problem of a regress of never-ending 
higher-order desires. Also, on proceduralistviews, the sort of questions that are central 
include, for example, "Do I (really) have the desire for X?" or "Does the intention to 
phi really belong to me?". To answer such questions, most hierarchical proceduralists 
cannot avoid (or explicitly adopt) a so-called 'dual model' of the self, according to which 
there is a 'shallow' and a 'deep' sense in which one's attitude can be attributed to oneself, 
the latter of which has likewise been taken to be problematic (see esp. Garnett 2015). 
The rationalist view, if we understand it as a proceduralist view of autonomy, 
is different, arguably, because it isn't hierarchical in this way. One might see the 
rationalist account of personal autonomy as trying to avoid the same problems 
that (some of) the hierarchical versions of the procedural view are said to face 
by defining autonomy in terms of the 'activity of reason' alone - this is Moran's 
explicit suggestion (Moran 2002, 214).'0 However, I don't want to linger on the 
10 The sort of questions that are central to the dominant proceduralist theories of personal autonomy ("Is the desire for 
X really mine?") are not practical or deliberative questions issued from the first-person but attributional, empirical or 
theoretical questions. On the rationalist view, a person's autonomy would not be a central matter of a person having 
certain pro-attitudes (second-order desires, etc.) towards her own attitudes. In fact, questions of this sort are arguably 
themselves self-alienating, because the very question of whether this or that attitude is one with which I do or do not 
identity only appears to be intelligible on the assumption that my attitude doesn't change depending on what I have reason 
to want or intend. Instead of answering the question of what my desires are by asking "Do I really want X?", the rationalist 
proposal might be that I ought instead to answer the world-directed question "Is X desirable?". !tis in virtue of the tact that 
the unwilling addict's deliberative effOrts (her transparent question-settling) don't change what she wants or reels that it is 
an attitude from which she is alienated. So on the rationalist account of personal autonomy, it may turn out, paradoxically, 
that most of the existing proceduralist views are founded on a fundamentally self-alienating standpoint, namely the 
standpoint from which one asks whether this or that attitude 'belongs' to one where such belonging is assumed to be 
answerable by asking attributive, not deliberative, questions. In this respect, then, the rationalist proceduralist account 
might be preferable to hierarchical views. I will not pursue this atgumentfurther, though, because I think there are reasons 
to think proceduralism in general is iniplausible unless an answer is provided to the question of what the preconditions 
are of the relevant reflective capacities in terms of which autonomy is defined. I discuss this below. 
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differences and possible (dis)advantages of the different proceduralist views, or on 
how the rationalist construal fares with respect to hierarchical ones. Instead, I want 
to return to the examples discussed earlier and observe that on the rationalist view 
construed along proceduralist lines, it follows that the Deferential Wife, Patty and 
the Taliban Woman do not just have non-alienated self-knowledge; they are also 
autonomous. If being autonomous just means having the capacity to make up one's 
mind, and assuming this is something they're able to do, then there's no reason to 
think that they would not be autonomous in the relevant sense. This would mean 
that if rationalism is a species of proceduralism, autonomy is compatible with being 
brainwashed and oppressed. As Stoljarwrites, "[O)n procedural accounts in general, 
there is no reason in principle why choosing subservience, or adopting oppressive 
norms, could not be autonomous" (Stoljar 2015). Dworkin, for instance, considers 
a person who "wants to conduct his or her life in accordance with the following: Do 
whatever my mother or my buddies or my leader or my priest tells me to do." Such a 
person, Dworkin claims, "counts, in my view, as autonomous" (Dworkin rg88, 21). 
As mentioned, the proceduralist view is more or less the standard view in 
discussions about autonomy, as well as in debates regarding liberalism, and not 
without reason. It has its benefits. The proceduralist conception of autonomy 
respects pluralism with regard to different conceptions of 'the good life'. Since 
proceduralists claim that what makes a person autonomous is not the content of 
her thoughts or choices but rather the 'form' it takes, such pluralism is easily taken 
on board. Also, it is able to accommodate the principle of first-person authority, 
that is, that the self-ascriptions of persons like the Tali ban Woman should be taken 
seriously (because they are true, on proceduralist views) even if their own desires 
do not encourage their own well-being (Friedman 2003, 146). This last idea is one 
that goes back at least to Mill, according to whom paternalistic interventions are 
prohibited even if they increase the person's well-being. 
However, in recent years , the proceduralist view has been challenged, in 
particular its individualist conception of the person. Many have argued that when 
asking what autonomy consists in, the capacity for self-reflection or, for that matter, 
the capacity to make up one's mind, cannot be the (whole) answer to the question of 
what it means to be autonomous. If rationalism is a species of proceduralism, then 
rationalism will face the same problems. I describe the alternative view of autonomy 
in the subsequent section. 
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6. Relational accounts of autonomy 
Relational and feminist theorists have been concerned with the 'atomistic' 
conception of autonomy, which conceives of persons as independent and self-
sufficient. n In particular, Rawlsian and Kantian notions of the self are "said to be 
'atomistic', that is, abstracted from the social relations in which actual agents are 
embedded" (Stoljar 2015). On a proceduralist view of autonomy, one's capacity for 
autonomy is enhanced the less others constrain one's actions. And so the goal, it 
seems, would be to create a society "allowing people to be as little dependent on 
others as possible" (Christman and Anderson 2005, 128). This conception of what it 
means to govern oneselfis criticized by many as being "excessively individualistic" 
(Benson 2005, n8). Feminist and communitarian theorists, in particular, have 
raised concerns of this kind. ' 2 Feminist philosophers, for instance, have argued that 
the idea that one can always shake oneself loose from one's history and societal 
ties has led to gross injustices. Personal autonomy, according to liberal feminism, 
depends on certain enabling conditions that are often overlooked (e.g. Oshana 
1998, 2006; Mackenzie 2oo8; Anderson and Honneth 2005; Mackenzie and Stoljar 
2ooo; Benson 1991, 2005; Baehr 2013). 
Though I think the view that (some) relational theorists argue against is a straw 
man, I think their positive claims are important. On my reading of the broader 
relational approach to autonomy, the main question is what are the preconditions 
of the sort of capacities that proceduralists claim are fundamental to autonomy? It 
is argued that proceduralist views of autonomy are atomistic in the sense that they 
do not consider what makes the capacities (second-order reflection, conforming 
to transparency, whatever it may be) possible in the first place. The capacity for 
reflection, or being able to deliberate over and answer world-directed questions, 
is not a solitary achievement, at least not in terms of the development of such a 
capacity. Spelling out what it means to be autonomous requires taking seriously the 
n The label is not mine but is used by relational/feminist theorists. 
12 Communitarians such as Alasdair Macinryre claim that one's history, family, city, nation, inheritance, and so 
on constitute "the given of my life, my moral standing point. This is in part what gives my life its own moral 
particularity." He goes on, "This thought is likely to appear alien and even surprising from the standpoint of 
modem individualism. From the standpoint of individualism I am what I myself choose to be. I can always, if I 
wish to, put in question what are taken to be the merely contingent social features of my existence" (Macintyre 
2007, 220). Macintyre thinks these features are not contingent at all: "the self has to find its moral identity in and 
through its membership in communities" (Macintyre 2007, 220). 
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various social, cultural and linguistic contexts that are necessary in order to develop 
the relevant capacities.'3 
These insights have proved to be the impetus for understanding autonomy itself 
in relational terms (e.g. Oshana 1998, 2oo6; Mackenzie and Stoljar 2ooo; Mackenzie 
2oo8; Anderson and Honneth 2005; Benson 1991, 2005). The concept of'relational 
autonomy' is not an entirely unambiguous concept. Perhaps in recognition of this 
fact, Catriona Mackenzie and Natalie Stoljar define the concept in their introduction 
to an edited volume as "an umbrella term" (2000, 4). They go on to say that the term 
is premised on the conviction that 
persons are socially embedded and that agents' identities are formed within 
the context of social relationships and shaped by a complex of intersecting 
social determinants, such as race, class, gender, and ethnicity. Thus the focus 
of relational approaches is to analyze the implications of the intersubjective 
and social dimensions of selfhood and identity for conceptions of individual 
autonomy and moral and political agency. (Mackenzie and Stoljar 2000, 4) 
There are weaker and stronger ways of understanding the 'relational' approach. On 
the above description, it is in principle possible for a proceduralist to take these 
concerns on board without abandoning the claim that autonomy can be defined 
in terms of certain reflective capacities. Even if a proceduralist failed to mention 
the social and cultural contexts that are required for an individual to develop the 
capacity for reflection at all, accommodating the above concerns is not something 
that is in principle incompatible with the proceduralist view. 
Some relational theorists, however, want to make a stronger claim that goes 
beyond claiming that the development of capacities for self-reflection or transparent 
deliberation has social roots. The stronger claim is that social circumstances do not 
merely facilitate a person's autonomy but form "an inherent part of what it means to 
be self-directed" (Oshana 2oo6, 49). The phrase 'inherent part' is, of course, still 
ambiguous. It might mean that autonomy itself is a relational concept, perhaps in 
the way that being a parent is a relational concept: you can't be a parent 'on your 
own'. This, to me, seems a rather strange conception of autonomy, which seems 
13 I think this can be accommodated on most (Rawlsian, Kantian) accounts. So the present point regarding the 
relevance of relational theories of autonomy can be taken as the claim that unless proceduralism provides us with 
an account of the preconditions of self-reflection/transparency, proceduralism is incomplete rather than false. 
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irreducibly first-personal. But in any case, the stronger conception regarding 
relational autonomy is that it's not just the development of autonomy that requires 
taking seriously all kinds of social circumstances; this is needed even once the 
capacity is in place. It's something that remains "vulnerable to disruptions in one's 
relationship to others", and so "full autonomy- the real and effective capacity to 
develop and pursue one's own conception of a worthwhile life - is only achievable 
under socially supportive conditions" (Anderson and Honneth 2005, 130). I am 
not concerned in what follows with whether or not this means autonomy itself is 
truly relational (in the way that, for example, being a parent is) or with whether 
autonomy itself is not relational but that its preconditions are (I refer to both 
views as 'relational' in what follows). The important difference is between those 
who think social contexts are merely causally necessary for the development of a 
capacity, including (some) proceduralists and those who think that you can fail to be 
autonomous depending on whether the socially supportive conditions are present 
or not. 
Crucially, if it's true that one's autonomy is vulnerable to disruptions in one's 
relationship to others, then it appears possible for someone to satisfY whatever 
the proceduralist condition for autonomy is (being able to form second-order 
desires or being able to make up one's mind) without being autonomous. In other 
words, relational theorists argue that procedural conditions may be necessary for 
autonomy, but they are not sufficient, and they criticize proceduralist views in this 
respect. From a relational theorist's perspective, the proceduralist has mistaken 
authenticity for autonomy: proceduralists take the answer to the question of what it 
means for someone not to be alienated from her own attitudes as at the same time 
providing an answer to the question of what autonomous agency consists of. On a 
relational but not a proceduralist account of autonomy, 
it is possible for two individuals to satisfY all the psychological and historical 
conditions we have been discussing, but to differ with respect to their status as 
autonomous beings-and this difference is to be explained in terms of some 
variance in their social circumstances. (Oshana 2006, 49) 
The relevant circumstances may include, for example, coercion, oppression, 
manipulation, hypnosis, racism, being silenced, and so on. 
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This brings us to the three examples discussed earlier. On the relational view, the 
Deferential Wife, Patty and the Taliban Woman are not autonomous, in spite of 
satisfYing the internal proceduralist criteria such as being capable of self-reflection 
or transparent deliberation. Oshana, from whom I've borrowed the example of the 
Taliban Woman, writes that 
the Taliban woman is not autonomous. In a "local" or occurrent sense of the 
term, she has chosen autonomously. Nevertheless, she fails to be autonomous in 
a "global" sense for the obvious reason that the life that she chooses, and toward 
which she experiences no alienation, is a life in which she is systematically 
subject to the ultimate will of others. (Oshana 2003, 104)'4 
Despite the fact that the Taliban Woman "lives in a manner consonant with her 
preferences, and succeeds in achieving what she believes is in her best interests 
[and] does what she wants, what she wants frustrates the exercise of autonomy" 
(Oshana 2003, ros). Apart from certain internal criteria, then, certain 'external' 
criteria have to be met in order for a person to be autonomous. Put differently, one 
might take Oshana's point to be that whatever constitutes authenticity does not 
always, or at least not necessarily, constitute autonomy: "the road to autonomy is 
not always the road to achieving one's aim" (ibid.). 
Onora O'Neill, coming from a different angle, writes that "there is no general 
reason to think that action which receives second-order endorsement [as the 
proceduralist claims) is autonomous"; indeed she states that notions of self-
identification, endorsement or second-orderedness more generally are "just too 
commonplace to guarantee any distinctive, ethically significant coherence or any 
sort ofindependence; it is not a likely basis for autonomy" (O'Neill2ooo, 36).'5 
The capacities that proceduralists have focused on are also essential on 
relational views, but rather than taking them for granted, they ask what makes these 
capacities possible in the first place, what sustains them and what can undermine 
them. Most relational theorists thus focus not on agents' capacity for self-reflection 
14 In my view, the local/global distinction is not usually very helpful and leads to (greater) confusion. But 'local' 
autonomy, as it is usually described, is what is required for choices, preferences or desires at particular rimts to count 
as autonomous, and is transient or autonomous with respect to a particular attirude or action, whereas global 
autonomy is meant to be a temporally extended condition. 
15 To which she adds that "none of this shows that second-orderedness is unimportant. Individuals bereft of all 
second-order preferences could hardly form coherent plans" (O'Neil12ooo, 36). 
:<.14 Chapter 7 
and deliberation as such but on the circumstances in which such deliberation takes 
place. This applies not just to the traditional proceduralist view but also to the 
rationalist view understood along proceduralist lines. Carla Bagnoli, for instance, 
writes, in her discussion of Moran's view, that we should realize that "the individual 
selfis formed through practices of social recognition" and that "the self's authority 
on itself cannot be understood independently of how it relates to other selves: they 
are instituted simultaneously and reciprocally limit their authority" (Bagnoli 2007).'6 
However, Moran's view understood as a normative project does not, I think, 
mean that it is necessarily flawed in the sense that it is committed to the view that 
making up one's mind is sufficient for being autonomous. It does not appear to 
be incoherent to say that making up one's mind is, for example, only expressive of 
autonomy provided that certain conditions, such as those specified by relational 
theorists, are also satisfied. '7 It does mean, however, that rationalism is, in its 
current form, incomplete. 
To end this section, I want to emphasize that there is a great diversity of relational 
views of autonomy and that I haven't been able to do justice to this diversity here. 
What all of them share, however, is the claim that deliberating over some subject 
matter is not sufficient for autonomy. What we need to do is address the question 
of what the (pre)conditions of such deliberative capacities are and to consider 
whether or not these conditions are met in specific cases. The question of what 
the preconditions of deliberation/autonomy are is not easy to answer. Minimally, 
it is plausible to think that autonomy requires things like food and clothing, health 
care, education, and so on. But, presumably, autonomy also requires (varieties of) 
r6 Bagnoli's proposal is "that we conceive the deliberative perspective as second-personal, rather than first-personal" 
because "[t]he practice of self-reflection is also fundamentally second-personal, the activity of a self addressing 
itself" (Bagnoli 2007, 49). IfBagnoli means that (the development of) the capacity for transparent deliberation 
that Moran discusses requires intersubjectivity/other people, then this seems right and something that can easily 
be taken on board by rationalists. If, however, the capacity itself is second-personal, then I am not entirely sure 
what she means, and I tend to agree with Moran when he responds to Bagnoli by saying, "It is one thing to claim 
that reasons must be public, the sort of thing that can be made intelligible to another person, shared or respected 
by another person, and this is an idea that has roots both in Kantian and post-Kantian philosophy, as well as in 
Wittgenstein. It is quite another thing, however, to claim that r{flection itself involves a second-person stance, a 
dialogue with a genuine other. For a second-person stance means a stance toward a separate freedom, a 'self-
originating source of claims' (Rawls), something calling upon me and demanding my respect. I do not stand in 
such a relation to my own attitudes or to myself" (Moran 2007, 75 emphases added). 
17 Alternatively, the rationalist could claim that one only really makes up one's mind provided certain (relational) 
conditions are met, but this is problematic for reasons discussed in the previous chapter regarding what I called 
the 'no proper judgement' response. 
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self-respect (cf. Anderson and Honneth 2005) and not being subject to the will of 
another (cf. Garnett 2014). Furthermore, it seems that being autonomous might 
mean different things to different people, depending on their needs and capacities. 
This, too, is something that relational, feminist and disability theorists have drawn 
attention to. 
If we ought not to confl.ate authenticity and autonomy, this leaves the question 
of what the implications are for how we should think about self-knowledge. This 
requires us to consider the relation between self-knowledge and autonomy. 
7. Implications for self-knowledge 
7.1 The simple vk..v 
Suppose we assume, regarding relational theorists, that for a person to be 
autonomous certain internal criteria must be met and certain external criteria 
(absence of oppression, etc.) must be met as well. According to what we might 
call the 'simple view' of the relation between autonomy and self-knowledge, a 
lack of autonomy and self-knowledge come and go together: a lack of autonomy 
implies a lack of self-knowledge. If that is the case, Patty, the Taliban Woman and 
the Deferential Wife simply don't know their own attitudes, because they're not 
autonomous. When the Taliban Woman, for instance, sincerely self-ascribes the 
desire to wear a burqa, she is mistaken, and we should not take her at her word. 
I think the simple view should not be accepted. If the Taliban Woman is not 
autonomous, then the simple view suggests that we might say that her self-ascribed 
desires do not reflect what she 'really' wants. If that's tnre, then one might wonder 
why doesn't she just go ahead and overrule her sincere self-ascriptions. She might 
say that she wants to wear a burqa, but 'deep down', she doesn' t. Isaiah Berlin (rg6g) 
famously warned against the political dangers of talking about true selves, and true 
and actual wishes and desires, and so on. On what he describes as the 'positive' 
conception ofliberty, the 'self' is 
identified with reason, with my "higher nature", with the self which calculates 
and aims at what will satisfY it in the long run, with my "real", or "ideal", or 
"autonomous" self, or with my self"at its best"; which is then contrasted with 
irrational impulse, uncontrolled desires, my "lower" nature, the pursuit of 
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immediate pleasures, my "empirical" or "heteronomous" self, swept by every 
gust of desire and passion, needing to be rigidly disciplined if it is ever to rise to 
the full height of its "real" nature. (Berlin 1969, 131) 
We should, Berlin argues, be wary ofjust going against people's sincere judgements 
about what they want or believe and attributing 'false consciousness' to them. Doing 
so, Berlin argues, has been at the heart of many oppressive and fascist regimes.'8 If 
we say that people are not true to their 'real selves', then we are 
in a position to ignore the actual wishes of men or societies, to bully, oppress, 
torture them in the name, and on behalf, of their 'real' selves, in the secure 
knowledge that whatever is the true goal of man ... [it] must be identical with 
... the free choice of his "true", albeit often submerged and inarticulate, self. 
(Berlin 1969, 133)'9 
However, one might also say that just because the 'real self' reasoning has been at 
the heart of oppressive and fascist regimes, as Berlin points out, doesn't mean 'real 
self' talk isn't useful or indeed true. It seems that self-knowledge is an interesting 
topic outside philosophy, precisely because we do distinguish between what's on 
the surface and what lies beneath. It appears to be part of commonsense to think 
that sometimes you might have a kind of self-knowledge, but it's not the real deal 
- it's not knowledge of your real or actual desires, preferences or beliefs. The 
psychological literature on self-knowledge is all about knowledge of your 'true self' 
(cf. Timothy D. Wilson 2002). Also, the concept of authenticity and the idea that one 
might have or lack a real self plays a central role in for example psychiatric contexts 
and in discussions regarding deep brain stimulation (see, for example, Nyholm and 
O'Neill 2016). But if Berlin is right, then perhaps we had better not talk about real 
selves in these and other contexts. 
18 This ties in with the literature on the (Marxist) notion of 'false consciousness' (e.g. Cudd 1994; Heath 2005; 
McGlynn 2o16b). 
19 Cf. "It is one thing to say that! may be coerced for my own good, which I am too blind to see: this may, on occasion, 
be for my benefit; indeed it may enlarge the scope of my liberty. It is another to say that if it is my good, then I am 
not being coerced, for I have willed it, whether I know this or not, and am free (or 'truly' free) even while my poor 
earthly body and foolish mind bitterly reject it, and struggle with the greatest desperation against those who seek, 
however benevolently, to impose it" (Berlin 1969, 133). 
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Much has been written in response to Berlin's claims, and I do not have the ambition 
to add anything of substance to that literature here. However, even if one is not 
convinced by Berlin's argument and thinks 'real self' talk is not so problematic after 
all, there are still other reasons to think the simple view is false. These reasons have 
to do with the notion of'first-person authority'. First-person authority, as explained 
in Chapter 2, is the idea that the subject is the (only) 'authority' on what state she 
thinks (or says) she is in, which explains why we are not often prepared to question 
or correct other people's sincere self-ascriptions. 
The standard view in the literature is that first-person authority is explained in terms 
of self-knowledge: people's self-ascriptions are authoritative because self-ascribers 
know their own attitudes. It seems to follow that if people lack self-knowledge, they 
lack the authority to say what their attitudes are. But this doesn't explain that even if we 
have good reason to think someone's self-ascription is false, we still are not prepared 
to challenge or correct their self-ascription. It might, for instance, be apparent to Sally 
that Harry is disappointed or insecure about himself, but Harry himself thinks he's 
angry with his father. But this doesn't necessarily mean Harry therefore has no first-
person authority. If Harry were to sincerely say that he's angry with his father, Sally 
may not be immediately prepared to override his self-ascription and say "No you're 
not" or something along those lines. It's not unlikely that Harry would take offence if 
this was her reaction, and, we might think, rightly so. •o, ., 
The present suggestion is that not taking seriously or overruling someone's 
sincere self-ascriptions without an excuse is not just impolite or rude but involves a 
specific sort of disrespect. The idea is that a possible reason why we do not normally 
challenge or correct people's self-ascriptions, even when they are evidently false, 
is because taking someone's self-ascription seriously is part of what it means to 
respect her as a person. 22 Much more needs to be said about this interpretation 
20 Or suppose you say you don' t want to eat meat, and a neuroscientist tells you, on the basis of some brain scans, 
that in fact you react very positively to meat and that you're a carnivore without realizing that you are- a suggestion 
made in a recent Dutch documentary ('Ben Kijkje in de Hersenen van Marijn Frank'). Again, it would seem that a 
complete denial of someone's sincere self-ascription is undesirable . 
.:u There are (many) different reasons for not challenging people's self-ascriptions Some philosophers think that we 
have such authority 'bydefault' and that "in the absence of good reason to the contrary, one must accord correctness 
to what a subject is willing to avow, and limit one's ascriptions to her to those she is willing to avow• (Wrightigg8, 
41). Expressivists, as we've seen, think that first-person authority is due to the fact that self-ascriptions are not 
reports but expressions. 
2 2 See also the appendix to the previous chapter and Strijbos and Jongepier (forthcoming) for a discussion of the 
principle of first-person authority in the context of psychotherapy. 
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of the principle of first-person authority and its relation to self-knowledge. For 
now, though, the idea is simply this: lf we adopt the simple view and deny without 
hesitation that the Taliban Woman, Patty and the others lack self-knowledge, this 
may be in conflict with the principle of first-person authority, given that first-person 
authority is naturally explained in tmns of self-knowledge. In other words, if they 
lack self-knowledge, then we would need some other explanation of why we are not 
entitled to overrule or challenge their self-ascriptions and why we are not entitled to 
just overrule them, even if we know they are false. •3 
What's wrong with the simple view, I want to suggest, is that it doesn't distinguish 
between different types of self-knowledge. It's acknowledged that it's possible to 
distinguish between different objects of self-knowledge, e.g. knowledge of your 
sensations versus knowledge of your attitudes. But this does not help to get a more 
nuanced perspective on the Tali ban Woman and the other cases, because in all cases 
we're considering their attitudes. As we've also seen, Moran further suggests that 
23 As suggested in the appendix to the previous chapter, maybe such a (non-epistemic) explanation can be provided, 
i.e. an explanation in which self-knowledge and first-person authority do not necessarily come (and go) together. 
On what I imagine might be a 'moral' approach to the notion of first-person authority, such authority would be 
described by understanding such authority as connected to, or being parasitic on, respect for human dignity. On 
the broadly Kantian line of thinking I have in mind, disrespecting someone's self-ascriptions may involve treating 
her merely as a thing, not as a person (cf. P. F. Strawson 1974; Langton 1992, 2009). IftheTaliban Woman expresses 
the desire to live a life of subservience, then the tact that she lacks self-knowledge, if indeed she does, should not 
be a reason to think that she also lacks first-person authority, i.e. is no reason to go ahead and correct, challenge or 
overrule her self-ascription. It seems to me that rationalism is best suited to explain such authority, for the Taliban 
Woman still has the capacity for coming to judgements, and arguably this provides the ground for the basic sort of 
respect for persons that I suggest is part of the notion of first-person authority. This would mean that rationalism 
offers the right theory of first-person authority but maybe not the right theory of self-knowledge. It would also 
mean that someone might Jack self-knowledge, but not first-person authority, in which case, maybe the simple 
view is somewhat less controversial. For instance, in his discussion of whether women working in the pornography 
industry or prostitution really know their own desires, Aidan McGlynn (2or6a, for related discussions about 
pornography see e.g. Bauer 2015 and Langton 2009) asks: "Isn't there a danger of denying the agency of a number 
of grown women, many of whom will even explicitly say that they enjoy their work? These are good questions, and 
they don't have easy answers." McGlynn I think rightly highlights that "such questions are not unique to the topic 
of pornography". He considers "the wearing of makeup, high heels, and uncomfortable underwear, or the desire 
to get married to a man, have children, and let one's husband be the main bread-winner• and asks to what extent 
these are "genuinely free choices that should be respected, and to what extent are they reflections of the facts that 
in parriarchal societies women are often rewarded for certain artitudes and behaviour and punished for others, and 
that women form their identities, attitudes, and behavioural patterns in a society seeped in patriarchal ideology, 
which they internalize to some extent?" I think these are questions that deserve our (philosophical) attention, and I 
also believe theorists of self-knowledge should at least be able to say something aboutwhatmakes these questions 
so difficult. After all, from a purely 'introspective' point of view, there seem to be no challenges to self-knowledge 
whatsoever. However, once we address the more difficult question of what makes a mental state (e.g. desire) one's 
own, things don't seem to be so easy. How could one have knowledge of a mental state that in some sense does not 
really belong to one? 
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there may be different 'routes' to self-knowledge (theoretical versus practical). But 
this doesn't help either, because we have no good reason to think that the Taliban 
Woman and the others were unable to make up their minds or that they are actually 
adopting a theoretical or empirical stance towards themselves. 
My suggestion is quite simple: instead of talking merely about different objects 
or routes to self-knowledge, we should also talk about different types of self-
knowledge. We can minimally distinguish between introspective self-knowledge, 
non-alienated self-knowledge and autonomous self-knowledge. I describe these 
types below, and define atomist/holist approaches in terms of them. 
7.2 A nuanced uiew: thru types qfself-knowledge 
Introspective self-knowledge is, simply, knowledge of one's current mental 
states, one's present judgements, conscious thoughts and words "running willy-
nilly" through one's head (Frankfurt rg88, 59). Introspective self-knowledge is 
prima facie easy: the Angry Spouse from previous chapters has introspective self-
knowledge; so do the Deferential Wife, Patty and the Taliban Woman. Even those 
who are hypnotized, drugged, tortured, and so on know what they are thinking 
here and now, as long as they are minimally conscious. The key question is how 
one thinks of the relation between occurrent thoughts and attitudes. Is knowing 
one's occurrent states (thoughts or judgements) sufficient for the latter? Or is the 
former merely an indication of the latter? I turn to these questions- and the relation to 
atomist and holist approaches to self-knowledge- in the next section. Here, I want 
to distinguish introspective self-knowledge from two other types of self-knowledge. 
Non-alienated self-knowledge is, to put it somewhat unhelpfully, 'knowledge of 
mental states from which one is not alienated'. What non-alienated self-knowledge 
is depends on what one takes 'alienation' to be. Non-alienation might mean that 
one positively identifies with one's true self, or that no "negative judgment about 
or a negative emotional reaction" to one's attitude is involved (Christman 2009, 
rss-s6). If that is the case, non-alienated self-knowledge involves the presence of 
second-order identification or the absence of negative judgements or feelings with 
respect to the self-ascribed attitude, as most proceduralists suggest. Alternatively, on 
a rationalist conception of the concept of alienation, non-alienated self-knowledge 
is to be defined in terms of the way in which one gains self-knowledge. One has 
non-alienated self-knowledge if and only if one answers the question concerning 
one's attitude by considering the reasons in favour ofbelieving/wanting/hoping for 
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P. In other words, if one conforms to the transparency procedure. These are (very) 
different ways of specifYing what non-alienation consists in, but both should be 
contrasted with what being autonomous consists in. 
We can add a third type of self-knowledge, which we can call 'autonomous self-
knowledge'. Again, what autonomous self-knowledge is will depend on what one 
takes 'autonomy' to be. Proceduralists think that autonomous self-knowledge just is 
non-alienated self-knowledge. But on the relational view that I've been discussing, 
given that autonomy is defined not Qust) in terms of non-alienation but in terms 
of certain extra or external conditions, a different type of self-knowledge emerges. 
On a broadly relational conception of autonomy, one would have autonomous self-
knowledge if, for example, the attitude in question is not, for instance, the result 
of being subjected to the will of another (cf. Oshana 2006, 62; Garnett 2014). On a 
relational view, whichever way we define it, autonomous self-knowledge and non-
alienated self-knowledge are different types of self-knowledge, and it differs from 
the proceduralistview in this respect. 
If we apply this threefold distinction to the examples discussed in this chapter, we 
should say that the Deferential Wife, Patty and Taliban Woman all have introspective 
self-knowledge. They also have non-alienated self-knowledge, construed in either 
of the above ways. The Taliban Woman, after all, lives a life that is "consistent with 
her spiritual and social values, provides her with a sense of worth, and satisfies her 
notion of well-being" and she "experiences no alienation" (Oshana 2006, 6o-6r). It 
seems this is no different for the other two women. They can either (a) identifY with 
their attitudes and/or be true to their real selves or (b) 'conform to transparency'. 
However, if the women in the examples are not autonomous, then they lack 
autonomous self-knowledge. This is not because there is a mental reality (real self, 
etc.) of which they are unaware or not faithful to but because the notion of having 
a mind of one's own requires the absence of coercive or oppressive circumstances; 
more generally, it requires that one isn't subject to the will of another, which in their 
case is arguably a condition that is unfulfilled. 
What this leaves us with, I think, is a more nuanced approach. The nuanced 
conclusion is thus that the Deferential Wife and the other women appear to have 
self-knowledge 'in some sense' but lack self-knowledge in another sense. This 
conclusion, and distinguishing between different types of self-knowledge more 
generally, is maybe not particularly exciting or controversial. Expressions like "She 
does not really know what she wants" or "He does not really believe that" illustrate, 
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I think, that the notion of self-knowledge is not homogenous at all. Perhaps in this 
respect the threefold distinction is trivial. 
However, it does not seem to be trivial if we consider the philosophical debate 
on self-knowledge. Philosophers have only recently begun to distinguish between 
different types of self-knowledge by recognizing that different objects of self-
knowledge may involve different ways of knowing them. Moran is an exception in 
this respect, for he at least recognizes that there may be 'good' (deliberative) and 
'bad' (alienated) cases of self-knowledge. I've suggested that on (one reading of) 
Moran's view, the way he defines the good from the bad types of self-knowledge is 
unsatisfactory. The rationalist only has one way of accounting for the way in which 
one might 'really' or 'not really' know one's own attitudes. For Moran, varieties of 
self-knowledge are defined in terms of two "different routes to knowledge of the 
same thing" (Moran 2001, 8g). So if we want to say, for example, that the Taliban 
Woman knows her own mind in one sense but does not know her own mind in 
another sense, the only way in which Moran can explain this would be if the Tali ban 
Woman were to know her attitude by interpreting evidence ofvarious kinds, i.e. 
by adopting a theoretical stance. But it seems clear that this is not what's going 
on. And so, as we've seen, the Taliban Woman 'has what it takes' in terms of self-
knowledge, at least on the rationalist account that's currently available. However, 
whether Moran's way of defining the good and the bad cases is ultimately the most 
plausible is a matter that is independent of the claim that there are good and bad 
cases. The topic of self-knowledge involves more than jus tasking how one acquires 
self-knowledge, for it also involves asking how one acquires which type of self-
knowledge and what makes some types of self-knowledge more important than 
others. So despite having been critical of Moran's view and the different versions 
thereof, there is an important insight that we owe to the rationalist, which is that 
the very question of self-knowledge is intimately connected to the question of what 
makes certain mental states yours and that the question of self-knowledge should be 
studied with this in mind. 
8. The metaphysical and epistemic sources of atomism 
In this final section, which is also the last section of this thesis, I want to take a step 
back and abstract away from the details of rationalism (or expressivism) to consider 
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the metaphysical and epistemic sources of atomism, for the idea of 'ownership' 
regarding one's mental states is not something that many philosophers in the self-
knowledge debate have been concerned with (though this certainly isn't true outside 
the debate). Maybe this does not mean anything, but I am inclined to think it does. 
I think the fact that the question of what it means for a desire, belief or emotion to 
be one's own has been ignored is because issues regarding ownership, identification, 
authenticity and autonomy are taken to be irrelevant to the question of what attitudes 
are and therefore what is required for a subject to know them. This, I think, reveals a 
distinctive way- an atomist way- of understanding the question of self-knowledge. 
Though it may not be immediately evident, the discussion regarding autonomy 
and self-knowledge has a lot to do with atomist and holist perspectives on self-
knowledge, in particular with the metaphysical question of what one takes mental 
states to be and, in turn, what is required to know them. The central question is at 
which level should we locate the knowledge a person has of her own attitudes: the 
introspective, non-alienated or autonomous level? 
My thought here is as follows: the atomist thinks that the question of how 
one knows one's attitudes can be answered by answering the question of how 
someone acquires introspective se!f-knowled.Cje, i.e. how someone acquires knowledge 
of occurrent states, such as one's judgements or current thoughts or what's in inner 
speech. Moderate atomists and holists, by contrast, will think that the question of 
attitudinal self-knowledge is not necessarily answered by answering the question of 
how someone acquires introspective self-knowledge. What you consciously think 
or judge might, but need not, tell you what your attitudes are. The moderate atomist 
will cling to procedures and methods to try and answer the question ofhow and why 
judgements provide one with knowledge of one's attitudes. The holist, on the other 
' hand, will think this a question that can only be answered by considering the life the 
subject leads, i.e. by giving the 'self' in 'self-knowledge' its due. 
Many of the theorists of self-knowledge claim that what they want to explain 
is the knowledge that subjects have of their own attitudes, and they go on to focus 
specifically on beliefs- not just beliefs but also 'conscious' or 'present' beliefs, and 
not just present beliefs but also occurrent thoughts and/or judgements. What we 
thus get is something like the following cascade: 









A pervasive assumption, made by theorists who defend verydifferentaccounts of self~ 
knowledge, is that we can provide an account of how we know our own attitudes by 
providing an account of occurrent thoughts or judgements. This assumption would 
be reasonable (only) if one thought that such things as thoughts and propositional 
attitudes are somehow the same or sufficiently similar to warrant similar treatment. 
This assumption, and the tendency to equivocate between attitudes, beliefs, 
judgements and conscious thoughts, reveals a distinctly atomist conception of what 
attitudes are. It is this metaphysical assumption that lies at the root of the atomist 
idea that if you speak your mind or make up your mind- an activity restricted to the 
here and now- you (normally) acquire knowledge of your attitudes. 
The 'metaphysical face' of atomism can be understood as involving a specific 
way of thinking about the cascade above or about way of thinking about the relation 
between the sort of things at the bottom of the cascade (occurrent thoughts and 
judgements) and those located at the higher end (selves or persons, and, to zoom 
out further, families, societies or cultures). We may imagine that an atomist thinks 
there is no such link: in order to know what one's attitude is, one does not need to 
have knowledge of the subject- the person or self- whose attitude it is. 
The atomist approach to the metaphysical question is problematic for various 
reasons, the main one being that it just isn't plausible to see a person's 'attitudes' and 
'thoughts' as (sufficiently) the same, not even if we restrict ourselves to beliefs (as 
discussed in Chapter 6). Even the sort of states that fall into the category of'attitudes' are 
so diverse that it's not obvious that we could even treat, say, beliefs as similar to desires, or 
desires as similar to intentions. Beliefs and desires appear to be fundamentally different 
kinds of states, and it's not evident that answering the question of how we know our 
beliefs gives us an answer to the question of how we know our desires. If there is so 
much variety within the class of attitudes, then it appears to be rather presumptuous to 
think that providing an account ofhowwe know our own thoughts/judgements gives us 
an account ofhow we know our own attitudes. 
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A couple of decades ago, Richard Rorty complained, "The attempt to hitch pains 
and beliefs together seems ad hoc-they don't seem to have anything in common 
except our refusal to call them 'psychological"' (Rorty 1979, 22; cf. Martin 2ooo, gg). 
It's certainly a good thing that philosophers now recognize the difference between 
'sensations', such as pain, on the one hand, and attitudes, like belief, on the other 
(cf. Coliva 2016; Boyle 2oogb). But the class of 'attitudes' is still too diverse and 
should not be lumped together metaphysically, nor should we assume that we can 
give a similar epistemic account of them. Thinking of attitudes as things that allow 
us to focus exclusively on the bottom of the cascade amounts to an atomist way of 
thinking about what is required to know such states. 
A holist, on the other hand, thinks that the question of what attitudes are should 
be addressed by considering the person whose attitude it is and the life she's lived 
and/or intends to live, i.e. requires giving due attention to what's located at the 
higher end of the cascade: persons, families, societies and cultures. In this context, 
a holistic approach to self-knowledge can be compared to various narrative theories 
of personhood and the metaphysics of mind. According to narrativists, the question 
of whom a mental state belongs to is not a contingent feature of that mental state 
(see e.g. Wollheim 1986; Schechtman 1996; Slors 2001; Bruner 2004; Macintyre 
2007; Goldie 2012; Jongepier 2014). Marya Schechtman (1990), for instance, claims, 
plausibly it seems to me, that "presuppositions about who has a psychological state 
come in at a level deeper than the level of the connections between states; they are 
necessary to defining those states as well" (Schechtman 1990, 84). Helpful in this 
context is Peter Goldie's (2o12) description of narrativity in The Mess Inside: 
Our lives have a narrative structure-roughly speaking, they comprise an 
unfolding, structured sequence of actions, events, thoughts, and feelings, related 
from the individual's point of view. A narrative, of course, can be recounted in 
vastly varying degrees of detail: I can summarize my whole life in ten minutes; or 
I can take an hour to tell you what happened to me in the last twenty-four hours. 
But, however much detail is provided, to be faithful to the narrative of my life I 
must show how its parts fit together in a structured way-making sense from 
my point of view as part of the whole. (This, as we all know, is often a difficult 
and painful thing to do.) Similarly, with emotional experience, it is the notion 
of narrative structure which ties together and makes sense of the individual 
elements of emotional experience-thought, feeling, bodily change, expression, 
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and so forth-as parts of a structured episode; and in turn it underpins the way 
that individual emotional episodes relate to the emotion of which the episode is 
a part, and this emotion to mood, to character trait and to character, and to the 
person's life seen as a whole. To make sense of one's emotional life, including 
its surprises, it is thus necessary to see it as part of a larger unfolding narrative, 
not merely as a series of discrete episodes taken out of, and considered in 
abstraction from, the narrative in which they are embedded. A true narrative, as I 
understand it, is not simply an interpretive framework, placed, so to speak, over 
a person's life; it is, rather, what that life is. (Goldie 2012, r). 
The sort of view Goldie proposes with regard to emotions is one in which emotions 
cannot be defined exclusively in terms of 'episodes' or the "individual elements of 
emotional experience", i.e. in terms of whatever is at the lower end of the cascade, 
but requires that the subject is able to relate to and understand these episodes in 
light of things at the higher end of the cascade. A holist approach to self-knowledge 
may appeal to a similar 'narrative' view and might see the question of what it is to 
have, understand and know one's attitudes as structurally similar to how Goldie 
proposes what is required for one to have, understand and know one's emotions. 
Note that this does not mean that the subject must see or experience herself 
as a 'protagonist in a plot', or that she must see her life as having a 'beginning, 
middle and end', as some narrativists have claimed, and which has, rightly it seems 
to me, been criticized {G. Strawson 2004; see also Jongepier 2014).24 I rather mean 
for the label 'narrative' to bring out the idea that knowing one's attitude requires 
self-understanding, i.e. understanding the role that that attitude plays is seen as 
something like a node in the larger web of one's life, and where the person whose 
attitude it is has a specific (reflexive) relation towards her own attitude. •s 
The upshot of this is that when we ask what is required for someone to 'know' her 
own 'attitude', we should carefully consider the question ofwhatone takes 'attitudes' 
to be and whatitwould mean to 'know' them. In otherwords, to properly understand 
the question of self-knowledge, and whether atomism or holism is plausible, we must 
l4 Note that what I mean by 'narrative' is meant to be even more minimal than, for example, Christman's narrative 
view, according to which "the person must be able to look upon the factors and evenlll of her life with a certain 
interpretive r~ection• (Christman 2004). Perhaps some readers will worry that what I'm calling narrative isn't 
narrative, but I will steer clear of these terminological disputes here. See also Slors (2oor) . 
25 Cf. the brief discussion of reflexivity in Chapter 3-4-
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first try to get a proper understanding of the 'self' component in self-knowledge, 
as well as the 'knowledge' component. In terms of a motto, on what I take to be 
the atomist view, self-knowledge does not require 'self-understanding', whereas 
on a holist view, knowing your attitude does require understanding your attitude. 26 
I think the (implicit) answer one gives to the 'cascade' question- whether, when 
defining what 'attitudes' are, we can restrict ourselves to the things at the bottom 
or not - determines, to a substantial extent, whether one thinks an atomist or a 
holist perspective on self-knowledge is plausible or not. If, after all, you think 
that in order to want, hope for, intend or believe X you need to here and now 
have the relevant thoughts or judgements regarding X, then it's not so strange to 
think that following your preferred (expressivist, rationalist) method will always, 
or at least in normal circumstances, be sufficient for you to acquire knowledge of 
your attitudes. If you make up your mind, you learn what you here and now judge; 
if you speak your mind, you 'show' what you here and now think or feel. The 
rationalist and expressivist methods thus seem specifically tailored to coming to 
know our own occurrent states. But if our attitudes are different, metaphysically 
speaking, then following these methods doesn't necessarily give one knowledge of 
one's attitudes. To ask what one believes, wants, intends or hopes for is to ask a 
26 Katsafunas for instance writes, in his discussion of Kant and Nietzsche on self-knowledge: "I might take pity to 
be a state aimed at helping those in need, whereas Nietzsche suggests that it can constitute a covert attempt to 
extend my power over others (seeD 132-8, GS 338, GM III.14, BGE 26o). Thus, even if! manage to identify one of 
my motives, I may not understand it." (Katsafunas 2015, 121) Similarly, perhaps, I might be able to identifY and thus 
'know about' certain of my beliefs and intentions, but fail to understand them, i.e. have self-knowledge without 
self-understanding. UnfOrtunately, I cannot offer a fuller discussion of the relation between self-knowledge and 
self-understanding at this point. Giving a minimal account of their relation will probably involve answering the 
question of what the distinction between 'knowledge' and 'understanding' more generally comes down to, if 
indeed there is such a distinction. Knowledge, as Duncan Pritchard claims, is "concerned with propositions, whereas 
understanding usually isn't, at least not directly" (Pritchard 2009, 30). What is also distinctive about understanding 
is that understanding is something that can come in degrees (Kvanvig 2003, 196). This in turn raises the question 
of how the relation between knowledge and understanding must be understood, and whether an answer to this 
question has implications for understanding the relation between self-knowledge and understanding. Pritchard 
notes that "the standard view within epistemology is that understanding is distinctively valuable but that it is not a 
species of knowledge" [Pritchard 2009, 31; cf. Kvanvig 2003, 196), butthat"outside of epistemology the consensus 
is clearly that understanding is a species of knowledge" (Pritchard 2009, 38). Pritchard argues that this view is 
"false" by arguing that "one can not only have understanding without the corresponding knowledge, but also 
knowledge without the corresponding understanding" (Pritchard 2009, 38). I take it that how the distinction is 
to be understood, and whether knowledge requires understanding or the reverse, depends on the subject matter. 
Pritchard's claims do not necessarily apply to moral 'knowledge', for instance (During and Duwell for instance 
claim that "Understanding what it means to know something ... presupposes understanding what it means to 
understand something" (During and Duwel12015, 945)), and indeed his claims do not necessarily apply to self· 
knowledge, either. 
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question about what makes these attitudes one's own, i.e. what makes these states 
belong to one's self. A holistwill see the question of what is required for someone 
to gain knowledge of her attitudes as a question to be answered not at the level of 
introspective self-knowledge but rather at the level of non-alienation or autonomy. 
These more fundamental issues about what attitudes are and what it means for 
them to be one's own have consequences for how the notion of 'self-knowledge' 
should be understood and studied. A number of contemporary writers on the 
philosophy of self-knowledge begin their books with a list of disclaimers warning 
against disappointment for those readers who were expecting a book about self-
knowledge to be about something like 'knowledge of the self' or interesting states of 
mind, such as those that "reflect depth of character or strength of will; the ones that 
motivate heroic striving or evil deeds; the ones that get repressed, create neuroses, 
and need psychoanalytical uncovering and treatment" (Bilgrami 2012, r-2). Instead, 
the innocent reader who stumbles upon the self-knowledge debate is confronted 
with literature that is concerned with "a kind of self-knowledge that nearly everyone 
thinks is easy to come by, almost to the point of triviality" (Carruthers 20II, xi). 
Rather than getting a theory of how we know our 'selves', what we get is a theory of 
how we know our own minds, more specifically our mental states, or actually only 
our propositional attitudes, in particular our beliefs, or indeed, what we get is a 
theory of how we know our conscious beliefs or occurrent thoughts. 
I am one of those disappointed readers. But my disappointment is not due to 
the fact that I expect philosophers of self-knowledge to provide me with a 'theory of 
wisdom' or a guide to what makes me happy or what living a good and fulfilled life 
consists in. I suspect that questions about how we know our own tragic or heroic 
mental states or what makes us happy are not the sort of questions that we should 
expect a philosophical theory of self-knowledge to provide us with in the first place. 
Maybe it isn't something we should expect philosophy to deliver the answers to but 
something we should turn to novels for. 
My disappointment rather has to do with the fuct that most of the literature 
on self-knowledge seems to overlook the question regarding the preconditions of 
self-knowledge, more specifically the circumstances in which people self-ascribe 
desires, beliefs, intentions, emotions, hopes and expectations and other attitudes, 
i.e. the sort of states that we normally take to have a reasonable life expectancy and 
which lead us to think and act in various ways. The fact that questions regarding 
the circumstances have been overlooked would be understandable if we could 
assume that the question of how one acquires knowledge of one's own attitudes 
can be reduced to the question of how one knows about one's own judgements or 
occurrent thoughts. In order to know that I am currently consciously thinking about 
pink elephants, it does not seem particularly relevant to take into consideration 
where I am, whether I'm excited, angry or sad, or who I'm with; indeed, it does 
not seem necessary to know what sort of person I am and what's important to me. 
I can be thinking about pink elephants, and know .that I am, when I'm confused, 
tipsy or depressed and indeed without understanding myself at all. But are the 
circumstances equally trivial or irrelevant when it comes to the question of how we 
know our own attitudes? 
The following are attitudes that I take myself to have: the intention to drink less 
coffee, the desire to have another one all the same, the belief that the outcome of the 
Brexit referendum is a disaster, the hope that things aren't as bad as they seem, and 
a particular fondness for my cats. These mental states, and my knowledge of them, 
appear to be tied up with 'who I am' in a way that my occurrent thoughts are not, or 
need not be. However, the above mental states, as well as the question ofhow I acquire 
knowledge of them, cannot be set aside as being too 'heroic'. My intention to drink 
less coffee does not motivate 'heroic striving'; my desire to have another coffee all the 
same isn't an attitude that 'creates neuroses'; my belief that the outcome of the Brexit 
referendum is a disaster and the hope that things aren't as bad as they seem do not 
require 'psychoanalytical uncovering and treatment'; and my being particularly fond 
of my cats does not reflect any particular 'depth of character'. 
One of the leading concerns underlying this thesis has been this: that we can 
legitimately draw a distinction between knowledge of occurrent thoughts on the 
one hand and the nnothi seauton or 'know thyself' sort of self-knowledge that the 
ancient Greeks were concerned with, or what Cassam (2014) has referred to as 
'substantial' self-knowledge, on the other, that is, the sort of self-knowledge that 
"matters in a practical or even a moral sense" (2014, 31). More specifically, the worry 
is that a person's attitudes are seen as falling squarely on the 'occurrent' end of the 
divide rather than on the 'substantial' end. Though I have not argued for any of 
this explicitly, providing reasons to think that this way oflooking at attitudes and 
knowledge thereof is misleading has been one of the underlying aims of this thesis. 
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9· Conclusion 
In this chapter I have addressed the question of whether someone in autonomy-
undermining circumstances can be said to know her own mind and, if so, in what 
sense. I have explored, specifically, Moran's account of self-knowledge, given 
that Moran, contrary to other theorists of self-knowledge, offers a distinctively 
normative theory of self-knowledge that is principally concerned with notions such 
as alienation, autonomy and ownership. I have argued that Moran's account bears 
similarities to so-called 'proceduralist' theories of autonomy and have therefore 
contrasted and compared his view with a so-called 'relational account' of autonomy 
that has criticized proceduralist views by arguing that having certain reflective 
abilities - such as the capacity to conform to transparency - is not sufficient for 
autonomy. I argued that if the objections raised by relational accounts of autonomy 
hold, then this means the rationalist account that focuses on transparency is subject 
to similar criticisms. 
The constructive aim of this chapter has been to suggest that apart from 
distinguishing between different objects of and routes to self-knowledge, we 
should further distinguish between different types of self-knowledge. To this 
end, I distinguished between introspective, non-alienated and autonomous self-
knowledge. I have not, however, offered much more than a rough sketch. Clearly, 
much more needs to be said about the relation between autonomy and self-
knowledge, such as the relations between the three types of self-knowledge and 
the relation between self-knowledge and first-person authority. One of the most 
important questions, though, is what, exacdy, it means to (fail to) be autonomous, 
i.e. what it means (not) to be governed by other people or institutions, or what is 
required in order to be resistant to someone else's will. An answer to these questions 
may, in turn, go some way towards answering the question of whether someone 
who is, say, not oppressed but is 'merely' manipulated by propaganda, or someone 
who is nudged, lacks self-knowledge in some sense of that term, or not. 27 
Z7 Sophie Grace·Chappell has recently written on political deliberation under conditions of deception, Brexit in 
particular: "is deliberation binding when its results are arrived at by deception? As a question in the individual 
case, we have no difficulty at all in seeing that the answer to this question is 'Of course not'. Ever since Plato, 
perhaps longer, it has been commonplace to make an analogy between individual agency and the agency of the 
political communiey ...• If individual deliberation is regarded, as it clearly should be, as invalid when it has been 
warped by deception, there is no reason why political deliberation should not equally be invalidated by deception" 
(Chappell 2016) A question in this context would be to ask whether vorers can be said to 'know what Iiley want' 
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Despite the fact that many questions remain unanswered, I hope to have made a 
case for the idea that if we adopt a theory of self-knowledge that is intimately related 
to normative notions, such as Moran's, then it's legitimate to evaluate how these 
normative notions themselves are defined and whether the definitions stand up to 
criticism. Even if the threefold distinction between introspective, non-alienated and 
autonomous self-knowledge as I have described it is not the best way of addressing 
these topics, I hope the question of what the preconditions of self-knowledge are 
and the suggestion that there are interesting and important connections between 
self-knowledge and autonomy are issues at least worth putting on the agenda. 
if their deliberative conclusions were arrived at by deception. Interesting in this context is Jason Stanley's work 
on propaganda. Stanley suggests that certain group identities that are formed under a regime of propaganda can 
"channelrationalandaffectivestreamsinspecificways,creatingobstaclestoself-knowledge,aswellastothefreefiow 
ofdeliberation required inahealthydemocracy" (Stanley2015, 4). Stanley does notelaborateon how propaganda might 
createobstaclesforself-knowledge,butitdoesnotseemimplausibletothinkthatirrationalfeelingsoffearandbeliefi; 
based on ideologies, for example, might make it harder for one to know what one wants or thinks. 
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Taking Stock and Looking Forward 
I started this thesis with the question of what is required for a subject to know 
her own attitudes. A natural response to this question would be to say "Well, it 
depends". The main task of the thesis has been to address the question of on what, 
exactly, it depends. To this purpose, I have described two different approaches to 
this question, which I have referred to as 'atomism' and 'holism'. I used these lenses 
to look, specifically, at expressivist (Chapters 2-3) and rationalist (Chapters 4-7) 
theories of self-knowledge. 
The principal aim of this thesis was to point out the limits of the atomist view, 
and in that respect the contribution of this thesis has been primarily negative. 
Atomism, as I have characterized it, is the view according to which answering 
the question of what is required for a subject to acquire self-knowledge involves 
focusing (almost) exclusively on the procedures or methods that she followed. With 
respect to expressivism and rationalism, this means that a subject necessarily or 
typically acquires self-knowledge by speaking her mind or by making up her mind. 
The question I have been concerned with is what is actually required in order for 
self-expression (expressivism) or transparent deliberation (rationalism) to deliver 
self-knowledge; in other words, I have asked what the preconditions are for such 
methods to be knowledge-conducive. 
I described two versions of atomism, radical and moderate, both of which I have 
described in terms ofwhatthey have to say about the circumstances of self-expression 
and deliberation, respectively. I have taken the circumstances of self-knowledge in 
a broad sense, to include various psychological and sociopolitical circumstances in 
which the subject might find herself and how the subject's self-ascription as made 
under these circumstances relates to her actions, values, character, other attitudes 
and self-conception. The radical atomist thinks that questions of circumstance are 
entirely irrelevant, or that all circumstances are 'good' circumstances, whereas the 
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moderate atomist appeals to normal or standard circumstances of self-expression 
or deliberation, i.e. by including certain (implicit) ceteris paribus clauses. The 
moderate atomist therefore thinks that we can mostly ignore the circumstances of 
self-knowledge. 
Throughout the chapters I have tried to make a case for the idea that the 
moderate atomist view is untenable by showing that there is no way of defining what 
the right or normal circumstances of procedures should be such that they lead to 
self-knowledge rather than self-ignorance or self-deception that does not beg the 
question. My argument throughout the chapters has been that so-called 'abnormal' 
circumstances of self-knowledge are actually quite 'normal' for us, and that, at the 
end of the day, the appeal to (implicit) ceteris paribus clauses, not the procedures, 
ends up doing most of the work. If moderate atomism is an unstable position, then 
this leaves us with two alternatives: one is to retreat to radical atomism and avoid 
appealing to normal circumstances from the start, and the other is to develop a 
holistapproach to self-knowledge. 
I have mostly assumed, rather than provided arguments for, the idea that radical 
atomism is implausible, even though I have argued (in Chapter 6) that the (im) 
plausibility of radical atomism is something that depends on what answers one 
gives to more fundamental metaphysical and meta-theoretical questions. In any 
case, an important task for future research is to evaluate radical atomism in relation 
to holism in greater detail, and, in particular, to ask on the basis of which desiderata 
we should choose one over the other. 
I have not directly argued for a holist account of self-knowledge, though I hope 
that the shape of what a holist approach would look like has emerged as a result 
of my consideration of the limits of moderate atomist versions of expressivism 
and rationalism. On a holistic approach to self-knowledge, the question of what 
is required for a subject to know her own attitudes depends on the circumstances 
in which she speaks or makes up her mind and on how her self-ascription as made 
under these circumstances relates to her other attitudes, values, character and 
self-conception. The result is that on a holist view, the question of what makes a 
self-ascription expressive of self-knowledge can only be answered by tailoring this 
question to the specific individual, the life that she leads and the psychological, 
social and moral-political context in which she finds herself. 
To develop a holist account of self-knowledge, I don't think it's necessary to 
start from scratch. There are interesting developments in, for example, feminist 
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and social epistemology that are concerned with questions of whether knowledge 
is connected to practical concerns, stakes, standards and social contexts and how 
the loss and gain of knowledge is connected to various forms of(in)justice and (in) 
equality that we may expect a holist approach to self-knowledge to be able to draw 
on. Apart from drawing on research in epistemology, developing a holistic view 
of self-knowledge is a project that will presumably benefit from going beyond the 
confines of epistemology by considering insights from the philosophy oflanguage, 
social and political philosophy and (meta-)ethics. I hope to have been able to make a 
case for the relevance of various discussions outside epistemology to self-knowledge 
in Chapter 7· 
I have left many important questions unanswered, even unaddressed, but I hope 
to work on these questions in the future. One such question is whether denying 
someone (autonomous) self-knowledge has any implications for first-person 
authority and, if so, which ones, and if not, why not. The more general issue in 
the background concerns the relation between self-knowledge and first-person 
authority, in particular whether the latter depends on the former or whether it 
should be given a non-epistemic explanation instead. Also, the relation between 
autonomy and self-knowledge deserves more attention than I have been able to give 
it. If we should distinguish, as I have claimed, not just between different objects and 
different routes but also between different types of self-knowledge - introspective, 
non-alienated and autonomous self-knowledge- then what a plausible account of 
these types of self-knowledge comes down to depends on what the right account of 
non-alienation and autonomy is; I have only scratched the surface of this matter. A 
final question for future research concerns the value of self-knowledge in light of the 
threefold distinction between introspective, non-alienated and autonomous self-
knowledge. Which, if any, of these types of self-knowledge is especially important 
to have, and why? Is self-knowledge necessary for autonomy and/or well-being or 
rather the other way around? These are the sorts of questions I hope to work on in 
the future. 
Despite the fact that I have not provided a positive account of what concrete 
shape a holist approach to self-knowledge can or should take, my aim in this thesis 
has, nonetheless, been constructive. The constructive aim has been to get a picture 
of the theoretical landscape of self-knowledge, in particular to show that answers 
to important questions about self-knowledge appear to be implicitly presupposed 
and that atomism with respect to self-knowledge is only plausible in light of certain 
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assumptions that are not unproblematic. One such question is the metaphysical 
question of what, exactly, we are trying to explain knowledge of, how things such as 
thoughts are related to attitudes and how the latter are connected to such things as 
persons and societies. The 'metaphysical face' of atomism would involve thinking 
of attitudes as equivalent or sufficiently similar to things like thoughts, and hence 
that we can give an account of how we know the latter by giving an account of the 
former. Another question is how we should understand 'knowledge' in the term 
'self-knowledge'. The 'epistemic face' of atomism would involve thinking of self-
knowledge as something that one can have independently of self-understanding, 
where we might take the latter to be a capacity for understanding how one's self-
ascription relates to one's larger biography, self-conception, past and future actions, 
and so on. 
The constructive aim of getting a better view of the theoretical landscape of self.. 
knowledge has negative consequences for the atomist, though. For it is only on a 
particular picture of what attitudes are and what it would mean to know them that 
atomism is plausible, i.e. that it would be legitimate to think that the question of 
what is required for someone to have knowledge of her attitudes can be explained 
exhaustively, or at least satisfyingly, by answering the procedural question of 
what the subject was doing when she ascribed a mental state to herself. To put it 
metaphorically, the more positive contribution of this thesis is to have made plausible 
the notion that the question of self-knowledge is a bit like a mobile hanging above 
a baby's cot: if you touch one of the items dangling from it, the whole thing begins 
to twist and turn. Less metaphorically put, my hope is to have convinced at least 
some readers of the fact that when studying self-knowledge, we cannot suspend 
judgement on or 'bracket' larger metaphysical and epistemic questions. 
I have argued in this thesis that any plausible account of self-knowledge needs 
to take holism seriously - not, perhaps, as a defining characteristic of the account 
itself but because any plausible account of self-knowledge will hinge on a proper 
understanding of these larger metaphysical, epistemic and moral questions and will 
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Stel dat je met een enorm ochtendhumeur wakker wordt Eigenlijk was je van plan 
om een boswandeling te maken maar, humeurig als je bent, besluit je dat je eigenlijk 
liever binnen wilt blijven. Heb je in zo'n geval zelfkennis of houd je jezelfvoor de 
gek? Of stel dat je je erg onzeker voelt of depressief ofjuist hoteldebotel verliefd. Kun 
je in die omstandigheden weten wat je echte verlangens, overtuigingen en intenties 
zijn? Weet je wat je wilt wanneer je tijdens een woede-uitbarsting aangeeft een 
scheiding te will en? Weet je dat je een gezonde salade wilt wanneer bet evident is dat 
je 'genudged' wordt?' Ken je je eigen overtuigingen wanneer je bent gemanipuleerd 
door propaganda? 
Het doel van dit proefschrift is niet zozeer een concreet antwoord te formuleren 
op dit soort vragen over zelfkennis, maar de meer fundamentele vraag te stellen 
wat er iiberhaupt voor nodig is om ze te beantwoorden. Meer specifiek is bet doe! 
van dit proefschrift te onderzoeken of hedendaagse theorieen van zelfkennis, 
expressivisme en rationalisme in bet bijzonder, voldoende gereedschap hebben om 
dergelijke vragen op een bevredigende manier te behandelen, datwil zeggen, op een 
manier die recht doet aan hun complexiteit. 
1. Introspectieve en persoonlijke zelfkennis 
Voordat ik in ga op wat ik concreet heb ondernomen in de hoofdstukken van dit 
proefscbrift, wil ik eerst iets zeggen over bet concept van 'zelfkennis' dat in bet 
debat en in dit proefschrift wordt gehanteerd. Deze term is namelijk ambigu: bet 
kan verwijzen naar wat we kunnen noemen 'introspectieve' zelfkennis enerzijds en 
'persoonlijke' zelfkennis anderzijds. 
]e wordt genudged wanneer de overheid (of een bedrijf) met behulp van inzichten uit, bijvoorbeeld, de (sociale) 
psycho Iogie, je een een duwtje in de 'goede' richting geeft. 
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lntrospectieve zelfkennis is kennis van je eigen (bewuste) mentale toestanden. 
Denk hierbij bijvoorbeeld aan kennis van je overtuigingen, verlangens, angsten, 
voorkeuren ofintenties. Vragen die gaan over introspectieve zelfkennis zijn vragen 
als: "Ik geloof dat partij X mij het beste kan vertegenwoordigen, maar hoe weet ik dat 
ik dit geloof?", maar ook vragen als: 'Ik weet dat ik denk dat het regent, maar hoe 
weet ik dat ik deze overtuiging heb?'. Persoonlijke zelfkennis, aan de andere kant, 
kan begrepen worden als de kennis over jezelf als persoon, zoals bijvoorbeeld kennis 
van je handelingsmotieven, kennis van je karakter, gewoontes, ambities, wilskracht 
(of gebrek daaraan), diepste verlangens, onderdrukte angsten, enzovoorts. Het 
gaat niet simpelweg over kennis van je mentale toestanden, maar kennis van de 
elementen die cruciaal zijn voor wie je bent. Persoonlijke zelfkennis is het soort 
van zelfkennis waar de oude Grieken zich in interesseerden (denk aan de woorden 
"Ken uzelf" (gnothi seauton) die geschreven stonden op de Tempel van Apollo in 
Delphi) en waar het bovendien de meeste mens en buiten de filosofie om te doen is. 
Met een of twee uitzonderingen zijn aile (analytisch) filosofen bezig met 
introspectieve zelfkennis en niet met persoonlijke zelfkennis. 2 Ben aantal filosofen 
opent zelfs hun boek met waarschuwingen tegen te hoge verwachtingen van lezers. 
Hun strekking: lezers die gei'nteresseerd zijn in persoonlijke zelfkennis hebben 
niets te zoeken in het filosofische debat over zelfkennis. De nietsvermoedende 
lezer die in het zelfkennis de bat verzeild raakt, leest dus niets over hoe we ons 'zelf' 
zouden kunnen kennen, of zelfkennis iiberhaupt belangrijk is en zo ja, waarom dan. 
In plaats daarvan wordt deze lezer geconfronteerd met argumenten en theorieen 
over hoe we onze eigen geest (mind) eigenlijk kennen, specifiek onze mentale 
toestanden, meer specifiek onze overtuigingen, meer specifiek onze bewuste 
overtuigingen en de dingen die ons in het hier-en-nu te binnen schieten. Kortom, 
niet het soort van zelfkennis dat we kunnen herformuleren in termen van een plicht 
zoals "Ken uzelf". De inzet is eerder: "ik weetwat ik denk, maar goh, hoe weet ik dat 
eigenlijk?". 
lntrospectieve zelfkennis is het vertrekpunt van dit proefschrift, in zoverre 
dit proefschrift zich engageert met het filosofische debat van zelfkennis. Echter, 
een van de onderliggende ambities van dit proefschrift is om te Iaten zien dat het 
onverstandig, zo niet onmogelijk, is om introspectieve zelfkennis onafhankelijk 
van persoonlijke zelfkennis te begrijpen en te analyseren. Dit is niet in aile gevallen 
2 1\vee uitzonderingen op de regel in de analytische filosofie zijn Quassim Cassam en Eric Schwitzgebel. 
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evident. Om bijvoorbeeld te weten dat ik nu denk aan roze olifantjes, lijkt het niet 
nodig dat ik weet 'wat voor persoon' ik ben. De meeste filosofen zijn echter niet 
zozeer ge!nteresseerd in dit soortvluchtige gedachtes, maar in onze meer 'stabiele' 
mentale toestanden zoals onze overtuigingen en intenties. De onderliggende 
boodschap van mijn proefschrift is dat om kennis te verkrijgen van deze meer 
stabiele mentale toestanden een belangrijke mate van persoonlijke zelfkennis 
noodzakelijk is, en dat elke filosofische analyse die een strikt onderscheid hanteert 
tussen deze twee vormen van zelfkennis uiteindelijk tekortschiet. 
2. De procedurele vraag en atomisme over zelfkennis 
Het huidige filosofische debat is vooral bezig met de vraag of zelfkennis een 
kwestie is van 'naar binnen kijken' (introspectionisme), jezelf interpreteren 
(interpretationalisme), jezelf uitdrukken (expressivisme), of delibereren 
(rationalisme). Wanneer je aangeeft in het zelfkennis-debat werkzaam te zijn, 
is dan ook een van de eerste vragen waarmee je geconfronteerd wordt: ben je 
een introspectionist, interpretationalist, expressivist of rationalist of misschien 
een 'pluralist'? Met andere woorden, bet debat concentreert zich met name 
op de specifieke 'methodes' of 'procedures' van zelfkennis - hun onderlinge 
overeenkomsten en verschillen, en (in)comptabiliteiten. De focus ligt op wat ik 
noem de 'procedurele vraag' naar zelfkennis: dit is de vraag welke procedure of 
methode iemand moet volgen om tot een zogenaamde ware 'zelftoeschrijving' te 
komen.3 
Er zijn een aantal andere belangrijke vragen die tot nu toe spijtig genoeg weinig 
aandacht hebben gekregen. Ben daarvan is de vraag naar de omstandigheden van 
zelfkennis. Wanneer Peter een zelftoeschrijving maakt, kunnen we niet aileen de 
vraag stellen welke procedure Peter volgde ("was Peter aan het introspecteren of aan 
bet delibereren?"), maar kunnen we bijvoorbeeld ook vragen: wie is Peter? Waar is 
Peter? Wat is Peter van plan? Wat he eft Peter gedaan? Hoe voelt Peter zich? Wat weet 
Peter? Met wie praat Peter? Hoe wordt Peter door anderen gezien en behandeld? Hoe 
zieten behandelt Peter zichzelf? Enzovoorts. 
3 Wanneer je een zelfu>eschrijving maakt, schrijf je (in gedachten of in taal, bewust of onbewust) een bepaalde 
mentale toestand aan jezelftoe. Denk bijvoorbeeld aan: "Ik aeloofdat Brexit een s!echt idee is", "lk wii een kof!ie•, 
"Ik vrus dat bet gaat regen en• of"Ik hoop dat de vergadering niet doorgaat". 
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Volgens velen zijn dergelijke vragen die betrekking hebben op de omstandigheden 
van iemands zelftoeschrijving (grotendeels) irrelevant wanneer we de vraag willen 
beantwoorden wat er voor het verkrijgen van zeifkennis nodig is. Voigens mij zijn 
ze echter wei degelijk van beiang. De red en hiervoor is dat het beantwoorden van de 
vraag watvoor procedure iemand voigt, niet per se de vraag beantwoordt ofiemands 
zeiftoeschrijving ook zeifkennis opievert. Misschien dat Peter wei voigens de regeis 
had gedelibereerd, maar Ieverde dat aisnog geen zelfkennis op, bijvoorbeeid omdat 
Peter boos, verliefd, of onzeker was. Het is in dergelijke omstandigheden goed 
mogelijk dat je op een verkeerde manier delibereert (bijvoorbeeld met oogkieppen 
op). Om te weten of bijvoorbeeld Peters zelftoeschrijving een instantie is van 
zeifkennis, hebben we dus veei meer nodig dan een antwoord op de vraag wat Peter 
aan het doen was in termen van de procedures die hij ai dan nietvoigde. 
Dit proefschrift hoopt een impliciete en hardnekkige aanname bioot te leggen, 
namelijk, de aanname dat vragen die betrekking hebben op de omstandigheden van 
zelfkennis van marginaal beiang zijn voor zeifkennis. In dit proefschrift gebruik ik 
de term 'atomisme' om deze aanname aan te duiden. De notie van 'omstandigheden' 
begrijp ik daarbij opzettelijk in zeer brede zin. Tot mogelijk reievante omstandigheden 
voor het verkrijgen van zelfkennis reken ik bijvoorbeeld de aanwezigheid of 
afWezigheid van (r) 'lichamelijke' omstandigheden (zoals honger, dorst, pijn), (2) 
emotionele omstandigheden (woede, blijheid, opiuchting, stress, verliefdheid), (3) 
sociaal-politieke omstandigheden (zoals vrijheid van meningsuiting, propaganda, 
onderdrukking). De alternatieve 'holistische' benadering ten aanzien van zeifkennis 
kan vervoigens begrepen worden als het omgekeerde van atomisme: het siechts 
voigen van een specifieke procedure of methode is geen garantie voor zelfkennis. 
Deze karakterisering van atomisme is een karikatuur. Om die reden onderscheid 
ik in mijn proefschrift twee varian ten van atomisme: 'radicaal atomisme' en 'gematigd 
atomisme'. Volgens een radicaal atomist verkrijg je bij het volgen van een specifieke 
procedure ten aile tijden zelfkennis. Er zijn, met andere woorden, geen 'zelfkennis-
beperkende' omstandigheden. Een gematigd atomist daarentegen stelt dat hetvoigen 
van een specifieke procedure in de juiste of in normale omstandigheden tot zelfkennis 
leidt. De gematigd atomist voegt dus (impliciet) ceteris paribus-clausules toe. Dit stelt 
haar in staat om bijvoorbeeld te zeggen dat je zelfkennis verkrijgt door procedure X 
te volgen, behalve in omstandigheden van, zeg, woede ofverliefdheid. De gematigd 
atomist wil tegemoetkomen aan het idee dat je in uitzonderlijke omstandigheden 
geen zelfkennis verkrijgt, ook al volg je de juiste procedure, maar wil niettemin 
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vasthouden aan het idee dat procedures het belangrijkst zijn wanneer we het over 
zelfkennis hebben. Of, met andere woorden, datwanneerwe een analyse willen geven 
van zelfkennis, we het vooral over de procedures moeten hebben. Waar de gematigd 
atomist denkt dat we het kunnen hebben over 'uitzonderingen op de regel', verdedig 
ik een holistische positie die stelt dat uiteindelijk de uitzonderingen de regel zijn. 
3. Samenvatting van de hoofdstukken 
De strategie van dit proefschrift is de limieten van atomisme bloot te leggen door 
een interne kritiek te leveren op twee van de meest dominante theorieen in het debat 
van zelfkennis: expressivisme en rationalisme, welke respectievelijk de twee delen 
van dit proefschrift behelzen. Hetdoel is daarbij aan het eind van het proefschrift een 
patroon te Iaten zien. De structuur van het proefschrift is daarom ook niet lineair: ik 
hoop aan te tonen dat, ondanks de belangrijke verschillen tussen expressivisme en 
rationalisme, deze theorieen geconfronteerd worden met soortgelijke problemen. 
De oorzaak van deze problem en schrijf ik toe aan hun gedeelde vooronderstelling 
van het atomisme. 
3.1 Expressivisme 
In heteerste deel van ditproefSchrift(hoofdstukken 2 en 3) bespreek ik expressivisme. 
Volgens expressivisten zijn zelftoeschrijvingen zoals "Ik wil koffie", "Ik hoop dat de 
vergadering komt te vervallen" of"Ik vrees dat het gaat regenen" geen rapportages 
over innerlijke men tale toestanden, noch slechts tekenen of mogelijke evidentie van 
wat voor men tale toestand je hebt, maar uitdrukkingen daarvan. 4 
In hoofdstuk 2 begin ik met het uiteenzetten van expressivisme. Opvallend 
genoeg wordt expressivisme vaak uitsluitend gezien als een (niet-epistemische) 
theorie over 'eerste-persoons autoriteit' in plaats van als. (epistemische) theorie over 
zelfkennis. Ik laat daarom ten eerste zien dat expressivisme wei degelijk de middelen 
heeft om uit te leggen waarom we doorgaans zelfkennis verkrijgen wanneer we 
onszelf op een talige manier uitdrukken. De vervolgvraag is hoe we deze theorie van 
zelfkennis moeten evalueren, en, in het bijzonder, in hoeverre expressivisme een 
vorm van gematigd atomisme veronderstelt. 
4 Er best:aat helaas geen goede vertaling voor de meer intuitieve Enge!se frase ' to speak one's mind'. 
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De centralevraagvan hoofdstuk 3 is dan ook: maakthetuitin watvooromstandigheden 
je jezelf uitdrukt? Ben radicaal atomistische variant van expressivisme zou deze 
vraag negatiefbeantwoorden. Maar het lijkt evident dat wanneer je jezelf uitdrukt 
tijdens een woedeaanval, je zelf-expressie niet correspondeert met wat je echt denkt 
of wilt ("Het was maar een momentopname"). Ik ga daarom in op de gematigd 
atomistische variant van expressivisme, volgens welke je zelfkennis verkrijgt door 
jezelf uit te drukken, behalve in 'buitengewone' omstandigheden, zoals wanneer 
je slaapwandelt, dronken bent, of een woedeaanval hebt. Ik problematiseer 
vervolgens deze gematigde variant van expressivisme door te laten zien dat er 
enorm veel omstandigheden zijn waarin je evenmin zelfkennis verkrijgt, zonder 
dat deze omstandigheden nu zo 'buitengewoon' zijn (zoals stress, vermoeidheid, 
verliefdheid of een ochtendhumeur). Bovendien is het zo dat wat voor de een als 
zelfkennis-beperkende omstandigheid geldt (zoals dronkenschap, verliefdheid of 
woede) voor een ander nog niet het geval hoeft te zijn. Dit lijkt te pleiten voor een 
holistische benadering van expressivisme waarbij de vraag of iemand zelfkennis 
heeft niet zozeer te maken heeft met of iemands zelftoeschrijving een instantie is 
van zelf-expressie, maar met de context waarbinnen die zelf-expressie plaatsvindt en 
hoe de persoon zich tot zichzelf en haar eigen verlangens, overtuigingen, in ten ties, 
angsten, enzovoorts, verhoudt. Echter, will en we expressivisme op holistische lijnen 
ontwikkelen, dan kunnen we niet anders dan zelf..expressies te zien als instanties 
van zelf-interpretatie. Met andere woorden: zelftoeschrijvingen als "Ik geloof dat 
ze het leuk vindt", "Ik wil ermee stoppen" of "Ik hoop dat hij nog langskomt" 
vormen slechts mogelijke aanwijzingen voor wat daadwerkelijk onze overtuigingen, 
verlangens en andere mentale toestanden zijn. Maar zelftoeschrijvingen als 
zodanig begrijpen is helaas incompatibel is met een van de centrale stellingen van 
expressivisme, namelijk, dat zelftoeschrijvingen niet slechts mogelijke indicaties 
zijn voor je men tale toestanden, maar een uitdrukkingen daarvan. De conclusie is dat 
holisme incompatibellijkt te zijn met een expressivistische theorie over zelfkennis. 
Als de holistische benadering ten aanzien van zelfkennis de juiste is, dan moeten we 
expressivisme dus laten varen. 
3.2 Rationalisme 
In deel twee van het proefschrift (hoofdstukken 4 tot en met 7) bespreek ik 
rationalisme. Rationalisme is de theorie volgens welke zelfkennis een kwestie 
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is van 'praktisch delibereren•.s Grofiveg houdt dit in dat zelfkennis een actieve in 
plaats van een pas sieve bezigheid is. Om erachter te komen watje overtuigingen zijn, 
bijvoorbeeld, moet je volgens de rationalist niet 'naar binnen' ki.jken maar juist naar 
'buiten': je moetreflecteren op gebeurtenissen offeiten in dewereld. Centraal hierbij 
is de zogenaamde 'transparantie procedure'. De procedure is als volgt: om erachter 
te komen ofje de overtuiging hebtdatX (een vraag over het mentale domein) moetje 
de vraag beantwoorden of X waar is ( een vraag over de were! d). Wanneer je de vraag 
overdewereld beantwoordt, kom je to teen oordeel, en datoordeelis nu eenmaal niets 
anders dan je overtuiging. Kortom, je kunt er niet achter komen wat je gedachtes zijn 
door je eigen gedrag te observeren of door een hersenscan te Iaten maken, maar je 
moetactiefbepalen watje ergens van vindtdoorte reflecteren op situaties in dewereld. 
In het eerste introducerende hoofdstuk geef ik allereerst een overzicht van 
de theorie zoals deze uiteen is gezet door Richard Moran, waarna ik inga op zijn 
centrale stelling, namelijk, dat we kennis kunnen verkrijgen van onze eigen 
mentale toestanden door de eerder genoemde transparantie procedure te volgen. 
Ik bediscussieer een aantal veelvoorkomende tegenwerpingen op rationalisme en 
bespreek kort manieren om deze te weerleggen. Ik eindig door in te gaan op de 
relatie tussen oordelen aan de ene kant en overtuigingen aan de andere kant. 
In hoofdstuk 5 onderscheid ik een 'radicale' en een 'gematigde' atomistische 
variant van rationalisme. Ik leg mij vervolgens toe op de gematigde variant, volgens 
welke het volgen van de transparantie procedure aileen zelfkennis oplevert wanneer 
de persoon deze procedure in de 'juiste' of'normale' omstandigheden heeftgevolgd. 
Vervolgens is de vraag wat we dan onder de juiste of normale omstandigheden 
moeten verstaan. Hiertoe bespreek ik het voorbeeld van de Boze Echtgenoot. 
De Boze Echtgenoot is iemand die overtuigd is geraakt van Moran's theorie, en 
besluit om de vraag te beantwoorden "Geloof ik dat een echtscheiding een goed 
is?" (een vraag over haar mentale toestand) door de corresponderende vraag "Is 
een echtscheiding een goed idee?" te beantwoorden (een vraag over de wereld). 
Omdat de Boze Echtgenoot deze procedure volgt in een opwelling van woede, kan 
ze alleen maar redenen v66r een scheiding bedenken, en ziet ze geen enkele reden 
om samen te blijven met haar partner. De vraag is: heeft de Boze Echtgenoot nu 
zelfkennis verkregen door deliberatie, zoals wevolgens rationalisme zouden moeten 
veronderstellen, ofleidt het juist tot zelfbedrog? Ik bespreek de mogelijke reacties 
5 Ook hier leent het Engels zich beter: ' to make up one's mind'. 
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die de rationalist zou kunnen geven, en laat zien dat geen van die reacties afdoende 
zijn. Ik concludeer dat de gematigde versie van rationalisme, die een beroep doet 
op (impliciete) ceteris paribus-clausules, uiteindelijk geen bevredigend verhaal kan 
vertellen over wat nude 'juiste' of'normale' omstandigheden van deliberatie zijn. 
Althans, zonder zelf-deceptie vanafhet begin uit te sluiten en daarmee aan te nemen 
wat precies op het spel staat. 
Ben voor de hand liggende optie, voor de rationalist, is om dan toch voor de 
radicale variant van rationalisme te kiezen en simpelweg geen beroep te doen op 
juiste of normale omstandigheden van zelfkennis. In hoofdstuk 6 bespreek ik 
hiertoe de theorie van Matthew Boyle. Volgens Boyle zijn er geen gevallen- en dus 
ook geen omstandigheden- waar er een kloof zou kunnen ontstaan tussen iemands 
oordeel Qud9ement) enerzijds en iemands overtuiging (belid) anderzijds. Boyle's lijkt 
theorie daarom lijkt te kwalificeren als een vorm van radicaal atomisme. In het 
hoofdstuk bespreek ikvervolgens een aantal voorbeelden, waaronder een voorbeeld 
over impliciete oordelen, waaruit lijkt te volgen dat het wel degelijk mogelijk is 
om tot een oordeel te komen zonder de corresponderende overtuiging te hebben. 
Mijn doel in dit hoofdstuk is om te laten zien dat de vraag of Boyle's theorie van 
zelfk:ennis plausibel is afhankelijk is van de metafYsischevraagwatwe onder men tale 
toestanden, overtuigingen in het bijzonder, verstaan. Om die reden contrasteer 
ik Boyle's metazysische opvatting over mentale toestanden met een altematieve 
'dispositionele' metazysica, waarbij ik mij baseer op hetwerkvan Eric Schwitzgebel. 
Mijn conclusie luidt dat het idee dat radicaal atomisme implausibel is aileen volgt 
gegeven een (impliciet) antwoord op de metafYsische vraag wat we iiberhaupt 
verstaan onder, bijvoorbeeld, een 'overtuiging'. Deze metazysische vraag is op haar 
beurt afhankelijk van meer fundamentele kwesties, zoals wat de rol en relevantie 
is van intuities die we hebben wanneer we geconfronteerd worden met bepaalde 
voorbeelden. Mijn conclusie wat betreft radicaal atomisme is dus voorzichtiger dan 
die over gematigd atomisme. De conclusie die ik trek is dat radicaal atomisme bij 
nader inzien niet zonder argumentatie terzijde kan worden geschoven, omdat de 
verwerping ervan afhankelijk is van bepaalde metatheoretische aannames. De meer 
genuanceerde conclusie is dan ook dat deze metatheoretische vraagstukken relevant 
zijn voor het bestuderen van zelfk:ennis. 
In hoofdstuk 7 bespreek ik een zogenaamde normatieve interpretatie van het 
rationalistisch project, en ga ik meer in het algemeen in op de vraag hoe zelfk:ennis 
en autonomie zijn gerelateerd. Ik doe dit aan de hand van een aantal voorbeelden, 
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zoals zelfkennis verkregen in omstandigheden van brainwashing en onderdrukking. 
Vervolgens vergelijk ik de normatieve lezing van rationalisme met zogenaamde 
'procedurele' en 'relationele' theorieen van autonomie. Op basis van deze 
discussie concludeer ik dat we niet slechts een onderscheid moeten maken tussen 
verschillende objecten van zelfkennis en verschillende routes naar zelfkennis maar 
datwe ook een onderscheid moeten maken tussen verschillende soorten zelfkennis. 
Ik stel voor dat we een onderscheid moeten maken tussen (r) introspectieve, (2) 
authentieke, en (3) autonome zelfkennis. Mijn hoop is dat inzichten uit discussies 
over autonomie ons iets leren over (de grenzen van) atomisme over zelfkennis; ik 
sluit het hoofdstuk daarom af door een stap terug te doen en te reflecteren op de 
onderliggende metafYsische en epistemische bronnen van atomisme. 
In het concluderende hoofdstuk maak ik de balans op, vat ik de belangrijkste 
punten uit het proefschrift samen, reflecteer ik op de vraag hoe dit proefschrift 
bijdraagtaan ons begripvan zelfkennis, en zetik mogelijke lijnen uitvoor toekomstig 
onderzoek. 
4· Tot besluit 
Ik heb in dit proefschrift, met opzet, geen 'nieuwe' theorie van zelfkennis 
gemtroduceerd of verdedigd. Er zijn mijns inziens al genoeg theorieen van 
zelfkennis. Mijn hoop is de grenzen van atomistische, procedure-gerichte theorieen 
bloot te leggen en om een belangrijke impliciete aanname van het de bat zelf te 
bevragen. Ik heb beargumenteerd dat iedere plausibele theorie van zelfkennis 
holisme serieus moet nemen, omdat een plausibel verhaal over zelfkennis afhangt 
van hoe we tal van metafYsische, epistemologische, morele en metatheoretische 
vraagstukken beantwoorden. 
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